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Abstract 
The Bush administration, intent on regime change in Baghdad, wished to generate a 
new Iraq for the Iraqis, the region and the international community. Iraqis were 
emancipated from the despots in Baghdad and now have the opportunity for the first 
time to choose an elected government, whilst investment and confidence in the 
country's economy will build up slowly to make Iraq in the coming years an 
economically prosperous country. The fall of Saddam's regime affected regional 
security and politics in the same way as the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and 
Nicolae Ceausescu in December 1989 generated the start of new post cold war 
environment of democracy and economic prosperity. 2003 will be the year of putting 
Saddam's tyrannical legacy firmly into the past, and be the start of a new chapter in 
domestic and ethnic peace and regional security. 
The current divisions and disarray amongst the 1991 Gulf War allies over Iraq did not 
come about in a vacuum, and neither did the decision of the world's sole superpower, 
the United States, to drive to war with Iraq under the George W Bush administration's 
"pre-emptive" strikes policy. In fact my thesis illustrates that even though the tragic 
terrorist attacks of 9/11 played an important part in the psyche of the American 
administration, the root of the decision to go to war goes way before that date. Its 
roots stem from the failure and collapse of the comprehensive economic sanctions on 
Iraq. The thesis shows that the Arab region's political economy, as well of that of the 
international community, played a key role in the erosion of sanctions. The thesis 
addresses other central issues, such as the moral dilemma resulting from the years of 
sanctions, UNSCOM, and contradictions of U. S. /Iraq policy. It concludes that the 
United States, the main advocate behind comprehensive economic sanctions and 
regime change in Baghdad, had lost the ability to keep sanctions intact and sustainable. 
The United States could not obtain multilateral compliance with comprehensive 
economic sanctions on Iraq or even overthrow Saddam Hussein regime by sanctions 
alone. This produced a clash of interests and perceptions that led to acrimony with 
allies, who in turn became frustrated and threatened to block any efforts to re-energize 
sanctions through tightening border control on Saddam and through UNSCOM. Key 
regional and international actors resumed diplomatic, commercial, and cultural ties 
XT 
with Baghdad despite the United States' displeasure. When the Bush administration 
arrived in power, they saw that sanctions had in effect collapsed, and UNSCOM was 
not on the ground leaving Saddam inspection-free, while all efforts to topple him 
through a popular uprising or a silver bullet coup attempt failed. 
After 13 years had passed, and any efforts to persuade, contain or remove Saddam 
Hussein had failed. In such circumstances, the new American administration, 
recognizing that sanctions, weapons inspections, and the multilateral efforts at the UN 
could not be anymore effective to coerce, contain or remove Saddam Hussein, were 
left with two options: to accept a de-contained stronger Saddam Hussein back into the 
international community, or to remove him by a force. The very fact of using military 
force to remove Saddam Hussein and his regime from power proves the failure of the 
supposedly peaceful foreign policy tool called economic sanctions. 
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Part One 
c'. 
Chapter one 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The work is divided into three parts. Part I of the thesis will discuss the research 
into, and literature on, the use and utility of economic sanctions, and examine why 
the United States chose to employ economic sanctions. The rational behind 
sanctions as well as the oil-for-food dynamics is also examined. Part II, which is 
the core of this thesis, examines key issues that have led to the collapse of the 
comprehensive sanctions on Iraq. In this part, the regional and international 
factors will be explored in greater depth. Part III discusses other factors that led to 
the demise of comprehensive economic sanctions on Iraq. A moral crisis resulted 
from the humanitarian catastrophe attributable to sanctions. How the world public 
opinion responded to this is examined, notably its influence on sanctions. Finally 
the policy rifts among the allies is investigated as well as its implications on 
sanctions and how the world hindered US aims of getting unseating Saddam 
through tighter economic sanctions or military force. The impact of the failure of 
the multilateral comprehensive sanctions including the failure to tighten the 
sanctions effectively on Saddam through the smart sanctions initiative was 
unacceptable politically and strategically for the US administration after 9/11 who 
could not possibly afford to live with de-contained Iraq. In sum the US could not 
force political change through economic pressure in Iraq and could not bridge the 
differences in the Security Council with Iraq's friends inside the Council and the 
world at large. Therefore the United States attempted to subvert the UN and take 
the initiative to dislodge an ever increasingly de-contained Saddam. 
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1.1 Aims and objectives 
This thesis explains the connections between how the primacy of economics, 
commercial trade as well as strategic considerations affected the sanctions' 
regime. The work will show how Western countries traded with Iraq and pushed 
for more trade relations with Baghdad thus eliminating the logic and effectiveness 
behind the multilateral comprehensive economic sanctions. In other words, the 
thesis will assess the effectiveness of the international economic sanctions when 
implemented in an oil-rich country. Iraq, as we will see in this work, offers a 
fascinating example in that regard. 
Thus, this thesis aims to establish and develop an understanding of Iraq's relations 
with selected countries during the era of sanctions. For example, the work 
establishes that Saddam Hussein's regime was de-contained regionally due to 
Iraq's trade and strategic relations with its neighbourhood; also Iraq's increased 
trade relations with the West and the policy rifts and conflicting perceptions 
among Western allies helped greatly in the international de-containment of the 
regime. The impact of sanctions on the Iraqi regime was minimal compared to the 
catastrophic results on defenceless civilians. Saddam behaviour hardly changed 
instead he remained strongly entrenged in power and defiant to UN rules and US 
hegemony. Therefore this research aims to show the influencing factors behind 
the ineffectiveness of sanctions on Iraq. Regional and international trade interests, 
oil imperatives, and strategic considerations will be the major focus of this 
research. Thus, the work aims to identify and explore the different regional and 
international forces and variables that have impacted on the comprehensive 
sanctions regime towards Iraq from the start of the oil-for-food programme until 
the decision to go to war on 20th March 2003. 
4 
More specifically the work aims to show that the Arab world, along with many 
other nations, were busy reconstructing their diplomatic, cultural and economic 
relations with Baghdad, despite the United States' branding of the Iraqi regime as 
irredeemably vicious and one that must be changed in order for Iraq to rejoin the 
world community. This thesis shows how regional players and international actors 
allowed a sanctioned Iraq return to the world community in economic, cultural, 
strategic and political ways. It also aims to illustrates how comprehensive 
economic sanctions was successfully circumvented through re-establishing of 
regional trade ties, oil, smuggling, and other sanctions-busting methods which 
inevitably prompted business ties with Iraq and rendered the economic/political 
pressure of sanctions to a poor record and results. With this in mind, it can be 
argued that Iraq was sanctioned but in theory. 
The thesis aims to illustrate how key countries did not share any more an identical 
view on the logic of economic sanctions or even the threat posed by Iraq as seen 
by the American administrations. 
In a broader objective, through the Iraq case, the thesis aims to offer a case study 
in how the narrow national interests of key countries in the UN and the Middle 
East region supersede multilateral cooperation. The thesis aims to illustrate how 
key countries did not share any more an identical view on the logic of economic 
sanctions or even the threat posed by Iraq as seen by the American 
administrations. 
Even though disarmament of Iraq remained incomplete, and no democracy or 
respect for human rights emerged from Saddam's regime, the general loss of will 
among the international community and the emergence of a sympathetic 
influential friends for Iraq in the UN and the discontent of the worlds' public 
against the humanitarian effects of the economic sanctions have made the Security 
Council unable to reach a decision on Iraq or act on Saddam's clear defiance of 
UN laws. For a decade, the situation in the UN Security Council was reminiscent 
of the mid-1970s stalemate. This deep rift continued when France and Russia 
threatened to use their veto power at the Security Council in March 2003 to stop a 
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war aiming to unseat Saddam Hussein, pushing the US and UK to give up on the 
UN and proceed alone to overthrow and disarm Saddam. Thus, this thesis aims to 
establish that because of the poor records of sanctions and its erosion as the 
international community deepened their diplomatic, trade and cultural links with 
Iraq coupled with the dismantling of the regional siege on Saddam adding to that 
the sensitivity resulting after 9/11, in addition to the continues divisions inside the 
UN Security Council and its constant refusal to adopt a hard-line or even tighten 
the sanctions on Saddam, the war to unseat the dictator of Baghdad was 
inevitable. 
Moreover, the thesis aims to establish that other vital factors have also contributed 
in eroding the international economic sanctions such as the humanitarian crisis 
resulting from years of sanctions. NGO's and UN agencies pressure are also 
examined. In spite of the rhetoric, the final chapter aims to prove that American 
policy was unsuccessful in maintaining multilateral consensuses on sanctions or 
even re-containing Iraq in tighter box through the smart sanctions initiative. Thus 
in the case of Iraq the American policy were backfiring. 
Thus, the Iraq case is vital as a case study because the US learned that 
comprehensive international sanctions were unsustainable, and this gave the 
inception to the thought of restructuring a new sanctions regime in what was 
called smart sanctions or targeted sanctions. In other words, the US government 
however late recognized that comprehensive sanctions were ineffective to contain 
or dislodge Saddam. 
This work aims to overcome the shortcomings pertaining to the study of economic 
sanctions in general through taking Iraq as a significant case in point. This study 
would like to encourage international relations students and policymakers to think 
more deeply about the sanctions' ineffectiveness. No study pays attention to trade 
volumes or inter-Arab trade relations with Iraq during the sanctions' era. Another 
major factor of this work is the identification of some of Iraq's neighbours as 
major sanctions-busters, They opened their borders to trade and commerce in 
millions dollars with Iraq despite the theoretical existence of sanctions regime. No 
single study has looked at how regional trade undermined the sanctions' regime 
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and tied the regional countries to the economic well being of Iraq. Moreover, 
there is no academic study on trade relations between Iraq and Europe, including 
Russia. The aim is to bring this view into the discussions and academic debate on 
global political economy. A treatment of international sanctions is incomplete 
without full integration of relevant factors and major actors that have disturbed the 
sanctions mechanism and helped its ineffectiveness on Iraq. This thesis covers the 
most important part of these economic and political relations with Iraq in the era 
of sanctions. Thus, the thesis comes to fill an important gap in the study of 
economic sanctions. 
The people who advocated sanctions on Iraq forgot that many international and 
regional countries viewed Iraq's oil, potential market, domestic stability, and 
strategic location as very vital to their national interests and economies. The work 
will show to pro-sanctions policymakers that sanctioning comprehensively and for 
long periods a rich and strategic country under an entrenched authoritarian ruler is 
politically and economically unrealistic. 
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1.2 Hypothesis 
One of the main aims of the research is to challenge the conventional wisdom in 
the policy and scholarly communities about economic sanctions. This being; 
That Iraq's sanctions were a success story in terms of containing Saddam 
Hussein inside his box keeping him isolated politically and economically 
because economic sanctions severely isolated his regime regionally and 
internationally. 
The thesis will establish the following: 
1) That Iraq's oil resources and the oil-for-food deal was the seed for the 
economic sanctions collapse. The oil-for-food agreement paved the way 
for normalization of trade with Iraq, gave Iraq access to its old business 
network and the wider international commercial and oil market, It also 
created a business lobby for Iraq especially in the Arab world, Russia and 
Europe for the lifting of sanctions in order to implement contracts. The 
programme also helped to erode the international political consensus that 
was in existence during the Gulf War of 1991. Thus, the growth of the 
legitimate trade under that programme fostered also illegal trade and 
commercial contacts including smuggling of oil and equipments forbidden 
under the UN sanctions regime. A significant number of major firms 
traded with Iraq in the era of sanctions. Some private companies and 
individual businessmen disregarded sanctions and traded with Iraq through 
the extremely porous borders of Syria, Turkey, Iran, Jordan and even 
Saudi Arabia. Implicitly and sometimes explicitly the neighbours of Iraq 
turned a blind eye to these illegal trades due to their own political agenda 
and policy at the time. When the oil-for-food programme was inadequate 
for their bilateral trade with Iraq, many regional nations just allowed 
illegal trade and smuggling to take place and refused to place UN monitors 
on their borders, Syria was a notable case in point. 
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2) Three kinds of factors impacted the evolution of the sanctions regime and 
its consequences: economic, humanitarian, and strategic. These factors 
worked at two levels: regional and international and rendered the sanctions 
regime and the logic behind it ineffective. 
3) That the Arab world broke the regional economic sanctions for economic, 
strategic, and cultural reasons. The Palestinian Intifada helped accelerate 
Iraq's integration with Arab world. The Arab dimension helped to leave 
Saddam regionally powerful with porous borders. 
4) That the international community traded, negotiated, and opened 
diplomatic ties with Baghdad despite American displeasure. This helped 
break international sanctions, stripping them of their economic and 
political logic and effectiveness. 
The regional factor was essential and had the direct impact on the sanctions 
regime. Without the regional states full cooperation on sanctions, the sanctions net 
on Saddam was loose, the borders extremely porous, and the embargo 
unsustainable. The international factor comes second as it means that Saddam 
regime was rehabilitated into the world economy. Iraq under the oil-for-food 
programme was allowed to sell unlimited amount of oil and trade with many 
nations including major nations with veto powers in the Security Council such as 
France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and China. The oil-for-food deal allowed 
Iraq to re-enter the global oil market, attract and entangle world business 
community in Iraq's present and potential market, re-established old business 
networks around the world, and created a powerful lobby for Saddam among the 
permanent five nations on the Security Council. 
Therefore, a different regional and international perception on economic security 
existed, regarding the use of power politics, and other strategic issues. Economic 
interests overlapped between allies especially as Europe, Russia, Asia and the 
Arab nations got the bulk of the present and potential lucrative commercial and oil 
contracts in Iraq during the Saddam era. 
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All these factors together helped collapse the sanctions regime and undermined its 
logic. In addition sanctions generated an international moral humanitarian 
dilemma. This all left America under the Bush administration with two policy 
options, live with unsanctioned Saddam or overthrow his rule. 
1.3 Methodology 
Why a new study of sanctions against Iraq? We have seen many Western 
perspectives on this timely topic. However, most were sympathetic to ordinary 
Iraqis in terms of the negative humanitarian effects resulting from the years of 
sanctions. Most researchers focused on the suffering of people under the siege of 
sanctions and were calling for more targeted sanctions. They criticised the 
American stance on sanctions and regime change, and blamed them solely for the 
humanitarian crisis in Iraq, which these writers have seen as being responsible for 
the collapse of sanctions. Other books focused on Iraq's history since the 
overthrow of the monarchy in 1958. There is now a great deal of material on this 
subject available. Hardly any popular or scholarly book or research attempted to 
study the political economy of sanctions as the core factor or indicator behind the 
collapse of sanctions and the drive to war with Iraq in March 2003. While this 
research does not deny that the moral and humanitarian issue constitutes a factor 
in the overall collapse of sanctions, the author has purposely concentrated on 
other factors as the prime causes for sanctions' collapse. The author believes that 
the greatest unexplored area in previous literature was how regional and 
international politics and economy helped destroy the logic behind sanctions, and 
constrained US policy to the extent they had to remove Saddam from power 
unilaterally without a clear UN mandate or public legitimacy. Any research on the 
Iraq sanctions and political economy is bound to be incomplete without the 
exploration of these vital areas. Thus this study attempts to fill these gaps in the 
story of economic sanctions, to provide a fuller, more convincing picture of the 
situation that led to the collapse of sanctions and the subsequent war than that 
given in previous studies the author employed a set of sources in relation with 
topic. 
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The chosen methodology centred around the collection of primary data, and 
relevant secondary literature on inter-Arab politics, inter-Arab trade, international 
political economy, oil, and international relations. 
Personal observations based on private interviews were added on the issue of 
regional and international relations with Iraq. Off-the-record discussions with 
businessmen from various states sometimes revealed impressions and perspectives 
on the issue of sanctions and trade with Iraq. They did not want to be named 
directly and I respected that wish. However I quoted some as anonymous sources 
and used some information from these discussions as background in this research. 
As a Dutch citizen from Iraqi origin and coming from a business family that has 
contributed greatly to Dutch companies in Iraq and eventually Dutch economy 
since the 1970's, this research benefited from my firsthand knowledge in indirect 
and direct ways from this personal experience. The author has advised Dutch 
businessmen on their dealings with Iraq under the "oil-for-food" deal, as well as 
advising the EVD (The Netherlands Foreign Trade Agency) -which is part of the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs- on Iraq. Moreover, my multicultural background 
also benefited this thesis turning into the first scholarly work on sanctions by a 
Dutch author of Iraqi origin. 
The author did not rely on one source of information and checked facts with more 
than one source. The author carried out a substantial amount of research on the 
topic. This included careful review of secondary literature from very recent books 
on the theory of economic sanctions, its many case studies as well as that of Iraq. 
Arabic sources such as Al-Hayat Arabic daily and Al-Jazeera. net were also used. 
In the absence of a reliable body of knowledge on this topic, in order to create a 
rich and multi-sourced research filled with primary data, this research also 
obtained its empirical information from United Nations documents, ETU, OPEC, 
BP Statistics, MEED, MEES, UNICEF, WHO, FAO, the Netherlands foreign 
trade agency (EVD), and the Jordan Central Bank. 
The author found Jordan to be very transparent country therefore it was easy to 
obtain data on its trade volume with Iraq during the sanctions era as well. 
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However, Turkey, Syria, UAE, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the rest did not clearly 
declared their official statistics on their trade volume with Iraq during the 
sanctions era. 
The author used other information from other Arabic newspapers, magazines, and 
news agencies as a means of supporting the primary data. The author believes that 
Al-Hayat and Al-Jazeera were sources worthy of documentation as they have an 
international reputation for professional and reliable reporting. Moreover, there 
are hardly any books in Arabic on the topic of political economy of sanctions and 
most books in Arabic have focused on the humanitarian tragedy of sanctions. 
Consequently, they have not been very helpful for this research. The author did 
however review many Iraqi newspapers. 
The research explored and used information including breaking news on the 
commercial and political situation in Iraq from reputable news agencies such as 
Reuters, Associated Press (AP), Agence France-Presse (AFP), BBC News Online, 
and CNN News Online. Respected journals were also used for this research such 
as International Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and Middle East Policy, Human Rights 
Quarterly. International Newspapers such as Jordan Times, Gulf News, 
International Herald Tribune, the Guardian, Times, New York Times and the 
Washington Post provided me with valuable analysis, and data. Policy briefs and 
analysis from major Western think tanks were also used in this study. 
It must be emphasized, that this study is not meant to be a concise history of Iraq 
or sanctions. The methodology chosen is rooted in political economy: the 
relationship between economics and the state. That is why the author refrained 
from including overly detailed historical material in this research. 
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1.4 Scope of the study 
The first chapter in part II explores and shows key Arab states' political and 
economic relations with Iraq in the sanctions' era. At the same time, it 
encompasses a chapter on Iraq's relations in a global context, exploring and 
studying various key international countries economic and political relations with 
Iraq in the era of sanctions. These chapters also illustrate various countries' 
foreign policy on Iraq during the sanctions. These two chapters are essential for 
producing a strong understanding of how the regional and global context affected 
the sanctions' regime and helped directly in its demise. These chapters also show 
how the international dimension, and specifically, the policies of these states, Iraq 
changed towards more trade and interactions with Iraq despite the continuance of 
Saddam in power and his defiance of UN Resolutions. 
Having discussed the regional and global political economy machinery and its 
effects on the international sanctions on the case of Iraq, the thesis then turns to 
other factors that led to the demise of comprehensive economic sanctions on Iraq. 
Chapter 6 examines how moral tension inside the UN and the influence of NGO's 
and UN agencies pushed towards the gradual easing of sanctions, stripping them 
of their credibility and political effectiveness. In sum, it also considers how that 
moral crisis managed to develop a human rights' lobby for Iraq against sanctions. 
The final chapter looks at how the United States policies were challenged by Iraq 
and its friends in the UN from the smart sanctions initiative till the beginning of 
the war that brought Saddam's downfall. This chapter will also discuss how the 
tragic events of 9/11 affected United States' Iraq policy, linking how Iraq's new 
found relations during the sanctions era with key countries like France, Germany, 
Russia and the Arab world acted as a major political obstacle and diplomatic 
embarrassment to United States new policy of pre-emptive strike against Iraq. The 
global challenge to American Iraq-policy helped Saddam during the sanctions era 
and tried to exert political pressure on the United States to halt its attempts to 
overthrow the Saddam Hussein regime. 
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Each chapter contained in this work contributes to show how the fences of 
comprehensive international economic sanctions were overcome and eroded. The 
motivations, reasons and factors that made and helped that happen are all 
considered. 
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Chapter two 
Is 
2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON ECONOMIC 
SANCTIONS 
Foreign Policy makers call it the best option between military conflict and 
engagement diplomacy, the business community argue that they exert a big 
economic toll as they deny businesses access to markets whilst placing those 
businesses in a disadvantaged position vis-a-via their competitors, while human 
rights organizations say they are morally wrong because they lead to death and 
humiliation of non-target actors. Economic sanctions have been around for very 
long time, but in the Post-Cold War era, economic sanctions got more popular 
than ever. Previously, sanctions were hindered by the threat of the powerful USSR 
veto at the UN Security Council. Sanctions reduce countries to starvation, denied 
the very essentials to survive, i. e. clean water, food, and electricity, trying to 
reduce the entire population to an impoverished state to push them to up rise 
against the targeted enemy government. President Woodrow Wilson described it 
"... No, not war but something more tremendous than war. Apply this economic, 
peaceful, silent deadly remedy and there will be no need for force. The boycott is 
what is substituted for war. "' 
This section will discuss theoretical aspects of this powerful non-military foreign 
policy tool. What are economic sanctions? In what circumstances can economic 
sanctions be effective? Why do they fail? Why has nations continued this policy? 
This section will investigate the role, efficacy and limitations of economic 
sanctions in the international community today keeping in mind the case central 
case of this thesis, Iraq, 
1 Quoted in Geoff Simons The Scourging of Iraq: Sanctions. Law and Natural Justice (Macmillan 
Press, 1996), p. 33. 
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2.1 Definition of sanctions 
Richard Haass described sanctions as "predominantly economic but also political 
and military penalties amid at a state or other entities to alter political and /or 
military behaviour. " He added, "The tactical purpose of a given sanction can be to 
deter, coerce, signal, and/or punish. "2 
Judith S. Yaphe takes a simplified look at what sanctions are all about, 
commenting that they "initially were seen as a way to influence, shape, or modify 
the behaviour of a wayward state much the same way parents deal with a 
wayward child-you will not develop and use weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD), you will not frighten or invade your neighbour, you will not terrorize or 
oppress your people or any other people. "3 
While Adam Winkler gave a more realistic definition to economic sanctions as he 
identified it as a set of restrictions and rules aimed at hindering or terminating 
trade with a target nations "Economic sanctions are limitations on trade or access 
to markets enacted to encourage a target nation to behave in a way preferred by 
the sanctioning nations. "a 
Daoudi and Dajani defined sanctions as "actions initiated by one or more 
international actors (the `senders') against one or more others (the' targets') with 
either or both of two purposes: to punish the targets by depriving them of some 
value and/or to make the `targets' comply with certain norms the senders deem 
important, "5 
Similarly, in their contribution on economic sanctions, Gary Hufbauer and Jeffrey 
Schott defined the foreign policy tool as: "the deliberate government inspired 
2 Richard N. Haass (ed) Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy (Council on Foreign 
Relations, 1998), p. l. 
3 Judith S. Yaphe "Iraq: The Exception to the Rule" The Washington Ouarterly Winter 2001 
126. 
Adam Winkler "Just sanctions" Human RightsOuarterly 1999, vol. 21, p. 136. 
M. S. Daoudi and M. S. Dajani Economic Sanctions: Ideals and Experience (Routledge, 1983), 
p. 7. 
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withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of `customary' trade or financial relations, " 
which can be used to coerce problematic states. 
6 
Geoff Simons takes a harder stance when defining sanctions, calling them a form 
of punishment and humiliation to humanity, as sanctions for him "is generally 
intended to serve as a form for punishment, a practical signal that the targeted 
state is manifestly derelict in its ethical or legal behaviour. Here there is the 
obvious question of who is to judge. The much-quoted Juvenal question quis 
custodiet ipsos custodies? ('who will guard the guardians? ') can be recast to 
highlight the problem of establishing the authority behind the imposition of a 
sanctions regime: quis iudicabit ipsos iudices? (` who will judge the judges? ). In 
the event the effective authority derives from power, rather than from any 
unassailable ethical status. States may act in concert through international bodies 
or unilaterally. In all cases 'sanctions' is virtually synonymous with 'punitive 
0 sanction'. 
Certainly his definition of sanctions deserves attention as it offers more careful 
analysis of what is economic 'sanctions as well as it is strikingly different in terms 
of depth from that given by other authors. Simon identified four major elements of 
economic sanctions. The four elements are boycott; embargo; sanction; and 
quarantine. He concluded that all these terminology for economic sanctions were 
nothing but punishment and warfare against innocent civilians. The differences in 
terminology was explained by Simon "A boycott is generally recognised as an 
action designed to achieve the economic or social isolation of an individual, group 
or nation to express disapproval, to coerce change, or to function as a supplement 
to a military campaign. This from Captain Charles Boycott, and English estate 
manager in Mayo, Ireland, whose ruthless rent-collection policies in the 1880s so 
enraged the impoverished Irish tenants that they refused to harvest crops for him. 
Thus a boycott is typically seen as a concerted campaign of social or economic 
non-intercourse as a means of expressing disapproval or applying coercion. It is 
6 Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: history and Current 
oi (Institute for International Economics, 1985), p. 2. 
7 Geoff Simons Imposing Economic Sanctions: Legal Remedy or Genocidal Tool? (Pluto Press, 
1999), p. 9-10. 
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used as a policy in international relations, regarded (according to taste) as a 
synonym for 'embargo or as distinct from this term. There are many historical 
examples of international boycotts; for example, the American refusal to buy 
British goods after the enactment of the Stamp Act of 1765, the refusal of the 
Chinese to buy United States products in 1905 because of the racist US 
immigration policies, and the Arab League's compilation of Israel-friendly 
foreign companies with which Arab trade is forbidden. The boycott need not be 
primarily economic (as with the US boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games in 
1980 and the reciprocal Soviet boycott of the Los Angeles Games in 1984). " 
The author added, "An embargo (Spanish, embargar, Latin, imbarricare from 
barra, 'bar) is depicted in international law as a ban on the movement of goods to 
a foreign country by land, sea or air. The embargo is said to be 'hostile where the 
property of a foreign state is detained- for return if no war occurs and for 
forfeiture in the event of war; and 'civil' when domestic ships are prohibited from 
transporting goods to foreign territory. Embargoes can be used for many purposes; 
for example, to aid a war effort, to coerce another state, and to support domestic 
commercial activity by preventing scarce resources from leaving the country. The 
US Embargo Act of 1807, a famous example, was enacted to protect American 
shipping at a time when the British were blockading Napoleonic France and its 
allies and so impeding American efforts to trade with a belligerent in non- 
contraband goods. President Thomas Jefferson believed that the British need for 
American food and raw materials would force respect for US neutrality, but the 
embargo was opposed by American force and other commercial interests. In 1809 
the Embargo Act was replaced by the Non-intercourse Act, which allowed trade 
with some European countries. " 
Then the author discussed the third element and that is sanction, in which he 
defined "A sanction (French, sanction; Latin, sanctio from sancrire, to render 
sacred or inviolable'), in international affairs, is a penalty imposed against a 
nation to coerce it into compliance with international law or to compel an 
alteration in its policies in some other respect. Originally an ecclesiastical decree, 
a 'sanction' may be considered to have an ethical component, encouraging moral 
action or serving to validate a moral judgement. Economic sanctions were 
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imposed by the League of Nations and subsequently by the United Nations in 
many different contexts; and powerful nations, particularly the United States, have 
found them a helpful unilateral tool of foreign policy. Where a state is relatively 
weak it is usually unable to mount an effective challenge against internationally 
mandated sanctions or analogous economic measures introduced unilaterally by 
powerful country. " 
The author elaborated -"Attempts to indicate the various elements of sanctions 
show the diverse ways in which economic pressure can be brought to bear against 
a targeted state. Some of the measures may require legislation, intended to have 
domestic or international affect; others may not. For example, conventional 
definitions imply that boycott does not necessarily have the force of law, 
signalling no more than a form of ostracism conducted on a private rather than a 
legislative basis. The boycott is often seen as a retaliatory act, instituted by 
government or private interest and intended to encourage other bodies to follow 
suit. Embargo, characteristically carrying the force of law, is a stronger measure 
typically implemented in time of war or threatened hostilities. "8 
Economic sanctions on Iraq incorporated many of Simon's points from boycott, 
embargo, and the sanctions. Iraq suffered severe and comprehensive forms of 
economic sanctions ranging from boycotts of its sports teams and cultural 
activities to imposing diplomatic and economic sanctions on it. But later Iraq 
gradually circumvented all these barriers and managed to trade and interacts with 
the international community despite the theoretical existence of economic 
sanctions however this point was ignored by Simon's work on sanctions 
Simon addressed the issue of economic sanctions from a moral perspective 
categorising economic sanctions to be morally unacceptable and unjustifiable 
instrument of foreign policy as it inflict an international suffering and harm upon 
the citizens of sovereign countries. 
S Geoff Simons Imposing Economic-Sanctions: Legal Remedy or Genocidal Tool? (Pluto Press, Remedy 
p. 8-9. 
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George E. Shambaugh presented another analysis and definition on sanctions: 
"Economic sanctions present a stark intellectual puzzle to students of international 
politics, Though often maligned, misused, and misunderstood, they stand as the 
policy tool of choice against foe, friends, and firm. Indeed, the United States has 
imposed sanctions against other countries nearly seventy-five times in the past 
five years-more than half the total instances in which sanctions have been 
imposed against other countries since World War II. The stated purposes for 
imposing these sanctions have varied widely. They includes discouraging the 
proliferation of weapons and strategic goods, as well as punishing countries for 
perceived violations of human rights and religious freedom, terrorism, drug 
trafficking, and violations against the environment. "9 He defined sanctions as "an 
economic penalty or cost that is imposed by a sender on a designated target, 
regardless of the particular form that it takes or the ends that it serves, " while he 
sees economic incentives as "an economic reward or benefit that is bestowed by 
the sender to the target. " He conceded, "While scholars and policy analysts 
disagree about the types of goals that economic sanctions and incentives can be 
expected to achieve and, consequently, the criteria against which to evaluate their 
effectiveness, there is a general consensus that their overall success rate is low. "0 
Thus one can conclude that there was near-unanimity among scholars and policy 
makers that economic sanctions are a tool to punish a target country and extract 
'full compliance along the lines of the sender country's vital national interests, and 
that their role was transformed after the collapse of communism. Thus, economic 
sanctions are used to influence and change behaviour. Although many historic 
uses of sanctions can be found in cases like in the ancient Greece with the 
Megarian decree, to the American colonies boycotting English goods and the 
examples are many, the dramatic increase in use of sanctions in international 
relations can be traced to the end of the Cold War, 
9 George E. Shambaugh States. Firms. Successful S 'o s Forcien 
'. ý10 y (State University of New York Press, 1999), p. 1. 10 Ibid., p. 4. 
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2.2 Why economic sanctions in foreign policy? 
Franklin Lavin, the executive director of the Asia Pacific Policy Center in 
Washington, explained why sanctions were so appealing to foreign policymakers: 
"The economic role of foreign policy continues to attract considerable interest, 
Woodrow Wilson summed up the appeal of economic sanctions, stating that they 
are an `economic, peaceful, silent, deadly enemy. ' First, the use of economic 
policy to advance foreign policy goals is perceived to be cost free, or at least low 
cost. Second, it is less brutal and thus more acceptable than military conflict. 
Third, it is a normal human desire to want to be aware of the moral consequences 
and propriety of one's actions. " 
In a fascinating fashion, Lavin divided economic sanctions into two major schools 
of thought. The first he called Oxygen and the second he named Asphyxiation. 
Under the Oxygen school of thought, "economic policy can reduce trade barriers 
such as tariffs and quotas and adopt more active measures such as loans, credits, 
trade and investment missions, and foreign aid. " The Asphyxiation strategy 
included "impeding exports to, or imports from, the targeted country and 
restricting financial flows. "' 1 
The Oxygen strategy, according to Lavin, argued, "That greater economic activity 
will lead to positive political consequences. " This view was widely held in and 
attempted by Europe where they strongly believed that economic power; trade, 
investment, and growth can lead to positive changes within the targeted society 
and the leadership behaviour as they see the economic improvements and rewards. 
This school of thought encouraged European and Arab trade, diplomatic ties, and 
cultural interactions with Baghdad. 
However, the other school, the Asphyxiation, strongly believed in economic 
sanctions and using trade as a punishment tool. Lavin explained this school of 
thoughts in four points: "First, attaching an economic cost to bad behaviour acts 
Franklin L. Lavin "Asphyxiation or Oxygen? The Sanctions Dilemma", Foreign Policy, Fall 
1996,104, p. 140. 
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as a disincentive. Second, the economic cost of sanctions can directly ameliorate 
the problem by limiting the government's capacity to engage in the offending 
practices. " Lavin added, "Third, if pushed to extremes, economic sanctions could 
even topple a government through mass discontent or unhappiness within a 
leadership faction, thereby ending the bad behaviour. " This clearly did not happen 
in Iraq for the past 12 years of economic sanctions and especially not in the most 
comprehensive early years of them. Lavin went on to highlight the fourth point 
"asphyxiation has a certain appeal over oxygen because it is an active step, while 
oxygen is essentially passive. If governments need to demonstrate they are `doing 
something, ' then asphyxiation fits the bill. "12 
Lavin gave examples of successes and failures according to how the two schools 
viewed it. Naturally the Asphyxiation side and its scholars tended to highlight 
"the Reagan administration's determination in restricting the Soviet Union's 
access to international funding as a factor that exacerbated its economic problems. 
In the end, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev had to come to terms with the West, 
this theory holds, because he had no economic option except to reduce military 
expenditures. " Lavin pointed out that "South Africa is also held up as an example 
of government against which sanctions were used successfully. After years of 
economic stagnation, the South African business establishment realized that 
apartheid was increasingly untenable and that their prospects for preserving their 
position lay in changing the status quo rather than preserving it. They shifted to 
favouring majority rule not so much from a democratic impulse but so that the 
boycott would be ended. "' 3 
However, the Oxygen school of thought contests these findings, claiming that 
other examples proved that economic sanctions were not necessary to achieve the 
desired foreign policy goals instead economic ties can work better. Lavin stated 
"In the Oxygen camp, most analysts of South Korea and Taiwan conclude that 
their moves toward democracy and a Western-style human rights standard were 
facilitated by their prosperity in the 1980s. The autocratic leadership in these two 
countries could relax political controls with a fair amount of confidence in 
t2Ibid., pp. 141-142. 13 Ibid., p. 142. 
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continued domestic stability as the countries were enjoying substantial economic 
success. Economic growth promoted the establishment of an educated middle 
class that sought and received more political freedoms. " That camp also pointed 
out to another example of sanctions' failure: "Economic sanctions against Cuba 
have existed as long as the 37-year-old Castro regime, yet Fidel Castro remains 
unchallenged. " Lavin cited another example highlighted by that camp: "The East 
European country that interacted most frequently with the West was East 
Germany because of its special relationship with West Germany. West Germany's 
Ostpolitik employed a deliberate policy of economic engagement, or 
Osthandel, 904 
An interesting point was made by Adam Winkler who compared and contrasted 
the use of economic sanctions to that of warfare "Although sanctions may be 
similar to war in some ways, the differences between them have led to the 
increasing use of the former. Warfare has lost much of its attractiveness as a 
means of pursuing international objectives, particularly in the West. The reasons 
for this are multifaceted, but three factors deserve special attention. First, there is 
popular awareness of the human cost of modern warfare. On account of the mass 
media's coverage of warfare in the last half of this century-from Algeria to 
Vietnam to the former Yugoslavia-familiarity with the "face of battle" extends 
far beyond the battlefields themselves, " Winkler added "In contrast to the horror 
and savagery of modern war, sanctions offer an approach to international coercion 
that sheds no immediate blood and causes fewer dramatic casualties. "ts The Iraq 
experience with sanctions resulted in many sufferings among the children, women 
and elderly and was in many ways a silent warfare that added to the agony of the 
Iraqis who went out from an Iran-Iraq war and the Second Gulf War (1991) 
destructions. Moreover, this silent weapon may have been the preferred weapons 
of the Clinton administration but the George W Bush administration did not 
believe that sanctions were doing its job in containing or removing the threat of 
Saddam. The frustration and failure resulting from the Iraq experience of 
sanctions made this economic and diplomatic tool not desirable strategic measure 
for the Republican decision makers in Washington. Sanctions as a policy tool 
t4 Ibid., p. 143. 15 Adam Winkler "lust sanctions" Human Rights Quarterly 1999, vol. 21, p. 136. I37. 
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failed to enforce the containment of Saddam and thus were not effective or useful 
in advancing US interests. Thus they choose military force and the commitment of 
American troops on the ground to that of economic sanctions. This was a clear 
indication that sanctions on Iraq had failed. 
Winkler second's factor behind the increased use of economic sanctions was 
linked to globalisation and the global economic interdependence "A second 
reason for the rise of sanctions is the development of the international economy, 
the growth of which has exposed new vulnerabilities of nations. " He added " The 
interdependence of the international economy means that even the developing 
countries rely heavily upon international trade to supply raw material and 
technological resources. Economic interdependence has made the restriction of 
trade a more viable method of achieving foreign policy objectives. If one state- 
or several together-has a vital role in another's economy, it can use its economic 
leverage to attempt to bring about conformity to its interests. " 16 In addition to 
these two reasons, Winkler believed that the third factor behind the excessive use 
of economic sanctions was "the end of Cold War, which has created further 
vulnerabilities to economic coercion. " 17 
16 Ibid., p. 137. 17 Ibid., p. 13ß. 
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2.3 The effectiveness of sanctions and their consequences 
Lavin highlighted two important requirements to make sanctions an effective tool 
in reaching foreign policy objectives: "Two core determinants of sufficiency are 
geography and alliance solidarity. A country that is landlocked or has few 
neighbours will be more vulnerable than one that is littoral or extensive. 
Geography is a given; solidarity is dependent on allies sharing the same 
perception of a problem and the same prescription. Otherwise, countries will 
agree to subscribe to the proposed economic sanctions only when the costs are so 
low as to make their participation essentially symbolic. "18 As will be proved in 
part two of this thesis, the main vital requirement stated by Lavin was not there to 
support US policymakers with the Iraq issue. Iraq is not a fully landlocked 
country as it has a narrow yet very important harbour on the Persian Gulf. It also 
has six neighbours with porous borders, and the allies were divided concerning 
the Iraq issue. In addition, the cost in terms of trade, oil, and human were high for 
many countries to just continue sanctions against Iraq indefinitely, as America had 
hoped. 
From that outlook, Lavin raised vital questions on the theory and utility of 
economic sanctions. "Will the target country be hurt more than the implementer 
or the implementing alliance? " he asked. No doubt that one of the reasons the 
world started to trade with Iraq was to secure and continue its commercial vital 
interests which sanctions were hurting. Here, the implementer was economically 
hurt, as their companies were disadvantaged in forgone profit and trade contracts. 
Lavin explained: "In order to deprive the target country of $1 million worth of 
petroleum, it could cost the implementer $1 million foregone profits. 
Economically sanctions can hurt the target country less than the implementing 
country. When the United States imposed a grain embargo on the Soviet Union in 
1980, the Soviet easily found other suppliers, but the United States found no 
alternative buyers. " Lavin significantly pointed out that: "Disrupting trade hurts 
all of the target country's trading partners as well. It is easy for the United States 
Franklin L. Lavin "Asphyxiation or Oxygen? The Sanctions Dilemma", Foreign Policy, Fall 
1996,104, p. 144. 
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to support an economic blockade against Serbia, but it was much more difficult 
for the neighbouring states of Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary or Romania to do so. 
Yet without their support the blockade is meaningless. "19 This point is important. 
The thesis will clearly show in part two that Iraq's neighbours could not carry on 
with sanctions against their national and commercial interests. Thus, this vital 
point allowed Saddam to break through the most important part of the sanctions 
blockade, the regional sanctions. 
Lavin accurately concluded that, "Core issues of sovereignty cannot be addressed 
successfully by sanctions. What country would choose national humiliation over 
economic hardship? Since even seemingly minor issues---a fishing dispute, for 
example-can be perceived as a test of the sovereignty and integrity of a 
government, sanctions must be implemented in such a way as to not back the 
target country into a corner. Presentation becomes important so as to ensure that 
the threat of sanctions is not perceived as a challenge to a country's sovereign 
integrity. Particularly, political sensitivities make sanctions a more effective tool 
in dealing with friendly countries than with unfriendly ones, for with the former 
there is no issue of sovereignty at stake. The prospect of sanctions can be held out 
with regret, and not as a threat. 9920 This was an issue of contention between Iraq 
and the Arab world from one side and the US and UN from the other side, 
concerning the weapons' inspections crisis; where Iraq used the sovereignty 
pretext to hide its weapons and programmes from the Americans and the UN, 
while America worked hard to eliminate and find Saddam's weapons yet still used 
the issue to humiliate Saddam and Iraq's sovereignty. This led to diplomatic 
moves by various forces in the UN in order to solve the crisis, but this resulted in 
UNSCOM losing power and being dismantled, while Saddam's weapons 
remained unchecked and not completely found. 
The problems with economic sanctions were highlighted clearly by Cortright and 
Lopez. While Lavin highlighted both side of the arguments on sanctions, 
Cortright and Lopez believes that sanctions had more disadvantages than 
advantages. Many of what they highlighted can be clearly seen in the Iraq 
19 Ibid., pp. 145-146. 20 Ibid., p. 147. 
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experience with sanctions. First, they stressed that "The economic success of 
sanctions does not guarantee political success. " They conceded: "to the dismay of 
decision-makers, economic strangulation did not automatically or consistently 
lead to political compliance. " This can be seen in Iraq. Sanctions did not remove 
Saddam from power or even push him to change his behaviour. He remained 
defiant to UN rules and US power. They accurately stressed that: "Some nations 
began to understand sanctions as instruments of punishment and retribution rather 
than as tools of diplomatic persuasion, which generated cynicism and further 
criticism of sanctions as a policy instruments. " This was an implicit criticism on 
American foreign policy which did not wish to compromise with Iraq or even 
offer a reward for any possible Iraqi compliance, which in turn created a division 
and generated criticism from US allies who believed in compromise and 
diplomacy as an instrument that goes along with sanctions. They maintained that 
"it was clear that sanctions carried with them the potential for bitter irony: often 
imposed to prevent human rights abuse and lawlessness, sanctions sometimes 
strengthened the centralized control of repressive regimes. At times they also 
disempowered those who were opposing from within policies that were being 
subject to isolation from without. " 21 Indeed, sanctions strengthened Saddam 
domestically and even regionally as it presented him as the victim of "imperialist" 
policy to weaken Iraq in particular and the Arabs in general. 
Sanctions triggered nationalism-instead of a rebellion against Saddam's regime- 
among the Iraqis, as they were made to believe that the UN weapons inspectors 
were in Iraq to delay the lifting of the economic sanctions that had become the 
source of their daily suffering and agony. Many Iraqis were caught between 
Saddam's brutality and sanctions' hardship. One such Iraqi, a university professor 
who earned a degree in international relations at Britain's Reading University 
echoed what almost all Iraqis inside Iraq felt of sanctions: "The embargo is the 
most humiliating thing. I'm a university professor. I have a PhD. How can I be 
neutral towards America when every month I have to go and get my food rations 
to feed my kids? " He added "We've been eating lentils and beans for 12 years 
2 Lloyd Axworthy, Foreword, to David Cortright & George A Lopez The Sanctions Decade: 
Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s. (Lynne Rienner, 2000), pp, 3-4. 
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now. Life should not be like that. s22 The state controls the goods, thus the people 
became dependent on the state, while the Iraqi middle class was destroyed and 
brought to poverty. Scarcity was rampant while the state controlled the oil and the 
distribution of goods and food. A government that is not entitled by taxation and 
elections like in the West to its subjects -does not need its people and does not 
fear them too. Saddam exploited sanctions and the weakening of the Iraqis' 
economic situation to his advantage to maintain and exploit political control and 
power. 
The second problem seen by Cortright and Lopez was that: "The United Nations 
system lacks the ability to administer sanctions. " They asserted: "In an era of 
financial constraint at the UN, the Security Council and its sanctions committees 
lacked sufficient resources to evaluate and implement sanctions. s23 
The authors accurately stated the third vital point: "There are tensions between the 
goals of the Security Council and those of members of states. " They clearly 
highlighted that: "The history of the Iraqi and Libyan cases in particular reflects 
tensions between UN objectives and those of major states like the United States 
and Great Britain. A related concern is the manner which major states tend to 
`move the goalposts' regarding criteria for the removal of sanctions once a 
Security Council Resolution is in place. The letter of the law, as imbedded in the 
text of Resolutions, loses prominence, while the most powerful states, especially 
the United States, interpret the spirit of the Resolutions to meet their own 
"24 particular interests. 
"The available evidence suggests that sanctions by themselves are seldom able to 
achieve major policy changes in a targeted regime, " the authors claimed. They 
added: "The more ambitious the instrumental objectives, the less likely that 
sanctions by themselves will be able to achieve these goals. "25 They indicated: "if 
the goals are more modest, especially if they are used to bring the targeted regime 
22 Reuters 25 February 2003. 
23 Cortright and Lopez (2000), p. 5. 24Ibid., p. 6. 
25 Ibid., p. 17. 
29 
to the bargaining table, the prospects for success are greater. "26 Their studies 
stated that economic pain does not result in political or street revolution against 
the targeted government. They pointed out clearly that economic strangulation did 
not necessarily result in political impact: "There is no assurance that a sanctioned 
population will redirect the pain of external coercion onto political leaders and 
force a change in policy, especially with the authoritarian or dictatorial regimes 
that are the usual targets of sanctions. When civilian populations are terrorized 
and lack basic democratic rights, they have few means of influencing government 
policy. On the contrary, they are more likely to be victimized by sanctions. "27 The 
Iraq experience clearly showed that. No significance uprising, military coup, or a 
mass revolution-that threatened the power base of Saddam or his two sons-took 
place in Iraq during the sanctions era (1991-2003) as a direct result of sanctions 
suffering or frustrations. Instead Iraqi's remained powerless and their energy 
consumed by the daily hardship of sanctions and the brutality of the regime in 
Baghdad. 
Tim Niblock highlighted an important drawback of economic sanctions, which 
was ignored by Richard Haass, and which Part Three of this thesis also deals with, 
the humanitarian issues: 
Attitudes towards sanctions are clearly conditioned by perception of 
the current global order. The Western powers that have orchestrated 
the imposition of UN sanctions portray sanctions as the instruments 
through which a peaceful world order can be built, where 
transgressions of international law are punished through the channels 
of international institutions. States that are the targets of sanctions, 
however, are able to mobilize a good portion of international opinion 
to their side by portraying a different perception, wherein sanctions are 
an instrument to establish and maintain the new Western hegemony 
and international institutions are used to provide a cover for the pursuit 
of Western (particularly US) interests... Resistance to sanctions, within 
the perspective of the negative critique, thus does not imply disregard 
za Ibid., p. 18. 27 Ibid., p. 20. 
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for international law but rather a determination not to allow 
international law and international institutions to be used to promote 
Western/US interests. The ability of states to withstand the effects of 
UN sanctions Resolutions, by mobilizing international sympathy and 
support, is substantially strengthened by this perception. It shapes the 
dynamics of support for, and opposition to, the use of sanctions. 28 
Tim Niblock forcefully concluded: 
Economic sanctions have tended to strengthen regimes. The 
assumption that sanctions will help the population by opening 
opportunities for civilian forces to overthrow an oppressive and 
undemocratic regime, therefore, is unjustified. There are three 
processes through which such strengthening can occur. First, the 
impact of the sanctions tends to make populations even more 
dependent on the government, mainly for provision of the basic rations 
needed for survival. The rationing system becomes an effective 
instrument for control. This has happened in both Iraq and Libya. 
Second, sanctions may strengthen a regime's ideological legitimacy. If 
the regime has projected itself to its population through an ideology 
built around nationalism-where external powers (especially Western 
powers) are seen as imperialist crusaders intent on undermining local 
sovereignty and indigenous interests-then the imposition of Western- 
orchestrated UN sanctions will reinforce the regime's central 
ideological message. The regime's analysis of the international order 
will carry conviction. The Iraqi, Libyan, and Sudanese regimes have 
all purveyed, from their inceptions, a nationalist ideology. The 
imposition of sanctions, therefore, can be and has been used by those 
regimes to buttress popular acceptance of the core ideology and to 
mobilize popular support. Third, the regime can gain some credit 
domestically by deftly defending the country from an external 
onslaught (as perceived by the population). Its ability to manoeuvre 
28 Niblock (2001), p. 6. 
31 
successfully to build support in the international community, to 
withstand and circumvent a blockade, to bring in the basic goods 
needed by the population, and perhaps to throw doubt on the legality 
of what is being done to the country, can all strengthen popular 
support. This factor has been evident in both Iraq and Libya. 29 
Meghan L. O'Sullivan fittingly established a parallel between the shrewd 
sanctions and the way its tools have been employed. O'Sullivan refused to 
labels sanctions as a economic coercion tool as an outright failure instead 
criticising the way sanctions have been implemented by foreign policy 
decision makers. She stressed that for sanctions to be shrewd "must be 
crafted to suit the circumstances of the case in a way that best advances the 
objectives at hand. She pointed "A sanctions regime intended to advance the 
goal of regime change should look different from one expected to 
accomplish containment. Both should differ substantially from a sanctions 
regime proposed to bring about changes in the behaviour of an existing 
regime. "30 She accurately concluded "sanctions must be multilateral if they 
"3 are to be shrewdly employed for containment purposes. 1 
O'Sullivan maintained that sanctions were not smart is the result of many 
factors the most important of all of them is the "lack of strategic thinking" 
she asked "Why has the shrewd use of sanctions been so rare in the past? 
The haphazard use of sanctions is in part due to a lack of strategic thinking. 
The notion that sanctions regimes can and should be structured in different 
ways depending on their goals is not widely recognized. "32 
29 Ibid., p. 218. 30 Meghan L. O'Sullivan Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism (The 
Brookings Institution 2003), p. 287. 31 Ibid, p. 289. 32 Ibid, p. 295. 
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2.4 Proliferation of sanctions and United States foreign 
policy 
Although many historic uses of sanctions can be found in cases like in the ancient 
Greece with the Megarian decree, to the American colonies boycotting English 
goods and the examples are many, the dramatic increase in use of sanctions in 
international relations can be traced to the end of the Cold War. 
Richard Haass stated that the use of sanctions was more easily occurring now than 
before the Cold War when the Soviet Union was more powerful: "In many cases 
sanctions can now be introduced without Russian opposition, be it political (where 
a Russian veto in the Security Council is by no means automatic); economic 
(Russian has less of a commitment to relationships that would lead it to provide 
aid and thereby offset any penalty imposed on one of its allies); or military 
(Russia is less likely than was the Soviet Union to block any Western or US 
attempt to enforce a trade-related sanction). In this sense at least, the end of the 
Cold War should make sanctions an instrument of greater potential impact. "33 
This thesis disagrees with Haass on that issue. Maybe his assessment in theory 
was correct for a short while, perhaps until the mid-90s; however, and as is 
explained in detail in the second part of this thesis, Russia started following its 
own interests especially in the case of Iraq, and of course in the other cases Iran, 
North Korea, Libya, former Yugoslavia and Cuba. Russia found itself that the 
United States was maintaining economic sanctions and prolonging them against a 
major country like Iraq with whom Russia has a broad range of importance or 
even vital interests, In scenes reminiscent of those of the Cold War, Russia even 
threatened to use its veto powers in the Security Council many times during the 
many Iraq standoffs at the UN. Russia used the Iraq issue to get back onto the 
world stage as a power that can still be reckoned with. This had an adverse impact 
overall on the effectiveness of sanctions. Increasingly France and Germany, 
sometimes supported by China joined the Russians in their efforts to relax 
33 Haass (1998), p. S. 
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sanctions on Iraq, help prevent regime change, and tried to hinder a complete US 
dominance of world politics and economics. This interesting phenomenon, which 
impacted sanctions' policy on Iraq negatively, will be explained in detail in the 
coming chapters. 
Many have argued that the United States is the most powerful nation in the world 
today that employs economic sanctions in its foreign policy. In an attempt to face 
up to threats from states that hold animosity towards or threaten vital US national 
interest- labelled by US government as pariahs or rogues states-US policymakers 
used economic sanctions for a wide range of purposes as a central foreign policy 
tool all through the 90s. Critics charge that this wide-spread reliance on sanctions 
as a core foreign policy tool is both an indication and a result of inefficient, 
confused American foreign policy through the 90s. 
Thus it is vital here to establish that the use of economic sanctions after the Cold 
War was a weapon used by American leaders and administrations more than any 
other country in the globe. Richard Haass conceded: "No other country tries to 
uses economic sanctions so frequently-and no other country possesses 
America's power and influence. "34 The excessive use by the US of economic 
sanctions was attributed by Richard Haass to America's domestic political 
circumstances. America's hesitation to employ its armed forces abroad or what is 
widely known as the "Vietnam complex", the power of the Congress who favours 
economic sanctions, the media pressure, the historic relevance, and it is seen as a 
less costly less risky tool among the foreign policy decision makers. 
Richard Haass stated that sanctions "satisfy a domestic political need to do 
something and can serve to reinforce a commitment to a behavioural norm, such 
as respect for human rights or opposition to proliferation. " Haass added, 
"American reluctance to use military force is another motivation-particularly in 
those instances in which US interests are not deemed sufficiently important to 
justify casualties and high financial costs, Sanctions provide a visible and less 
expensive alternative to military intervention at the same time they provide an 
34 Ibid., p. 4. 
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alternative to doing nothing or limiting the US reaction to rhetoric, " He argued 
that many in the United States see sanctions as an action "that appears to involve 
less risk and cost (be it human, financial or moral) than using military force. s "a 
The threat and application of economic sanctions have been central elements of 
the US Congress effort to act as a power centre in American and world politics. 
Richard Haass made this clear: "The growth of congressional power also helps 
explain the prevalence of economic sanctions. The Constitution divided the 
foreign affairs' power between Congress and the executive, and over the past 
quarter century there has been a shift in the pendulum toward Congress. Thus 
sanctions are introduced regularly by members of Congress-often at the behest 
of single or special interest groups-through legislation or as amendments to 
legislation. " The growing importance of economic sanctions as a tool of American 
foreign policy is interestingly attributed by Haass to the growing visual power of 
communication technology represented by the media. "The greater reach of media 
is another factor. The so-called CNN effect can increase the visibility throughout 
the United States of problems in another country and stimulate a desire on the part 
of Americans to respond. Sanctions offer a popular and seemingly cost-free way 
of so doing. " Richard Haass contend that the proliferation in the use of sanctions 
among American leaders can be traced back to historical contexts: in other words, 
the United States has tried it before. "Despite these changes, sanctions are nothing 
new to the United States. The American Revolution was in part a revolt against 
British sanctions. Indeed, sanctions occupy an important if not always 
distinguished place in US history. Sanctions helped trigger the War of 1812, 
weakened the Confederacy a half century later, and were levied against Spain 
during the Spanish-American War of 1898. " He goes on saying "Sanctions were 
also an important tool of American statecraft during the Cold War. At times, the 
target was the behaviour of the Soviet Union and its allies. ""36 
Echoing Richard Haass, Tim Niblock fittingly established that the proliferation of 
sanctions came after the collapse of Communism as a powerful block in the LJN: 
"The use of UN sanctions must be viewed within the context of the world order 
'$ Ibid., p. 2. 36 Ibid., p. 3. 
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that came into existence after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the 
collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe. It was only with this so-called 
New World Order that the UN Security Council gained the practical ability to 
impose sanctions. Prior to that, the divisions between East and West had ensured 
that there was never sufficient common ground for such actions to be taken. The 
dynamics of international relations under the New World Order, in fact, have not 
only enabled sanctions to be imposed but also shaped the character, content, and 
sustainability of sanctions. " Niblock is correct to argue that Iraq was the first 
occasion that the Security Council had specifically authorized a comprehensive 
economic sanction with that magnitude on under the new international order. 
"Events in the Arab world, moreover, carry particular relevance to conceptions of 
the New World Order: much of the early debate on the New World Order was 
engendered by the international reaction to Iraq's occupation of Kuwait in August 
1990. There is good reason, therefore, to be attentive to the links between the New 
World Order and UN sanctions. "37 
As stated by Richard Haass, the United States is the principle user of economic 
sanctions, and thus one needs to understand how the United States selects a 
country for sanctions and why. The United States and its subsequent 
administrations since Ronald Reagan's presidency, when communism was seen as 
the standard terror, evil and aggression, have viewed and termed states that are at 
the top list of its concern as "pariah states", which then became "rogue states", 
then changed to "states of concern", and after September 11`h the term became 
"alliance of evil". Most of these states have had economic sanctions imposed on 
them. Noam Chomsky defined the term "rogue state" as a term that "has two uses: 
a propagandistic use, applied to assorted enemies, and a literal use that applies to 
states that do not regard themselves as bound by international norms. "38 
37Tim Niblock Pariah States & Sanctions in the Middle East* Iraq Libya Sudan (Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2001), p. 2. 38Noam Chomsky Rorue States: The Rule of Force in World Affairs (Pluto Press, 2000), p.!. 
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Tim Niblock explained how the United States' government viewed these states: 
Such states were deemed to be playing an international role that was 
not only disruptive to US interests but was also contrary to the norms 
and values of the international order. The "pariahs" had to be restricted 
and contained until domestic political changes removed the leadership 
that had inspired the state's delinquency. The normal patterns of 
economic and diplomatic relations had to be disrupted, with as many 
countries as possible drawn into the boycott. Negotiating with them 
would do no good, as they could not be trusted to abide by 
international commitments. Perceptions of pariah-hood, therefore, are 
of direct relevance to the imposition, implementation, and dynamics of 
sanctions regimes. 39 
Perhaps the most significant explanation of American policy on sanctions is 
written by Meghan L. O'Sullivan, who stated: "One of the major dilemmas faced 
by American policymakers today is how to treat the countries that the United 
States now refers to as "rogues. " America's European and Asian allies had 
traditionally dealt with these countries by engaging them with commercial and 
diplomatic contacts. In contrast, the United States had generally pursued policies 
of containment, where economic and diplomatic isolation on the target country 
has been virtually inevitable. " O'Sullivan conceded: "Castigating countries that 
oppose US interests as outlaws or pariahs is certainly nothing new, However, the 
concept of a "rogue" state has been popularised in the post-Cold War era in 
response to the changing nature of threats facing the United States and, many have 
argued, in an attempt to fill the void that the demise of the Soviet Union and 
international communism created. " She pointed out four reasons why the United 
States categorizes a country as a "rogue": "pursuit of weapons of mass 
destruction, support for terrorism, reprehensible treatment of their own citizens, 
and vocal animosity toward the United States. " She stressed that: "a country must 
be guilty in all four departments in order to be classified as a "rogue" in American 
39 Niblock (2001), p. 12. 
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politics. " O'Sullivan observed: "In pursuing these objectives, the United States 
has relied largely on policies that isolate or punish the offending "rogue. " Punitive 
tools, such as military force, covert action, and the strengthening of a regime's 
neighbours or rivals, have sporadically played important roles in America's quest 
'4to marginalize or replace "rogue" regimes. o 
The tragic terrorist events of September 11`h persuaded George W. Bush to 
identify Iraq as one of the three powers in his "axis of evil" doctrine, This doctrine 
replaced the earlier "rogue" regime doctrine. Under this new doctrine, the 
administration adopted vigorously the "regime change" strategy that the Clinton 
administration initiated first but never implemented. For that the Bush 
administration called for the removal of Saddam regime and the liberation of Iraq 
by military action. 
40Meghan L O'Sullivan "Sanctioning 'Rogue' States: A Strategy in Decline? " Harvard 
International Review, summer 2000. 
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3. RATIONAL FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST 
IRAQ 
3.1 Overview of economic sanctions on Iraq 
The UN Security Council took the original decision to impose a comprehensive 
regime of economic sanctions on Iraq shortly after the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait 
began in 1990. The objective of the policy at this point was fairly clear: to censure 
Saddam Hussein's regime for its violation of international law and to apply 
pressure to persuade Iraq to withdraw its forces from Kuwait. As events 
developed, the international community ultimately chose military action rather 
than sustained financial pressure as the primary means of ending the occupation. 
Saddam's forces were driven from Kuwait in the "Gulf War" of 1991 by an 
international coalition of forces led by the United States and including many of 
Iraq's Arab neighbours. 
However, rather than reducing or suspending the sanctions after the conclusion of 
the war, the Security Council chose, with the support of a broad international 
consensus, to enhance them and extend them to cover an effectively indefinite 
period of time. The total number of Security Council Resolutions from 1990 to 
2000 reached 53 Resolutions on the case of Iraq, The most important of them is 
the one that imposed the sanctions regime on Iraq, the Resolution that called for 
using all means to push Iraq outside Kuwait even by using military means, and the 
"oil-for-food" Resolution. The first of all these Resolutions was Resolution 660, 
issued on 2 of August 1990, the same day the Iraqi forces entered Kuwaiti soil. 
The UN Resolution asked Iraq to leave Kuwait immediately and without 
conditions. Then the many other Resolutions that placed economic penalties and 
demanded the full destruction of Iraq's WMDs were enacted. Later the "oil-for- 
food" deal was initiated due to the mounting tragic humanitarian situation among 
the ordinary innocent Iraqis. 
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Sanctions after the Gulf War 1991 were partly a result of the UN's desire to send 
a strong message to Iraq and other would-be aggressors that the organisation 
could and would attach a high economic price to hostility against its member 
states. However, and more importantly, the policy was also the product of a 
complex agenda which reflected the fact that key actors in the international 
community regarded the Resolution of the Gulf conflict as far from satisfactory. 
While Saddam's forces had been defeated militarily and driven from Kuwait, he 
and his regime remained in power in Baghdad, occupying such a strongly 
entrenched position that it would be effectively impossible to remove them 
without engaging in a major invasion of Iraq. However, the first Bush 
administration, as well as those of Clinton, did not find it necessary to commit a 
massive number of American troops on the ground to overthrow Saddam's 
regime. Instead, they relied heavily on sanctions, which went for too long, and 
were too untargeted, harming economic and national interests of many countries 
and thus lost their effectiveness and logic. 
The fear of creating a democracy in Iraq by many of America's allies in the 
Middle East region if America decided to liberate Iraq from Saddam rule's and 
install a more moderate democratic government was another reason, which kept 
sanctions as the only foreign policy tool for 12 years and is evident in the very 
theme of the "oil-for-food" deal. This deal could also have been used as oil for 
democracy instead of only food. The West could have also pressured the Iraqi 
dictator by using sanctions to promote democracy, but they chose not to, due to 
the above reasons. Most of the Arab states neighbouring Iraq also refused to 
cooperate or support the Iraqi opposition. They also feared democracy in Iraq 
because such a thing might encourage their already deprived people to demand a 
similar system and freedom. Jeremy Binnie, a Jane's Intelligence specialist in 
London, conceded that democracy in Iraq "could make Saudi Arabia look like a 
feudal state, reactionary when it comes to advancing democracy in the region. 41 
While Fuller E Graham and Rend Francke admitted that: "Discussion of the 
viability of democracy in a future Iraq frequently founders on anxieties about the 
41 AP_, 6 September 2002. 
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Shi'a majority in Iraq and its implications for Iranian influence in the country in 
the future. "42 The media in the Arab world and the West started to pick up these 
fears and expanded them in an exaggerated ways to reach policy makers in the 
world to increase their fears of a change in Iraq thus keeping the status quo of 
Saddam's regime, trying to contain him in his box. 
It is important to add here that after the Gulf War and during the twelve years of 
sanctions, Saddam managed to establish many militias/paramilitary forces made 
from schoolboys, such as the lion cubs of Saddam, and Saddam's Fedayeen. 
Military training camps throughout Iraq were open to train people. It is said that 
each of these militias has some one million people. This gave the West and key 
regional powers an indication of what kind of chaos that could ensue if Saddam 
was taken from power in Baghdad. They feared street fighting along ethnic and 
sectarian lines that could result in the break up of Iraq and its state. 
Given the fact that the major coalition members were thus either unable or 
unwilling to encourage a war to remove Saddam's regime, the consensus among 
external actors seems to have been that the possible desirable outcomes were 
limited to: a coup d'etat by political and/or military elements that would remove 
Saddam and his close allies but leave the bulk of the existing ruling structure in 
place. It was generally recognised that the circumstances within Iraq at the time 
that such an outcome would be unlikely to emerge, in either the short or the long 
term, unless the international community continued to apply heavy economic 
pressure. Thus maintaining economic pressure was seen by much of the 
international community as a key imperative. It was also recognised that even 
sustained pressure would not necessarily produce the desired result of forcing 
Saddam out of power. For as long as Saddam's regime managed to stay in power, 
and in the eventuality that it would be able to persist for a long time, a second 
imperative was to keep Saddam's regime as weak as possible and to limit his 
ability to exert any kind of regional or international interaction or influence. 
42Graham Fuller & Rend Francke The Arab Ship (Macmillan Press, 1999), p. 2. 
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The enhancement and extension of the sanctions' regime was essentially intended 
to address both of these imperatives. In short, the principle aim of the policy was 
to drive Saddam out of power if possible, or, failing that, to stop him from ever 
again becoming a real force in the Middle East. Of course, this central objective 
can be sub-divided into a number of more specific component objectives. These 
may be summarised as follows: 
- To prevent Saddam's regime from taking advantage of Iraq's considerable 
oil wealth. 
- To weaken the regime's domestic position by forcing it to contend with 
the dissatisfaction of Iraq's impoverished citizens. 
- To prevent the regime from using Iraq's potentially significant economic 
influence as a way of rehabilitating itself as a legitimate regional and 
international actor. 
- To prevent the regime from rebuilding its military forces. 
- To give the UN an economic lever to pressure the regime into complying 
with measures designed to stop it from producing and stockpiling weapons 
of mass destruction. 
Although it is certainly true that it was generally accepted at the time of the 
sanctions' initial implementation that their duration would be indefinite, it seems 
very unlikely that anyone anticipated at the time that they would continue for over 
a decade, exact such a heavy toll on the Iraqi people and have so little practical 
effect in terms of undermining Saddam's regime. On the contrary, it is probably 
accurate to suggest that, in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War, there was an 
overly optimistic expectation in the international community that Saddam's days 
in power was numbered. 
As time passed, it became clear: 1) that even during and directly after the war, 
Saddam's position within Iraq was never as seriously threatened as many in the 
international community had hoped and/or imagined; 2) that his position was 
possibly becoming even stronger over time; and 3) that, in some respect, the 
sanctions were actually contributing to his ability to maintain his stranglehold on 
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power. A natural consequence of this growing awareness was that the countries 
that made up the international coalition which opposed Iraq during that Gulf War, 
and that supported the continuation of the economic blockade thereafter, have 
gradually become increasingly disenchanted with the sanctions' policy. 
Many Arab countries began calling for an end to sanctions as soon as it became 
clear that the Iraqi people, rather than Saddam and his government, were bearing 
the brunt of the hardship associated with them. Conditions in Iraq had become so 
bad and when this factor was coupled with economic, oil and business interests 
the UN was virtually forced to make some sort of modification to the 
comprehensive sanctions regime on humanitarian grounds. The result was 
Resolution 968, which established the first "oil-for-food" facility. At later stages 
this UN deal, allowed the Iraqi regime to sell up to $2 billion every 180 days on 
the condition that the money raised could only be used to buy and import food, 
medicine and other items for the rebuilding of Iraq's infrastructure. In 1998, Iraq 
was allowed to sell as much as $5.26 billion every six months while in 1999; the 
ceiling on its oil exports was removed by the Security Council. 43 
Cortright and Lopez illustrated the American predicament in the UN on Iraq: 
After more than eleven years of continuing sanctions, the United 
Nations has been unable to achieve its objectives in Iraq. The 
sanctions have constrained Iraq's military capabilities, but they have 
not succeeded in convincing Saddam Hussein's government to 
comply fully with the UN mandate on disarming weapons of mass 
destruction. On the contrary, Iraqi defiance of UN policy has 
deepened and become more strident frontline states, Iraq has 
aggressively pursued policies to undermine the sanctions, and 
international compliance has steadily eroded. Unauthorized trade has 
43 Office of the Iraq Programme, United Nations, 18 July 2003. 
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increased, and commercial and transportation links with Baghdad 
have multiplied. 44 
The following section will examine the oil-for-food deal and illustrates its 
implications on the multilateral comprehensive economic sanctions on Iraq. 
44 Cortright & Lopez (2002), p. 21. 
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3.2 Oiling the wheels of Iraq's sanctions: the 011-for-Food 
Scheme and its consequences 
During the period of the oil-for-food programme almost all the EU countries re- 
opened their embassies in Baghdad, and participated in Iraq's annual trade fairs, 
and dispatched lawmakers, parliamentarians and human rights' activists to assess 
the impact of sanctions on the Iraqi people, accepted Iraqi official delegations in 
their countries including business delegations and governmental figures, re- 
opened Iraqi embassies in their countries, and broke the air embargo on Iraq. 
Subsequently, Saddam's regime took almost every possible opportunity to 
challenge the limits of the sanctions regime and increase the differences between 
the world and the United States. Baghdad awarded commercial and oil/gas 
contracts on political rather than professional bases. Arab countries, China and 
Brazil and other countries also restored their diplomatic missions in Baghdad, 
despite economic sanctions and the lack of regime change. France withdrew 
from patrolling the no-fly zone jointly with the US and Britain. They began to 
view economic sanctions, especially the oil ban against Iraq, as a pure US 
personal agenda causing adverse affects on their own commercial and national 
security interests. Many nations were becoming more and more critical of the 
sanctions' policy as a whole. It was becoming clear that there was no longer a 
sufficient international consensus to maintain anything like a comprehensive 
economic blockade. 
The "oil-for-food" deal boosted Iraq's commercial importance. Countries started 
to place their commercial calculations as a priority once again. This in turn gave 
Baghdad a mean to influence policy in many powerful capitals in Europe or the 
Arab world. Instead of tightening the economic embargo even further, countries 
started turning their backs on the economic sanctions to foster trade and ties with 
the Iraqi regime. This is exactly what Saddam wanted and achieved through the 
`oil-for-food" deal. Charles Tripp asserted: "For Saddam Hussein, the main 
advantage of this agreement was not merely that it placed additional revenues in 
his hands, but also that it might be a prelude to the end of sanctions since it 
brought Iraq back into the world market as an oil producer and, potentially, as a 
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major consumer of industrial goods. It was clearly his hope that this would help to 
build momentum within the UN for the lifting of sanctions. It was a momentum 
that the Iraqi government had been seeking to encourage since at least 1992. In 
particular, Iraq had targeted Russia and France as members of the UN Security 
Council that were owed roughly $10 billion and $7 billion, respectively, by Iraq, 
largely for weapons purchased during the 1980s. They had every interest, 
therefore, in seeing Iraq's reinstatement as a major oil-producing power and the 
Iraqi government reinforced these interests by signing a number of agreements 
with Russia and France companies for the development of Iraq's oil industry once 
sanctions were lifted. " Tripp, who illustrated the success of Iraqi diplomacy 
during the sanctions' era, added: "These moves were accompanied by other 
diplomatic initiatives on the part of Iraq. The more remote Gulf states were 
cultivated, leading Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates to join the ranks of 
those who called for the immediate end to the UN sanctions and the rehabilitation 
of Iraq. t945 
The table below will illustrates how the oil-for-food deal and the UN Secretary- 
General compromised the most comprehensive sanctions ever imposed in any 
nation in history and helped expand the oil-for-food deal programme to the 
advantage of the Iraqi regime allowing them to increase legal trade and oil export 
by that contributing significantly to the collapse of the comprehensive sanctions 
regime on Iraq. 
45 Charles Tripp A History of Iraq (Cambridge University Press Tripp, 2000), p. 262. 
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Table 3.1 Chronology of the oil-for-food 
2 August 1990 Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait. On the 
same day, the Security Council adopts 
Resolution 660 
6 August 1990 Resolution 661 is adopted by the 
Security Council which imposed 
sanctions on both Iraq and Kuwait 
20 March 1991 A report by Under Secretary-General 
Martti Ahtisaari warns of imminent 
catastrophe is massive life-supporting 
needs are not met 
3 April 1991 The Security Council. In Resolution 
687, sets terms for a cease-firs- 
disarmament and removal of Iraq's 
capacity to develop weapons of mass 
destruction 
15 August 1991 The Security Council adopts Resolution 
706 offering an opportunity for Iraqi oil 
to be sold and the revenue used to 
purchase essential humanitarian 
supplies. This Resolution is not 
accepted by the Government of Iraq 
14 April 1995 Resolution 986 is adopted by the 
Security Council, Iraq subsequently 
refuses to accept its terms 
20 May 1996 Following extensive negotiations, a 
Memorandum of Understanding is 
signed between the Government of Iraq 
and the United Nations Secretariat 
regarding the implementation of 
Resolution 986 
10 December 1996 Phase I officially begins with the 
pumping of Iraqi oil for export 
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8 June 1997 Phase II officially begins. However, the 
Iraqi Government announces that oil 
will not be pumped under this phase 
until a new distribution plan is 
approved by the Secretary-General 
4 December 1997 The Security Council adopts Resolution 
1143, extending the Programme for 
another six months. It also requests the 
Secretary-General to submit a 
supplementary report, reviewing 
humanitarian needs, and expresses its 
willingness to authorize "additional 
resources" 
5 December 1997 Phase III officially begins. The Iraqi 
Government announces that pumping 
of oil under phase III will not flow into 
the pipeline until the distribution plan is 
approved by the Secretary-General 
1 February 1998 Secretary-General's Supplementary 
Report offers proposals to improve the 
process of contract approval and 
delivery. The report proposes to raise 
the ceiling of oil sales every six months 
(per phase) from $2 billion to $5.2 
billion 
20 February 1998 The Security Council adopts Resolution 
1153 authorising the increase in the 
Programme and requests that the 
Secretary-General appoint a group of 
oil experts to look into Iraq's oil 
producing capacity and the need for 
spare parts and equipment 
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20-23 February 1998 Secretary-General Kofi Annan travels 
to Baghdad to defuse the growing 
political crisis with the Government of 
Iraq on the issue of UN weapons 
inspections 
15 April 1998 The Secretary-General transmits the 
report of the group of oil industry 
experts who note the lamentable state 
of Iraq's oil industry and recommend 
the provision of equipment and spare 
parts to increase Iraq's ability to export 
oil 
19 June 1998 The Security Council adopts Resolution 
1175 authorizing Iraq to import up to 
$300 million worth of oil industry spare 
parts and equipment in order increase 
production of oil for export 
28 September 1998 Secretary-General Kofi Annan appoints 
Hans von Sponeck, A German national, 
to the post of United Nations 
Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq 
4 January 1999 OIP is advised by the Government of 
Iraq that it is unable to ensure the 
security of United States and United 
Kingdom nationals serving with the 
Organization in Iraq. On 3 February, 
the United Nations withdraws all US 
and UK nationals working in Iraq 
30 January 1999 Following a proposal by Canada, the 
Security Council establishes three 
separate panels on disarmament, 
humanitarian situation and prisoners of 
war and Kuwaiti missing persons 
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13 May 1999 The Secretary-General approves the 
inclusion of a new sector in the 
distribution plan-telecommunications 
21 May 1999 OIP Executive Director presents the 
Secretary-General's 180-day report on 
phase V to the Security Council. He 
emphasizes that the Programme cannot 
-and was never meant to- meet all the 
humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, 
nor can it restore Iraq's economic and 
social infrastructure to pre-1990 levels 
4 October 1999 Resolution 1266 (1999) adopted by the 
Security Council permits Iraq to export 
an additional amount of $3.04 billion of 
oil in phase VI to make up for the 
"humanitarian deficit" in revenue in 
phases IV and V 
12 October 1999 Secretary-General recommends that the 
Security Council approve the request to 
increase by $300 million the allocation 
for oil spare parts and equipment, 
bringing the total allocation to $600 
million, during phase VI 
22 October 1999 The Secretary-General in a letter to the 
Security Council expresses concern 
over the growing number of holds 
placed on applications and the resultant 
serious implications for the 
implementation of the humanitarian 
programme 
12 February 2000 The UN Humanitarian Coordinator for 
Iraq, Hans von Sponeck, announces he 
will leave his post 
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1 March 2000 In line with paragraph. 17 of Resolution 
1284 (1999), the UN begins 
implementation of accelerated or "fast 
track" procedures for the approval by 
notification of contracts for 
humanitarian supplies as per lists 
approved by the 661 Committee 
29 March 2000 The Security Council Committee 
approves two more lists of 
commodities-in the health and 
agriculture sectors- for "fast track" 
contract processing 
31 March 2000 Security Council adopts Resolution 
1293 based o the recommendation of 
the Secretary-General report of 10 
March 2000, raising the funding level 
for oil spare parts and equipment from 
$300 million to $600 million per phase 
20 April 2000 At a formal meeting of the 661 
Committee on the issue of "holds" 
Benon V Sevan points out that the 
effectiveness of the programme has 
suffered considerably, not only because 
of funding shortfalls in earlier phases, 
but also because of the very large 
number of applications on hold. He 
reiterates the Secretary-General's 
appeal for a further review and 
reconsideration of applications on hold 
which have a direct negative impact on 
the implementation of the programme 
8 June 2000 The Security Council adopts Resolution 
1302 which extends the programme for 
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another 180 days. It invites the 
Secretary-General to appoint 
independent experts to prepare a 
comprehensive report and analysis of 
the humanitarian situation in Iraq. 
Other measures include: application of 
accelerated procedures for the approval 
of water and sanitation equipment; 
allocation of $600 million for oil spare 
parts under phase VIII; and requests the 
Secretary-General to appoint additional 
oil overseers 
12 June 2000 The Secretary-General approves the 
proposal of the Government of Iraq to 
include a new housing sector in the 
distribution plans for phases VI and VII 
28 June 2000 A gunman attacks the Baghdad office 
of the United Nations Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) Two 
FAO staff are killed and six injured, 
including four Iraqi government guards, 
in an exchange of gunfire 
17 July 2000 The Security Council Committee (661) 
approves the list of oil spare parts and 
equipment eligible for approval by 
notification under the accelerated 
procedures 
1-16 August 2000 Benon V. Sevan, the Executive Director 
of OIP undertakes a 2-week mission to 
Iraq 
11 August 2000 The Security Council Committee (661) 
approves the list of water and sanitation 
supplies eligible for approval by 
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notification under the accelerated or 
"fast track" procedures 
1 September 2000 The Security Council approves a 
massive expansion of the health sector 
list for "fast track" procedures 
3 October 2000 In a letter to the President of the 
Security Council, the Secretary-General 
express serious concern on the total 
value of holds on applications for 
humanitarian supplies 
31 October 2000 The Security Council's 661 Committee 
authorises the UN Treasury to open an 
UN Iraq account in euro. It also 
requests an in depth report within three 
months on the costs and benefits for the 
Programme and other financial and 
administrative implications of the 
payment for Iraqi oil in euro 
1-12 December 2000 Iraq suspends its oil exports under the 
United Nations oil-for-food programme 
over oil pricing disagreement with the 
UN 
5 December 2000 The Security Council adopts Resolution 
1330 extending the programme for an 
additional 180 days (phase IX). It 
directs the sanctions Committee to 
approve lists of supplies and equipment 
in the electricity and housing sectors for 
"fast track" approval procedures, as 
well as expand the existing lists in other 
sectors; reducing the allocation for the 
UN Compensation Fund from 30 to 25 
per cent, transferring the additional 
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funds to the "53 per cent" account for 
humanitarian supplies in the 
centre/south of Iraq to address the 
needs of the most vulnerable groups 
and; requests the Secretary-General to 
make arrangements to allow funds up to 
600 million euros to be used for the 
cost of installation and maintenance for 
the oil industry 
26 February 2001 The Security Council's 661 sanctions 
committee approves a list of 26 items in 
the housing sector for "fast track" 
processing by OIP 
26-27 February 2001 High-level talks are held in New York 
between the United Nations and an 
Iraqi delegation headed by the Foreign 
Minister of Iraq on the situation in Iraq, 
including the humanitarian programme 
24 May 2001 A list of 97 items is approved by the 
Security Council's 661 sanctions 
committee in the electricity sector for 
"fast-track" processing 
4 June-10 July 2001 Iraq suspends its oil exports under the 
programme over its, rejection of 
Resolution 1352 (2001) 
26 & 28 June 2001 The Security Council holds an "open 
meeting" on Iraq at the request of the 
Russian Federation. The Under- 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, 
Mr. Riyadh Al-Qaysi, as well as 38 
member-states, - including the 15 
members of the Security Council, and 
the Permanent Observer of the League 
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of Arab States (LAS) address the 
Council 
2 September 2001 The Government of Iraq declares four 
current and one former UNOHCI staff 
persona non grata 
3 January 2002 In a letter to the President of the 
Security Council, the Secretary-General 
advises of his approval of phase XI 
distribution plan, submitted by the 
Government of Iraq on 23 December 
2001. The plan foresees a humanitarian 
budget of over $4.43 billion for 13 
sectors countrywide 
14 January-10 February 2002 The Executive Director of the Iraq 
Programme, Benon V. Sevan, 
undertakes a three-week working visit 
to Iraq, including a week-long visit to 
the three northern governorates 
8 April-9 May 2002 The Government of Iraq announces a 
30-day suspension of its oil exports 
under the programme, in support of 
Palestinians 
14 May 2002 The Security Council adopts Resolution 
1409 (2002), introducing the Goods 
Review List (GRL) and a new set of 
procedures for the processing and 
approval of contracts for humanitarian 
supplies and equipment. 
28 October 2002 The Security Council's 661 sanctions 
committee approves a list of about 
6,000 items to be "fast tracked" by OIP 
Source: Office of the Iraq Programme, 25 August 2003, 
http: //www un orgDepts/oip/background/chron. html 
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This thesis argues that, ultimately, the oil-for-food deal was a very serious 
concession. Although it can hardly be criticised in terms of its humanitarian 
intent, it served to significantly strengthen Saddam's hand: 
1) Because it gave the Iraqi regime access back to the world market. If one look at 
statistics and trade volume between Iraq and the many countries during the 
sanctions era, one can see that the oil-for-food deal meant nothing but resumption 
of normal economic activities and relations between Iraq and the world. 
2) Iraq had the chance to reopen its oil pipelines by that connecting its economy to 
the Mediterranean, the outside world, as well as the neighbouring countries. 3) 
The Programme re-energized and increased Iraqi oil production. 4) Created 
influence for Iraq in the world economy with its oil supplies. 5) Iraq's return to 
the oil market in 1996 under UN authorization has given it more leverage with 
European, Russian, and Asian states. 6) With every commercial contract and oil 
money through this UN programme, Iraq managed to consolidate and maintain 
solid integration into the Middle East economy. 
7) Special-interest groups-business companies and associations exerted influence 
on policy makers and lobbied to have their interests in Iraq served so they can 
secure lucrative contracts and protect their commercial interests in Iraq. Allowing 
Iraq back to the international market created a commercial momentum, incentives, 
and relations in addition it tied many businesses and factories to Iraq thus a behind 
the scenes lobby formed itself standing against sanctions so they can secure and 
implement commercial deals. The international business community also wanted 
to secure post-sanctions favourite commercial position in Iraq. 
8) Saddam used this programme for his own narrow political agenda. He awarded 
contracts to countries that were supporting the lifting of sanctions or one's that 
could be neutral or plays a modifying role inside the UN Security Council. Thus 
he created a lobby for his cause inside the UN and the Security Council to 
pressure the Council for easing or the total lifting of sanctions. In sum, Saddam 
targeted the consensus for sanctions inside the Security Council to place strain on 
them in order to render that Gulf War (1991) consensus in the Council fragile and 
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fractious. The programme gave the Government of Iraq the authority to contracts 
with foreign companies for the goods and products. This allowed Iraq to politicise 
the Programme by choosing companies whose countries pursue a diplomatic and 
political line favourable to Baghdad. Obviously, the Russians, Arabs, French and 
Chinese got the bulk of these import contracts with that Iraq won strong veto 
power members of the UN Security Council. Thus by accepting the oil-for-food 
deal Baghdad has given itself a means to influence policy in the UN regarding its 
sanctions regime. A look at table above gives us a clear picture of how Saddam 
used his oil weapon to get more concessions to his own advantage especially in 
the area of contract holds in the UN Sanctions Committee and in the area of 
increasing the scope of the oil-for-food deal. The UN needed Iraq's oil to finance 
the humanitarian programme thus gave in many times to Iraq demands to expand 
the imports scope to involve oil and infrastructure, to speed contracts in the UN 
sanctions Committee under the "fast track" procedure, accepting Iraq's 
distribution plan for all of Iraq including the northern provinces, and finally to 
change Iraq's oil exports revenue from the dollar to euro. 
9) The Iraqi political and military inner circle was protected through that 
programme as they could order lavish and essential materials for their survival 
and the maintaining of their domestic power. This in turn boosted Saddam 
longevity in power and gave him legitimacy and power within the inner circle, the 
elites and the tribes. 10) Also Iraq through the oil-for-food deal broke the air 
embargo on it and neighbouring countries including key international actors such 
as Russia and France resumed few and sometimes regular flights to Saddam 
International Airport. 11) Psychologically it made people think that the embargo 
was shattered and that the world was trading openly with Iraq. This helped many 
to openly infringe the embargo. Parallel schemes gradually build up to smuggle 
oil outside Iraq and bring in consumer goods and other forbidden products into 
Iraq outside the UN inspectors eye and in violation of the oil-for-food agreement. 
Sanctions breaking took place and allowed many Arabs especially Palestinians, 
Jordanians, Syrian, Lebanese, Egyptian, and non-Arabs such as Turkey and Iran 
as well as some Europeans to make quick cash as Iraq managed to trade with its 
neighbourhood and the international community effectively under the cover of the 
oil-for-food programme in contravention of sanctions. 
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Iraq's Minister of Trade proudly announced in Baghdad at end of July 2002 that 
his country's trade volume from the signing of the "oil-for-food" deal in 
December 1996 had reached $18 billion. That was in addition to what the Iraqi 
private sector and other bilateral trade agreements, conducted with the Arab 
world, had achieved: this totalled $26 billion, increased by 50% from the total by 
external Iraqi trade volume. 46 According to the Office of the Iraq Programme in 
the United Nations, "Some 3.4 billion barrels of Iraqi oil valued at about $65 
billion were exported under the Programme between December 1996 and 20 
March 2003. " 47 
Saddam also managed to develop and generate money outside the UN deal - 
sometimes equal or much more than that received from the UN. This allowed 
Saddam to bolster his internal position through his direct control of the patronage 
that the oil sales created, and to create the public perception in Iraq that he was a 
great benefactor who had worked tirelessly to win some relief from oppressive 
sanctions. It also provided him with funds to pursue his other objectives. Thus, 
the "oil-for-food" programme flouted almost directly the fundamental intents of 
the sanctions' regime as a whole. Admittedly, it only gave Saddam's regime 
limited room for manoeuvre, but it demonstrated that the international community 
was no longer prepared to prosecute the sanctions ruthlessly, and this prompted 
Saddam to work at further weakening his opponents' resolve. 
ab 1- aa, 26 July 2002, p. 2. 
47 Office of the Iraq Programme, United Nations, 18 July 2003. 
htto: //www un or / efts/oip/index htmi 
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Table 3.2 Iraq revenues from the oil-for food deal for 12 phases that began 
December 10t 1996. Each phase lasts for six months. 
The oil-for-food 
programme 
Barrels (m) Revenue (US$ m) 
Phase I 120 2,150 
Phase II 127 2,125 
Phase III 182 2,085 
Phase IV 308 3,027 
Phase V 361 3,947 
Phase VI 390 7,402 
Phase VII 343 8,302 
Phase VIII 376 9,564 
Phase IX 293 5,638 
Phase X 300 5,350 
Phase XI 226 4,589 
Phase XII 84 2,037 
Source: EIU Iraq Country Report-September 2002, p. 26, 
Table 3.3 Iraq oil exports since the beginning of the oil for food programme 
Phase I-VIII Volume of oil (million of 
barrels) 
Value of oil exported 
($million) 
One 120 2,150 
Two 127 2,125 
Three 182 2,085 
Four 308 3,027 
Five 360.8 3,947 
Six 389.6 7,402 
Seven 343.4 8,302 
Eight 375.7 9,564 
Total 2,206.5 $38,602 
Phase IX-XIII Volume of oil (million of 
barrels) 
Value of oil exported (E 
million) 
Nine 293 E 6,668 (or $5,638) 
Ten 300.2 E 6,004 (or $5,350) 
Eleven 225.9 E 4,886 (or $4,589) 
Twelve 232.7 E 5,517 (or $5,639 
Thirteen 169.6 e 4,175 (or $4,413) 
Total 3,427 E 27,250 (or $25,629 
Source: Office of the Iraq Programme, United Nations, 21 March 2003, 
httn: //www. un. orgMepts/oip/background/basicfi Rures. html 
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Table 3.4 Iraqi oil exports under oil-for-food program, 1998 
Year 1998 Total (Mn B/D 
1 1.09 
2Q 1.52 
3Q 1.77 
4Q 1.80 
Source: Middle East Economic Survey (MEES), 9 August 1999, p. A2. 
Table 3.5 Iraqi oil exports under oil-for-food program 1999 
Year 1999 Total Mn B/D 
Jan 2.00 
Feb 2.10 
Mar 1.87 
Apr 2.20 
May 2.17 
Jun 1.87 
Jul 2.34 
Aug 2.27 
Sep 2.33 
Oct 2.01 
Nov 1.98 
Source: Middle East Economic Survey (MEES), 6 December 1999, p. A6. 
Table 3.6 Iraqi oil exports under oil-for-food program 2000 (MEES 
Estimates- '000 B/D) 
Year 2000 Total (MEES Estimates- '000 B/D 
Jan 2,180 
Feb 2,590 
Mar 2,160 
Apr 2,630 
May 3,030 
Jun 2,540 
Jul 2,440 
Aug 3,000 
Sep 2,810 
Oct 2,960 
Nov 2,700 
Source: Middle East Economic Survey (MEES), 11 December 2000, p. A8. 
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Subsequently, Saddam's regime took almost every possible opportunity to 
challenge the limits of the sanctions regime, using particularly the issue of 
UNSCOM weapons inspection mechanism that had been set up by UN Resolution 
687 in 1991 to ensure that the regime was not able to produce chemical or 
biological weapons or weapons of mass destruction. While the US and the UK 
tended to favour responding to non-compliance with punitive air strikes and bomb 
attacks against suspected weapons' installations, the international community as a 
whole was critical of such aggression and preferred to negotiate with Saddam's 
regime. The chief consequence of this preference was that the "oil-for-food" 
programme was continuously renewed, amended, relaxed and further 
compromised to the advantage of the Iraqi regime. In 1998, Iraq's non- 
compliance reached a level that the UN weapons inspectors had to leave. Iraq later 
ceased all cooperation with UNSCOM. Negotiations with Iraq to install some kind 
of a new inspection system failed. Nevertheless, in 2000, UN Resolution 1330 
eliminated the revenue ceiling on Iraqi oil sales and provided still more flexibility 
for Saddam regime. 
Key global powers, including permanent Security Council members France, 
Russia and China, have become more and more critical of the sanctions' policy as 
a whole. In 1999, the UN passed Resolution 1284, which authorised the possible 
suspension of sanctions, provided that Iraq would agree to comply with 
UNMOVIC, a new weapons inspection system designed to replace UNSCOM. 
Saddam's regime refused and effectively demanded an immediate and 
unconditional suspension of the sanctions' regime. The Iraqis stayed adamant for 
four years. It was a telling blow to the future of sanctions policy that this notion 
received support from a considerable number of countries, not only in the Arab 
world, but also across the whole of the international community. It was becoming 
clear that there was no longer sufficient international consensus to maintain 
anything like a comprehensive economic blockade. 
Even the United States, Saddam's chief Gulf War antagonist and the strongest 
advocate of the sanctions' policy, began suggesting in late 2000 that the blanket 
sanctions should be replaced with so-called "smart" sanctions, which would 
specifically target certain areas of the Iraqi economy. At one point in the spring of 
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2001, the US was apparently ready to support a British proposal in the UN that 
would end all sanctions with the exception of those banning the trade of weapons- 
related materials. 48 The United States continued to support this path subsequently; 
the US delegation at the UN once again raised the possibility of introducing a 
Resolution that would establish a proposed set of smart sanctions. When Russia 
threatened to veto any such Resolution, it touched off a series of intense behind- 
the-scenes negotiations amongst the Security Council members. The decision 
marked the boldest move yet by Russia in the UN ever since the end of Cold War. 
The factors behind the smart sanctions initiative will be explored later in the 
thesis. 
The international rehabilitation of Iraq was evident. The travel ban designed to 
prevent potential trading partners and investors from going to Iraq to arrange 
business deals was no longer respected or enforced by France, Russia, Turkey, 
and the Arab world. Directors of major foreign companies were all but openly 
lobbying, arranging deals and competing with each other for billions of dollars 
worth of commercially lucrative contracts. Moreover, international companies 
very well attended international trade fairs in Baghdad in November of both 2000 
and 2001, as was an International Exhibition and Conference for the 
Reconstruction of Iraq's Infrastructure, held in Baghdad in February 2002. 
Major petroleum companies have also been working, with some success, to 
circumvent the sanctions. As one commentator for the Times newspaper noted at 
the beginning of 2001: "Iraq is the crock of gold for oil multinationals and no one 
should be surprised that Shell is flirting with the regime that guards the world's 
second-largest oil reserves. " The same article stated: "The Anglo-Dutch Oil 
Company, yesterday admitted that it has been holding talks with President 
Saddam Hussein's regime on future oil exploration, once sanctions against Iraq 
are lifted. In a further sign that the decade-old international embargo against 
Baghdad is falling apart, a spokeswoman for the company confirmed that contacts 
had been taking place on and off since 1994. "a9 
48 The Guardian, Thursday 17 May, 2001. 
49 'm s, Wednesday 17 January, 2001. 
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Table 3.7 Iraq crude oil production (1,000 b/d), 1989-2001 
Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
daily 
average 
2,785.8 2,112.6 282.5 526.2 659.5 748.7 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
daily 
average 
736.9 740.4 1,383.9 2,181.1 2,719.8 2,810.2 2,593.7 
Source: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2001, p. 13. 
Table 3.8 Iraq proven crude oil reserves (m b), 1989-2001 
Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Proven 100,000 100,000 100,000 100,000 100,000 100,000 
crude oil 
reserves 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 2000 2001 
Proven 100,000 112,000 112,500 112,500 112,500 112,500 
crude oil 
reserves 
Source: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin, 2001, p. 9. 
Table 3.9 Iraq proven natural gas reserves (Billion standard cu m), 1989-2001 
Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Proven 
reserves 
3,115 3,107 3,100 3,100 3,100 3,115 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Proven 
reserves 
3,360 3,360 3,188 3,188 3,285 3,109 3,109 
Source: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin. 2001, p. 11. 
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Table 3.10 Iraq exports of crude oil and refined products, (1,000 b/d), 1989- 
2001 
Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Exports of 2,405.0 1,722.2 50.5 76.8 76.9 77.8 
crude oil 
and 
refined 
roducts 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Exports 81.8 111.7 765.5 1,440.6 2,153.9 2,062.8 1,735.2 
of crude 
oil and 
refined 
products 
Source: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin. 2001, p. 29. 
Table 3.11 Iraq oil proved reserves 
Year At end 1991 At end 2000 At end 2001 
Proved oil 100.0 112.5 112.5 
reserves 
(Thousand 
million barrels) 
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2002, p. 4. 
Table 3.12 Iraq oil production, (thousands b/d), 1991-2001 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Oil 
production 
279 526 465 522 575 625 1201 2162 2581 2624 2414 
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2002, p. 6. 
Table 3.13 Iraq natural gas proved reserves 
Year At end 1991 At end 2000 At end 2001 
Natural gas proved 2.69 3.11 3.11 
reserves (Trillion 
cubic metres) 
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2002, p, 20. 
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Under the UN "oil-for-food" programme, Iraq pumped millions of barrels per day 
into the oil market. Many oil sources predicted that Iraq could export still more if 
given the opportunity to advance and repair its oil machinery or by allowing 
multi-national companies to invest in its oil industry. Iraq has enormous reserves 
of oil and gas that could be extracted at very low costs. Iraq's oil flowed on to the 
market and, in effect, sometimes played a key role in setting the world prices. 
For instance, the blackouts in California and a dramatic increase in gasoline prices 
nation-wide prior to the last general election in November 2000 led to widespread 
talk of a new "energy crisis". The Saudis angered the Americans by helping to 
keep OPEC a force to reckon with in the world. The Saudis, Iraqis and Iranians 
helped shape up discipline inside OPEC, which pushed the price to over $30 per 
barrel. 
Stephen Pelletiere explained: "In 1999 OPEC embarked on a new course of 
driving prices back up. " Pelletiere stressed "the United States was constrained to 
suffer this alteration in a setup that was working fine for it. It did so probably 
believing that OPEC could not hold out, that, once again, the members would 
cheat, this bringing about a price downturn. " As Pelletiere indicated "Cheating did 
not occur. Even the sheikhs, who orDinarily could be counted on for this, held 
firm. It is not easy to say why this happened, but it would appear that the Saudis 
had something to do with it. " According to Pelletiere ""The Saudi want OPEC to 
remain a force in world politics. They count on it as a vehicle of their national 
policy. " The author stated: "That means from time to time it must change 
direction, even at the risk of displeasing the United States. " At this point, and as 
the he highlighted: "With discipline holding in OPEC ranks, the oil price kept on 
rising, until by the year 2000 it had reached over $30 a barrel. Then the United 
States began to suffer, as certain segments of American society felt the pinch. " 
This was a hard time for many in the US as Pelletiere illustrated: "The winter of 
1999-2000 was intermittently quite cold, which pushed up heating bills in the 
Northeast. This brought protests from homeowners. The independent truckers 
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mobilized and `marched' on Washington, demanding that the government open up 
the strategic oil reserves. , 50 
Moreover, "Iraq and Iran had lined up to push for higher oil prices. Even as the 
two were refusing to discuss peace, they were nonetheless cooperating on a 
common oil policy. Even more interestingly, there were signs that in this 
endeavour, they had the support of the Saudis. "51 Iraq successfully managed to be 
a swing producer, manipulating the oil market on its own schedule and national 
interests. It closed Iraq's oil taps many times to influence the prices as well as the 
UN Security Council. Pelletiere asserted "Gulf oil is important irrespective of 
whether America has its own or not. Prices cannot be regulated unless Gulf oil 
production is controlled. "52 
In sum, at the start the sanctions on Iraq were accompanied by efforts to relief the 
civilian population from the humanitarian crisis through what was called the oil- 
for-food deal. Yet the outcome of the international community efforts has led to 
the rehabilitation of Saddam regime, his re-emergence as an important oil 
exporting state, and renewed the commercial interests and competition for the 
present and potential Iraqi market and oil. Thus, the oil-for-food deal helped 
Saddam and contributed in his rehabilitation. 
What follows is an account and analysis of how the oil-for-food deal altered the 
regional and international diplomatic chessboard and with it the effectiveness of 
the comprehensive economic sanctions. 
so Stephen Pelletiere Iraq and the International Oil System (Praeger, 2001), p. 220. 51 Ibid., p. 221. 52 Ibid., p. 222. 
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4 REGIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY AND 
IRAQ 
De-containment of Iraq happened because of the collapse of the regional 
comprehensive economic sanctions. In this chapter, we soon will discover that 
Saddam managed to break the 1991 siege around him, traded in billions with his 
neighbours, and form strategic relations, while the United States of America could 
not sustain or maintain the comprehensive regional siege on Saddam and his 
regime. 
A key characteristic of the post-Gulf War period has been the seeming return of 
Iraq to the Arab fold after its isolation due to the Gulf War of 1991. The period 
was characterized by several major shifts in Iraq's alignments with Arab countries 
marked by political, strategic and economic alliance. This had a tremendous 
impact on the effectiveness of sanctions against Iraq. Yet no account in the 
international literature carefully analyses the reasons behind the Arab shifts, 
offering no insight into the dynamics behind Arab alignment, thus leaving a great 
deal unexplained and under-explored. 
This chapter will devote greater attention to the role of the Arab world on 
sanctions than has been given so far by the traditional international relations 
literature. The Chapter will highlight the importance of economics, the Palestinian 
issue, domestic challenges, and strategic alliances, particularly as these relate to 
one another to form a powerful determinant of Arab foreign policy towards Iraq 
during the sanctions' era. During this period, the West lost touch with the new 
Middle East and Arab concerns while Saddam managed to win the hearts and 
minds of the region - reminiscent of the "good old days". 
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The argument of this thesis is that the economic sanctions on Iraq are cut into two 
different layers: international sanctions, which are discussed in the next chapter, 
and regional sanctions (which are the result of the general UN sanctions' 
Resolutions and the political differences inside the Arab house because of and 
after the 1991 Gulf War), which will be the concern and focus of this chapter. 
The main bases of Arab-Iraqi interaction after the Gulf War include several 
factors. First, were economic factors to secure the domestic political economy and 
enhance state economic security (i. e. oil, trade, and aid, avert future potential 
economic challenges). Iraq with its oil, and purchasing power, geographic 
proximity, as well as the same traditional and cultural taste made a much more 
attractive market for Arab exports. Also, some of the Arab countries faced dire 
economic problems during the 90s and the early 21St century. They needed to help 
their industry exports, which in turn helped their domestic employment and 
growth. Iraq also managed to use smuggled oil revenues to provide aid for some 
of these Arab governments and civil society. 
Second, were political factors (i. e. internal challenges to state stability and 
regime-consolidation). The apathy of the Iraqi people was translating into 
frustration and anger amongst Arab public opinion. The longer the sanctions 
stayed in place, the more ordinary Iraqis looked like the victims and Saddam like 
a hero for surviving. This presented Arab regimes with shaky legitimacy with a 
formidable problem. It was an issue that could stir up public anger as long as 
Saddam stayed in power. His fiery speeches accusing Arab leaders of allying with 
the United States and Israel against the people of Iraq were not helping these Arab 
leaders either. Saddam managed to rally the masses not only through rhetorical 
speeches but also through mobilizing the intelligentsia, musicians and artists. 
Third, were strategic factors (i. e. the Arab-Israeli conflict, Turkish-Israeli alliance, 
water issues, and Iranian armament threat). The strategic regional alliance that 
was taking place around Iraq during the era of sanctions, in addition to the 
violence on the Palestinian- Israeli front, helped bring Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and 
eventually the rest of the Arab states towards closer and sometimes strategic ties 
with Iraq. 
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Economic sanctions were imposed by the world coalition that fought Iraq in 1991. 
This coalition included major Arab countries (i. e. Egypt, Syria, Morocco and the 
Gulf states). Some of the Arab world broke ties with Baghdad over the Iraqi 
occupation of Kuwait in 1990. Most of the Arab governments joined the 
international alliance that drove Saddam troops from Kuwait in 1991. This chapter 
will clearly show that oil-wealthy Iraq emerged from its 1991 regional isolation. 
Iraq managed to demonstrate regionally its economic, strategic, and political 
potential. A large Arab market, oil money, and strategic depth all served as stimuli 
to move Arab countries towards Iraq despite their political differences resulting 
from the 1991 Gulf War. 
On the one hand, there are the economic indicators of this relationship. Iraq's 
trade with the Arab world, for example, which reached $14.5 billion in December 
2001, has raised up to $26 billion. Egypt takes the first place at trade volume of 
$3.5 billion, then Jordan at $2.8 billion and the UAE at $2.6 billion. 53 On the other 
hand, there is the political indicator of improved relations, such as when, right 
after the Arab Summit of March 2001, which showed the beginning of the Saudi- 
Iraqi rapprochement, the Iraqi Ministry of Information and media asked all print 
media not to verbally attack Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Egypt in Iraq's seven main 
daily newspapers. This rule affected even the President's influential and 
flamboyant son, Uday, who owns the Babel Newspaper. To show its Arab 
neighbours that Baghdad had agreed to change its tone towards Jordan, Egypt 
Saudi Arabia or any other Arab states, this rule passed the test when the authority 
ordered the closure of Uday's Babel Newspaper for one month on 20`" November 
2002, because it had verbally attacked Egypt and Jordan for their relations with 
Israel. This indicates how the Arab factor became so vital for Saddam-who 
himself used to attack moderate Arab governments who had ties with the US and 
Israel with nationalist and inflammatory rhetoric. 54 
53 Ak, Jazeera. net, 25 July 2002. 54 AL Jazeera. net, 20 November 2002. 
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As a further indication of the eroding of comprehensive sanctions and Iraq growth 
in trade with the region and international community, the table compare Iraq trade 
volume with that of the Middle East region and clearly rank Iraq as one of the top 
ten exporters and importers in the region. The table below shows how Iraq 
managed to reach the sixth rank in exports and fifth in imports. In exports, Iraq 
ranked above Libya, Oman, Qatar and Morocco. While in imports it exceeded that 
of Kuwait, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. Such reality clearly indicates 
how Iraq was not isolated country. 
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Table 4.1 Iraq climbs up regional trade ranking, top 10 Muslim countries 
exporters/importers, 2000 
1 Saudi Arabia 84,060 
2 UAE 39,900 
3 Iran 30,017 
4 Algeria 19,550 
5 Kuwait 19.544 
6 Iraq 19,300 
7 Libya 14,200 
8 Oman 11,328 
9 Qatar 9,378 
10 Morocco 7,417 
Importers ($ million) 
1 UAE 31,930 
2 Saudi Arabia 30,300 
3 Iran 15,220 
4 Egypt 14,010 
5 Iraq 13,700 
6 Morocco 11,484 
7 Algeria 9,152 
8 Tunisia 8,560 
9 Libya 7,740 
10 Kuwait 7,622 
Source: MEED, 16 November 2001, p. 20. 
This chapter seeks to show that Saddam managed to break the regional isolation, a 
vital component of the UN economic sanctions, and make his way back to 
regional Arab politics and economics. This chapter also will make clear that the 
Israeli-Arab conflict returned again to the scene as the gravest regional security 
issue in the Middle East and helped Iraq to win considerable public and political 
importance in the region. In addition, the chapter will conclude that enormous 
regional complexity, overriding regional concerns, and the dilemma of the 
Palestinian-Israeli issue, which confronted and affected the US-Arab relations on 
Iraq during the past years, were the challenges that merely drove Arab countries 
deeper into friendship with Saddam. 
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4.1 The second Palestinian uprising and Iraq's regional 
relations 
The effectiveness of the sanctions regime in practice has depended to a large 
extent on Iraq's neighbours. A key political factor that boosted Iraq's growing 
economic role in the region is the Palestinian-Israeli violence. This violence 
shaped many of the regional key player's policies and perceptions towards Iraq 
and as a consequence opened the region-a crucial part in maintaining and 
influencing the effectiveness of sanctions-to Saddam's ambitions and attempts to 
hinder the performance and lessen the impact of the sanctions regime. Therefore 
the author sees it is of great importance to discuss this key political factor-which 
strengthened Saddam in the Arab street and made his survival a strategic 
imperative for Arab countries-before embarking on other significant issues such 
as the economics, strategic and cultural factors that were also behind the collapse 
of the regional sanctions on Iraq. 
The Arabs were promised, after the Gulf War, that the United States would use its 
weight as a superpower to push for genuine and comprehensive peace in the 
Middle East. Peace was going to be based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338 and the 
Madrid Conference, which called for land for peace. Both sides in the conflict 
were urged to make significant, genuine compromises to bring peace into their 
region. Yet less than a decade later, the peace process was killed off by the 
collapse of Camp David talks, the subsequent election of Ariel Sharon and the 
Intifada. 
For many Arabs, the Palestinian conflict remained a sensitive issue. At the same 
time, many taboos remain unbroken: the repatriation of Palestinian refugees, the 
Israeli withdrawal from all settlements in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, the 
exchange of territory, preserving security for Israeli towns and citizens, sharing 
water, and the contentious issue of sharing Jerusalem. These unresolved issues 
helped escalate the situation and draw the Arab and Islamic world closer to 
Baghdad's orbit. 
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Ever since the collapse of the peace negotiations in September 2000, the Arabs' 
relationship with Israel has been marked by mistrust, violence and shaky peace. 
Arab-American relations also suffered. From the Arab point of view, Washington 
exhibits a "double standard" by tolerating "Israeli violations" during the 
Netanyahu, Barak, and Sharon eras, while blaming the Palestinians alone for 
violence, thus pushing them to have to make further concessions on refugees, 
settlements, water and the political-religious sensitive issue of Jerusalem. America 
is seen to have failed to take into account the holiness of Jerusalem to Arab 
Christians and Muslims. 
It is important to note that Arabs viewed the new Intifada of September 2000 in a 
different way: for most Arabs, this is an uprising against Israeli occupation and for 
winning the Palestinian people historic aspirations for a free Palestinian state. 
Many Arabs point out that ever since Sharon entered the Al-Aqsa mosque in East- 
Jerusalem (the third holiest shrine of Islam) in September 2000 coupled with the 
closure of the Orient House in Jerusalem, "aggression" was waged against 
Palestinian aspirations for an independent Palestine with East-Jerusalem as its 
eternal capital. 
Palestine as a state exists in most Arabs hearts and minds. At the Arab League, for 
example, the Palestinian issue is alive in every summit and ministerial meeting 
with the Palestinian flags and symbols present, while Arab media and cultural 
activities constantly highlight and document Palestinian sufferings, Even major 
streets and squares in many key Arab capitals are named after Palestine or some 
"martyrs" from the Palestinian Intifada. The Arab media devotes many of its news 
bulletins to the Palestinian issue and the Intifada. Most of its writers praise and 
justify the Palestinian cause. Moreover, Arab schools teach Arab generations that 
Palestine is occupied by a "Zionist entity" that wants to create a "Zionist state" 
from the Euphrates in Iraq till the Nile in Egypt. The schoolbooks glorify the 
"martyrs" and the Palestinian cause. Schools in key Arab states such as Iraq and 
Syria indoctrinate a new generation on the centrality of the Palestinian issue in 
Arab politics. They depict pictures and stories of Palestinians at war with the 
Israeli occupying force. Yasser Arafat, and his PLO organization, is officially 
greeted and represented in the Arab world as the sole President and representative 
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of an occupied Palestine. Even in meetings of Arab poets, Palestine finds itself as 
the priority in the poems. So it comes as no surprise when most Arabs views 
Israeli actions against Palestinians as aggression against another fellow Arab 
nation and people. 
At the same time, Arabs viewed Barak, Netanyahu and Sharon as trying to settle 
sensitive and long-standing issues by changing facts on the ground and building 
new settlements in occupied land even though when Israel has committed it self to 
negotiate in later phases of the peace process (which should have been started in 
1997) on these very politically sensitive issues of Jerusalem, refugees, water and 
settlements. The arrival of Prime Minister Sharon to power in Israel, alleged past 
involvement in massacres of Palestinians in Lebanon during 1980s, his 
uncompromising rhetoric, his constant bombing of Palestinian areas, and his 
continual refusal to shake hands with Arafat or even negotiate for peace in any 
premise, his undermining of Arafat's credibility and authority, and with no end to 
settlement activities have all defined how the Arab world sees Israel and, 
ultimately, the United States. 
The general Arab perception was that the United States was fully siding with 
Israeli policies. Arabs could not accept sanctioning Iraq while seeing Israel 
slaughtering Palestinians. This harmed America's "honest broker" credibility in 
the peace process "One must not underestimate the continuing centrality of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict for public attitudes in the region. It remains today the 
quickest shortcut in peoples' minds to decide whether they like or dislike one 
country or another. It is an issue that has defined the political identity of Arabs 
and Muslims over the past half-century. "55 
ss Shibley Telhami "Defeating Terror: Confront Supply and Demand" Middle East Insight 
November-December 2001, www. mideastinsi hg t. orgll 1 Q1/telhami. html 
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Politics is about perceptions, and in the politically volatile realities of the Middle 
East, perceptions shape politics and strategy most of the time. Adel Darwish wrote 
in the Middle East Magazine "The scenario recalls May 1967, when the late 
autocratic Egyptian leader Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser decided to conduct a 
sabre-rattling exercise to keep the Israelis in check. He moved some 100,000 
troops into Sinai desert. The operation was a crazy exercise. Colonel Nasser had 
no intention of invading Israel, but the Israelis were taking no chances and 
launched the Six Day War, the consequences of which remain the basis for many 
of the Middle East's current problems. "56 The perception from the Israeli side is 
no less dramatic than that of the Arab side. From the Likud viewpoint, there can 
be no sharing with the Arabs, especially on issues that are perceived to 
compromise Israel's security and right to exist. Naturally, the tragic bombing 
targeting civilians in the street of Israel increased this notion among hard-line 
Israelis and moderate ones alike. 
In general, and most importantly for this thesis, the failure to honestly implement 
the Oslo agreement by both sides of the conflict has jeopardized US' Middle East 
interests, especially in Iraq. As mentioned by many writers including Rosemary 
Hollis US interests was not only affected in the most nationalist states like Syria 
and Egypt, but also in the more politically passive Gulf States, such as Saudi 
Arabia, Bahrain and even Kuwait. In these states, where protests were rare, saw 
large anti-American and anti-Israeli demonstrations coupled with the rise of 
fundamentalism. Rosemary Hollis explained why: 
In policy terms, meanwhile, the United States has sought to manage its 
relations with Israel on the one hand, and the Gulf states on the other, 
in such a way that the two `issue areas' do not collide. However, with 
the breakdown of the Arab-Israeli peace process in 2000 and the 
advent of the second Palestinian Intifada, Washington's efforts to 
separate its dealings in the Gulf from its dealings with Israel have 
collapsed. A new generation of Gulf Arabs have come to view the 
56 Adel Darwish "Saddam & the New Order" The Middle East April 2001. 
htto: //www afric sia hive index html 
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Palestinian cause as a defining aspect of their identity as Arabs, and a 
wave of anti-Americanism has overtaken the region in the face of US 
support for an Israeli government set on suppressing Palestinian 
resistance. 57 
The dilemma was that Arabs viewed the two issues of Iraq and Palestine as 
interlinked matters; therefore, moderate Arab leaders could not afford to ignore 
what was considered the two core Arab issues. Bush's administration policy of 
disengagement from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during the period of 2001- 
2002 has placed moderate Arabs in an uncomfortable and weak position; the 
result was thus immediately evident in the American failure to rally Arab support 
for its policy on Iraq. Arab states resumed commercial and diplomatic links with 
Saddam, refused to see Saddam as a threat to the region, and objected to military 
cooperation with the US plans to topple Saddam during the 90s, or even to grant 
the US use of facilities to attack Iraq with the sole exception of Kuwait. 
Saddam knew the importance of linking the Iraqi issue with the Palestinian 
conflict, to make an impact of political and strategic significance. During the 
second Gulf War, Saddam used the Palestinian problem, prompting George Bush 
then to pressurize Israel not to retaliate on Saddam's Scuds that were falling on 
Israel. Bush went to great pains to de-link the war on Saddam and the Palestinian 
conflict. He knew that it would be much harder to achieve a successful war 
against Saddam while giving the Israeli government a free hand in killing 
Palestinians. Today history repeats itself. 
Checkpoints, air raids, suicide bombs, and indignities against people replaced 
peace. This undermined the chances of peace, hope and security for both Arabs 
and Israelis, which opened the way for Saddam's rehabilitation into the Arab 
system. In that context, moderate Arab leaders found it hard to cooperate with and 
defend pro-American policies on Iraq, because in the view of Arab public opinion 
the Palestinian and Iraqi civilians were victims of the same plight. 
57 Rosemary Hollis "Getting Out of the Iraq Trap" International Affairs 79,1 (2003), p. 28. 
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Thus, every time the peace process deteriorates, Saddam capitalized on what were 
widely seen as contradictions in United States Middle East policy. He helped 
increase anti-American sentiment with inflammatory speeches and made moderate 
Arab allies appear weak and treasonous in the eyes of Arab public opinion which 
gave ammunition to fundamentalist groups to recruit, criticize and attack the 
moderate governments and the liberals voices in the Arab world. Therefore, going 
along the lines of US policies would have been highly destabilizing, politically 
destructive, and a possible recipe for disaster for many friendly moderate Arab 
regimes. 
Saddam's propaganda machine to the Arab World had been successful in 
presenting Iraq and Palestine as a victim of "US/Israeli aggression". Saddam also 
managed to draw strength from the Palestinian cause, by using the hopelessness of 
moderate Arab leaders coupled with street political frustration, to emerge as the 
champion of the Palestinian uprising against Israel. He rallied the masses with 
tough rhetoric against US and Israel. "Rise up, dear ones, for whom we are ready 
to sacrifice anything. Say to your enemies, the enemies of our Arab nation who 
are the foul Jewish usurpers, their covetous allies and all the colonialists and their 
abject servants: Stop abusing the Arab nation. "ss 
The Palestinian Intifada helped to rehabilitate Saddam inside the Arab and Islamic 
world, and strengthened his stature among his people. He mobilized the Arabs and 
Muslim world to meet in Baghdad and support the Intifada. On one such an 
occasion, the title of the meeting was clearly linking the two under one cause 
"Palestine and Iraq in the same trench facing up to US-Zionist tyranny" the title of 
an Islamic conference held in Baghdad where 350 delegates from the Islamic 
world attended. 59 
In another form of projecting strength and rallying the masses, Saddam mobilized 
more than six million volunteers to liberate Palestine, pledged 1 billion euros from 
his UN controlled oil revenues to the Palestinian uprising, compensated 
generously the families of Palestinian suicide bombers against Israel, and ordered 
58 BBC117 July 200 1. 59 Ate. 20 August 2001. 
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the construction of a monument to honour the Palestinian who died in the Intifada. 
He even sent Iraqi doctors to Amman to treat Palestinians injured in the Intifada 
while at the same time paying for their treatment in Baghdad. 
Many Palestinians saw Saddam as their financial and moral salvation "Really, it's 
not just the money, it's Saddam's just and strong political position. He doesn't 
give in to Israel or America. He doesn't give in. He represents us, " said a 
Palestinian mother of a boy killed in the Intifada. 60 The Telegraph reported how 
Saddam's assistance to the second Palestinian Intifada serves the prolonging of it 
for his own political ends: "One of the few smiles in Jenin-the site of the biggest 
battle between Israelis and Palestinians (in April 2002) - is on the face of 
Mahmoud Besharat, the man who is handing out millions of pounds of largesse 
from Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi leader. " The British newspaper added, "payments 
are on strict scale: £350 for a wound, £650 for disablement, £ 6,500 for death as a 
"martyr" and ;C 17,000 for a suicide bomber. , 61 
Through skilfully using the Intifada, Iraq began to make its presence felt more 
forcefully in inter-Arab politics. In every Arab TV and Satellite channel, Arabs 
could see that Saddam's portraits and Iraqi flags shown alongside the Palestinians 
in the daily anti-Israeli protests. In nutshell, the Intifada helped Saddam to rebuild 
his relations with all Arab states with the very exception of Kuwait. In addition, 
Saddam managed to reinforce pro-Iraqi bases in many vital Arab capitals and 
among the Arab intellectual community in Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Morocco, and the 
Gulf States. 
Unfortunately, the US-sponsored peace proved elusive and lifeless. On the 
ground, hatred, anger, bombs, violence and despair have become the alternative to 
peace. Increasingly losing faith in a diplomatic solution to their conflict with 
Israel, the Palestinian street banked on Saddam's money, army, and WMDs. 
Economic sanctions seek to prevent Saddam from acquiring all the billions of oil 
revenue into his hands; however this aim was running against Arab interests, 
especially those of the Palestinians and other poor Arab states. Thus, Saddam's oil 
60 BBC, 6 August 2001. 61 Alan Philips "Saddam Spends Millions to Win Hearts in Jenin" The Telegraph 30 May 2002. 
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money was significant to the Intifada and the Arab world at large. Already in a 
weak economic position, Arafat and the Arabs would not want to throw away 
such a pivotal economic source, thus more than ever, the sanctions on Saddam's 
oil revenues was counter to immediate Arab needs and economic security, 
especially as he became a significant contributor to the Intifada and directly or 
indirectly to many other Arab states' economies. 
During the sanctions era, Arabs were repeatedly told by the United States in 1991 
that Saddam was the enemy; however, the Arabs did not subscribe to this view. 
Containing Saddam at this time meant only one thing for them: pure US efforts to 
silence and destroy the only country rich enough, patriotic enough and 
knowledgeable enough to stand up to Israel and America. Iraq under Saddam 
Hussein was, for many Arabs, the financer and the strategic backbone for the 
Arab nationalists. Have that destroyed, and you have cut the strategic element of 
Arab security. 
For instance, while the United States viewed Iraqi weapons as dangerous weapons 
in the hands of an unpredictable dictator that can aid or supply terrorists with it, 
the Arabs saw what they perceived to be the real terror on daily TV news, used by 
the Israelis with American made airplanes and guns. The Arab media has 
concentrated heavily on broadcasting live news of daily bombing and humiliation 
of Palestinians areas by Israeli forces for over two years. Thus, Iraqi weapons 
were considered at that critical period of time for the Arabs as the "sword of the 
Arabs". Even worse, America and Israel became one in the eyes of most Arabs, a 
merged interest set to destroy first Nasser and now Arafat and Saddam. Thus, 
seeking to destroy Saddam's weapons was perceived in the Arab world as a 
hidden American/Israeli agenda to suppress any Arab challenge as a balance of 
power and humiliate the future Arab generations by keeping them backward and 
under occupation. Israel's continual refusing to open its nuclear, chemical, and 
biological weapons facilities for UN inspections and monitoring regime 
reinforced conspiracy theorists' in the Arab world perception of a hidden 
American/Israeli agenda to subjugate the Arab people and prevent them from 
reaching the technological balance of power with Israel. 
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The Intifada managed to strengthen nationalists' feelings and increased solidarity 
toward the Iraqi issue. Amr Moussa, the head of the Arab League, summed up 
this nationalists emotions when he commented on the bombing of Baghdad in 
March 2003: "The bombing and violence we're seeing on satellite TV should stir 
the ire of every Arab who sees it, " adding that the bombing of Baghdad could not 
be tolerated. 62 
Iraq is one of the first Arab countries for which the Palestinian cause became an 
internal political issue and a weapon of foreign policy. Saddam used the 
Palestinian uprising as a perfect opportunity to bolster his position and regionally 
rehabilitate his sanctions stricken country by pressing on the powerless and 
divided moderate Arab governments to need him back. He employed the UN "oil- 
for-food" deal and the oil smuggling revenues to finance the Intifada. 
Going beyond rhetoric, and after a long boycott, Arab leaders had to invite Iraq- 
along side the Kuwaiti delegations to the Arab League emergency summit in 
Cairo and later to the Amman Summit on March 2001 and the Arab Summit in 
Beirut March 2002. This provided an indication of Iraq's strategic importance in 
the region, adding a further gain to Saddam in breaking the walls of sanctions. 
Iraq refused to discuss sanctions as the core subject in these meetings, but rather 
gave the priority to the Palestinian issue. This gave the impression that his country 
has already broken the Arab part of sanctions and it was not necessary to discuss 
it any further. The invitation also meant that Arab leaders acknowledged that 
Saddam Hussein's regime had showed he could survive sanctions and was likely 
to survive for some time. Thus, Saddam's survival was a fact and reality, a needed 
reality at that critical period of time while Sharon was still in power. 
All these facts cannot be dismissed lightly. The Intifada had made the sanctions' 
regime harder to sustain because as frontline states began to resist efforts to 
continue besieging Iraq, it became harder to establish procedures for the control of 
weapons of mass destruction, long-range missile technology, and oil/goods 
smuggling. It even made it harder for moderate Arab governments to keep 
62 CNN, 22 March 2003. 
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Saddam isolated from the region's politics, and allowed Saddam to yield the 
dividends in his struggle to break out the regional and international containment 
box. 
Moreover, the United States failed to place Iraq and the peace process in two 
separate tracks. For isolated Iraq, the new Middle East crisis offered a vital 
opportunity to defeat regional isolation and provided Iraq with the means to 
achieve a vital strategic goal of playing the influential Arab role once again. In a 
nutshell, the Palestinian uprising had changed the geo-strategic parameters of the 
Middle East. 
It was reiterated constantly that Saddam Hussein was 'in his box', in total 
exclusion from the world and a threat to the Arab and non-Arab neighbours. This 
thesis aims to prove that Saddam was not isolated. Instead Iraq was politically, 
strategically, culturally and economically interacting significantly and 
suspiciously with neighbouring states. Syria, Jordan, UAE, Egypt, and Turkey 
became main centres for Iraqi commercial dealings and wheeling. Substantial 
trade took place through all Iraq's borders with the very exception of Kuwait. This 
undoubtedly paved the way for more cordial and strategic relations with 
neighbouring governments and people. Cross-border smuggling and ambiguous 
deals also took place with Iraq's immediate neighbours. Sanctions for Iraq's 
neighbours had become irrelevant. Direct and indirect pressure from the United 
States to curtail trade with Iraq were ignored repeatedly even by United States 
closest ally Egypt who in stead broke the flight ban on Baghdad and signed a free 
trade agreement with Saddam's government. Therefore, this required a closer look 
and analysis of key regional powers and their relations with Iraq during the 
sanctions era. 
The following section treats these economic, strategic, as well as the cultural 
relations with Iraq in greater detail. 
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4.2 Iraq and key Arab actors 
4.2.1 Syria 
Certainly the unprecedented overtures to Baghdad can be explained by the 
Palestinian situation, yet other factors remained powerful determinants as well. 
Syria, one of the most nationalist Arab states, was one such a country that had 
smoothened Iraq's return to the Arab fold. 
Diplomatic relations between Syria and Iraq, broken in 1979 over an alleged coup 
attempt against Saddam and over Syria's support for Iran during its war with Iraq 
during 1980-88, were resumed in the aftermath of the Hussein Kamel's-Saddam's 
son in law and Iraq's minister of defence and industry- defection to Jordan in 
1995. "Syrian President Hafez Assad sees the whole affair as part of an effort to 
isolate him... Assad is so preoccupied that his aides have told visitors he is 
devoting himself full-time to the Iraqi question. "63 It did not take long before the 
wheels started turning in Saddam's favour, especially after the death of the Syrian 
President Hafiz al Assad, and ties started to get warmer. It is worth noting that 
relations between the two rival factions of the socialist Ba'ath party in Syria and 
Iraq have been poor in the past two decades. Damascus backed Tehran in its eight 
years of war with Baghdad in the 1980s. Hafiz al Assad also sent Syrian troops to 
force Iraq out of Kuwait in the US-led alliance in the 1991 Gulf War. However, 
the situation has changed: "Syria has repeated its demands for UN sanctions 
against Iraq to be lifted and announced it is to double trade with Baghdad. "64 
Damascus-Baghdad alignment included economic, political and strategic 
components that have played a role as the rapprochement developed. Two things 
were certain: first that this rapprochement was not coincidental, and second, that it 
had helped Iraq greatly to emerge from its regional isolation. 
63 Christopher Dickey "Enemies Like These" T ewsweek 02 October 1995, pp. 49-50. 64 $., 27 September 2000. 
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There was a public and private face of this alliance. The public face started in the 
aftermath of Hussein Kamel's defection to Jordan in 1995. The late Syrian 
President, Hafiz al Assad, together with the Egyptian President, belittled the 
defections of Saddam's son in laws to Amman by not giving a welcoming boost 
and endorsement for Saddam-son in laws. Since 1997, the two countries had 
cleared up their differences, opened their borders, encouraged oil and commercial 
trade, signed free trade agreement, revived and upgraded diplomatic ties, and 
tremendously scaled down the sponsoring of each other's opposition groups. 
On the undisclosed secret side of this alliance, it is only possible to predict as it is 
related to the intelligence sharing and planning that might have been going on 
behind the scenes. It undoubtedly can get clearer when we know that the two Arab 
regimes were drawn towards each other because of shared security and strategic 
concerns. The swing in attitude between the two Arab countries' ruling elites had 
moved their relations from a vicious rivalry to a strategic geo-political 
relationship. "Arab diplomatic sources in Damascus reported late last year that 
Maher Assad, the brother of the Syrian president, made a secret two-day visit to 
Baghdad to discuss military cooperation with the Iraqi regime, During his visit, he 
met with Qusay Hussein, the younger son of Saddam Hussein who has taken 
charge of important security functions for the Iraqi regime. Shortly thereafter, 
Assad appointed a committee of military and intelligence officials, headed by 
Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam, to oversee military ties with Baghdad, " 
The Middle East Intelligence Bulletin added "According to Israeli intelligence 
sources, Qusay visited Damascus in January to discuss contingency plans for 
Syrian-Iraqi military cooperation in the event of an Israeli attack. Qusay 
reportedly agreed to establish a joint command and control centre and place two 
Iraqi armoured divisions (the 10th Armoured Division and an unspecified 
Republican Guard division) on a state of heightened readiness for deployment to 
,, bs Syria. 
65 Gary C. Gambill "Syria's Foreign Relations: Iraq" MiddleEast Intelligence Bulletin March 
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This strategic understanding was confirmed later by Iraq's Vice President Taha 
Yassin Ramadan in a visit to Syria On January 31,2001, when he said "that the 
two countries are negotiating a long-term strategic cooperation agreement and that 
the main terms of the accord only need drafting and finalizing. s66 Tariq Aziz, 
Iraq's Deputy Prime minister and former Minister of Foreign Affairs confirmed 
these plans when he stressed Baghdad's backing of Syria against any possible 
threat from Israel. In an interview with the United Arab Emirates' Al-Khaleij 
Arabic daily, he confirmed that Iraq had military arrangements ready to stand 
behind Syria militarily and did actually so when Israel threats against Syria 
increased in late 2000: "We sent our forces closer to the Syrian borders to be 
ready if conditions require so. "67 
In a front-page article, the Israeli Ha'aretz daily wrote that weapons and military 
equipment had been channelled to Iraq via road and rail routes. The newspaper 
said that Syria was becoming the buyer for Saddam. Syria bought weapons for 
Iraq from Eastern and former Soviet Union countries and shipped them to Iraq. 68 
In addition, the recent formation in Iraq of the Jerusalem army and al-Quds army 
of some 6 million people could be explained as a possible effort from Baghdad to 
add military weight to Syria's defence in case exposed to an immediate Israeli 
attack. 
Iraq's mobilization of popular troops coincided with continued speculations in 
some Western quarters that Iraq retained -in addition to its conventional 
capabilities-non-conventional WMD coupled with Iraqi periodical rhetorical 
threats that could represent a possible threat to Israel and American forces in the 
Gulf region. 
In the same tone, Syria opposed any attack on Iraq, rejecting Washington's views 
on smart sanctions and definition of state terrorism. 69 On one such attack, during 
Desert Fox operation in 1998, tens of thousands Syrian were permitted to take to 
the streets and pour their anger against the American and British embassies. They 
stoned both embassies and scaled the US embassy wall to pull down and burn the 
66 Ibid. 
67Arabi`c News, 19 February 2001. 
68 
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ut , 16 November 2001. 
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American flag, while others were busy destroying the residence of the 
ambassador. One Syrian expressed the general mood at the time: "The Americans 
are trying to make us kneel down and surrender, I will not leave before I burn the 
flag and make my voice heard. s70 Such public demonstrations in support of the 
Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein were un-heard of in Syria during the 80s and 
much of the 90s. 
The failure of the Middle East peace process played a key role in how the Syrian 
leadership perceived threats and the balance of power within the region. Since the 
Madrid conference of 1991, Syria has become committed to the peace process as a 
strategic option to solving the Arab-Israeli conflict. Yet following the right wing 
Likud leader, Benjamin Netanyahu's, victory in Israel's elections of May 1996 
and with the subsequent collapse of the Israeli-Syrian negotiations, a dramatic 
policy reversal was undertaken in Syrian regional foreign policy. The situation 
was complicated even further by Sharon's arrival at the helm of power in Israel in 
2000, which gave the region a different political landscape and pushed Syria even 
closer to Iraq. Sharon's actual bombing of Syrian troops in Lebanon inflamed the 
entire Syrian leadership. The mood was grim, "Since the attack, Syrian soldiers in 
Lebanon have been put on a state of high alert and there have been troop 
movements in the country. "" 
Syria began to shift its priorities and started viewing Iraq as its strategic backyard. 
Syrian leaders viewed Iraqi weapons that America wanted to destroy as a pivotal 
"Arab sword" in the face of any possible Israeli menace. It is worth mentioning 
that Iraqi troops had once prevented Israeli tanks from entering Damascus, and so 
were seen by the Syrians as their defender. A Syrian government spokesman 
confirmed their fears, speaking after Israeli attacks on Syrian troops in Lebanon: 
"This (aggression) constitutes a dangerous escalation that would destabilize 
security and stability in the region. "72 As the peace process started to deteriorate, 
Syrian and Iraqi cooperation increased on regional security. 73 
70 CNN, 19 December 1998. 
71 iN. 16 April 2001. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Reuters, 2 December 2001. 
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It was also easy to see why rapprochement with Baghdad was necessary for the 
Syrians when one takes into account the Turkish-Israeli military alliance. Efraim 
Inbar clarified the new alliance: "The exercise is a clear signal to radical regimes 
that there is a realignment in the Mideast and a new balance of power. "74 As a 
front-line Arab power with both Israel and Turkey, Damascus considers this 
alliance as a siege surrounding it to push it to compromise further on the question 
of a negotiated settlement with Israel (e. g. the Golan Heights) and its 
historic/territorial disputes with Turkey such as that over Iskandarouna. The 
alliance means: joint exercises, Israeli warplanes training in Turkish air space, and 
joint naval exercises. 75 Hence, with this alliance, Israeli jets could easily surround 
Syria, Iraq and Iran, placing Damascus, Tehran, and Baghdad external threat. 
The new balance of power had increased Syria's feeling of regional isolation and 
strategic encirclement. From Syria's Middle Eastern calculations this 
unprecedented situation necessitated an upgrading of their relations as it was in 
neither side's interests to purse a different path other than mutual cooperation. 
The Syrian perception of an Israeli/Turkish threat to its national security had been 
increased ever since the regular and large-scale Turkish military interventions in 
northern Iraq. The prospect of an armed Turkish presence on Syria's natural and 
strategic sphere of influence dominated the top foreign and security decision- 
makers in Damascus. Thus, the Syrian leadership saw the need to create a 
strategic environment more favourable for Syria's national interest. In such 
context, a comprehensive reconciliation with Baghdad was a strategic and crucial 
card to strengthen Syria's stance regionally and internationally, and provides it 
with a space to politically manoeuvre. Through its alliance with Baghdad, Syria 
was given an opportunity to reassert its role as a major regional player. 76 
Thus despite Syria's past ideological bitterness with Saddam, the need to 
counterbalance the new military alliance was a vital Syrian interest. In this context 
7s CNN, 7 January 1998. 
BBC, 8 August 2001. 
76 "The Turkish Israeli Alliance is a New Destabilizing Factor in the Middle East and Southern 
Europe Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, April 2000, pp. 33-34,82. 
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Saddam was there to provide Syria with a powerful partner economically, 
politically and militarily. 
Another element of a political strategic value of cooperation was in the area of 
water rights. Syria and Iraq's threat perceptions also centred on this vital yet 
complicated issue. Concern about water was part and parcel of both countries' 
drive towards each other, and remained a possible future source of conflict with 
Turkey and Israel. Turkey, due to its geography, controlled the headwaters of the 
Euphrates River and Tigris. Turkey raised tension with its neighbours when it 
constructed dozens of dams (e. g. the controversial Ataturk Dam) on the Tigris and 
Euphrates rivers-that also went through Syria and Iraq-threatening to reduce both 
countries' share of water. Such a prospect could plunge Syria and Iraq into water 
shortages, electricity cuts, pollution and possible famine. 
As is well known, water is precious in the Middle East, and any Turkish action 
could pose a direct threat with long terms implications for the agriculture, 
development and industry of both Syria and Iraq. "Syria, and its neighbour Iraq, 
blame Turkey's huge network of dams on the Tigris and the Euphrates for 
threatening their water supplies. 07 The Associated Press reported on November 
2001 yet another meeting between Iraq's and Syria's Irrigation Ministers, raising 
once again their concerns over the dwindling water supply from Turkey: "Syria 
and Iraq are concerned about Turkey's commitment to a 1987 agreement on 
sharing the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris. "78 Syria had constantly suffered 
from water shortages coupled with droughts and population increase (from 
300,000 in 1960 to 4 million in 2001 in Damascus alone). The Syrian authorities 
had to cut water supplies in many times on Damascus for up to 20 hours a day. 79 
Thus it was not surprising to see the two countries look to each other on this issue. 
A final arena for mutual cooperation between the two Arab countries was in 
investment, oil and trade. Iraq was also of economic significance to Syria, which 
was struggling to move from the socialist economy of Hafez al-Assad to a more 
78 
77 BC, 26 September 2000. 
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modem capitalist economy. Trade with Iraq provided Syria with cash, discounted 
oil for its energy security, interest-free loans, and reinforces Syria's role as a key 
transit country whilst provided lucrative trade contracts for its private and 
industrial sector. Thus it also benefited the Syrian merchants, who provided one of 
the pillars of legitimacy that the government rested on. 
Beyond Iraq's strategic depth, Saddam also demonstrated his full economic 
potential and rendered Syria's new president with large market and oil money 
despites sanctions. For Iraq, cementing the link with Damascus was critical to 
assure that a key regional player would not isolate it, economically and politically. 
Iraq, for its part, used economic instruments such as increased trade, cash 
handouts and oil money to cement the relationship with its Arab neighbours 
including that of Syria "For new markets, Syrians look to Baghdad. Iraq has a 
surplus of capital, Syria a surplus of labour. An ideal match. i80 Perhaps it was not 
surprising, then, to see the two countries push for bilateral economic 
reconciliation in the fields of oil, trade and commercial contracts. The facts are 
clear and unambiguous. Headlines read: "Syria and Iraq hold trade talksi81; " Syria 
and Iraq to boost trade , 82; " Syria and Iraq sign trade deal"; 83 "Iraq reopens trade 
centre in Syria"84; "Syria reopens trade centre in Iraq after gap of eighteen 
years"85 ;" Iraq exports oil to Syria"86; " Syria and Iraq forge closer ties"87; "Syria 
and Iraq strengthen ties"88 
Baghdad and Damascus reopened an old UN-approved pipeline, pumping 
discounted Iraqi crude oil outside the United Nations sanctions system where 
millions of dollars went straight to Saddam's pocket. "The pipeline, dormant for 
nearly 20 years, was quietly reopened last November. "89 Baghdad looked to 
extend its regional influence, regain control over oil-its main source of income- 
and generates more private unrestrained channels of revenues: "the clandestine 
B° Brian Whitaker "Syria Looks to the Future" The Guardian 13 March 2001. 
81 BQ 22 May 2001. 
82 BBC331 January 2001. 
83 Ibid. 
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89 B, 29 January 2001. 
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pipeline operation generates at least $2 million a day in funds for the regime of 
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. "90 
The Syrians benefited from the discounted Iraqi oil supplies on a number of 
levels. Syria's army in Lebanon benefited from the nearly free Iraqi oil (around 
150,000 barrels per day)91 while Syria's own local production of oil began to rise 
with an improved international bargaining position to demand better prices from 
buyers. A trader and a Syrian crude buyer confirmed: "Syria has not reduced runs 
but is selling more because they are getting more from the Iraqis. " Other traders 
noted that: "with larger export volumes Sytrol-Syria's state oil marketer- has 
become more rigid on its official selling prices, starting higher and conceding less 
ground to lifters. "92 In addition, the two countries had agreed to construct a new 
oil pipeline link: "Baghdad and Damascus agreed in 1998 to build a new pipeline 
to stretch through Syrian and Lebanese territory with a capacity of 1.4 million 
barrels per day to replace an old one. 903 
Iraqi trade relations with Syria had included other elements besides oil and water 
Early this year, Iraq's vice President and Syria's Prime minister signed a free 
trade agreement in Damascus, which further improved the relations between the 
two: "it means the exchange of goods between the two countries can take place 
without import licences or customs fees. "94 
From a Syrian point of view, a push for bilateral economic integration was high 
on the agenda because this would enhance its economic security and position 
them for favoured treatment by the Iraqis. For Iraq, this was another way of 
maximizing its leverage in the power politics of the region and destroying the UN 
regional siege. The free trade agreement meant that trade; goods, labour, banking 
and investment could flow easily without reservations between the two countries, 
helped by the fact that the UN had no significant monitors- with only a single 
small checkpoint between Iraq-Syria's border- on in Syria or along the Iraqi- 
90T, 23 January 2001. 
91 Reuters, 23 November 2001. 
92 ut s, 24 May 2001; and Reuters, 31 January 2001. 93 Reuters, 30 October 2001. 
94 BBC, 1 April 2001. 
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Syrian long land border. Syria simply refused an American request to place those 
monitors on its soil or its long land border with Iraq, viewing it as a violation to its 
sovereignty. 
Following the implementation of the free trade agreement, Iraq established a free 
trade zone in Al-Qaem near the Syrian border. 95 Also Baghdad "had agreed to 
import $20 million worth of Syrian-produced medicines per year and to double 
imports via Syrian ports (to one million tons in the year 2000 from nearly 500,000 
tons in 1999)", 96 while from among 14 international companies, a Syrian 
company was awarded a huge water contract for the Tigris River of 133 Million 
Euro ($113 Million) 97 
In a further move to demonstrate that regional links were far more important to 
the two countries, 2001 witnessed the participation of 130 Syrian companies, 
under the motto "Made in Syria", held an exhibition for Syrian products only in 
Baghdad without the hassle of competitors on the ground of the Baghdad 
International Fair halls. 98 This was repeated in February 2002, when hundreds of 
Syrian companies held two trade exhibitions for their products in Baghdad. 99 
Meanwhile it was announced in Baghdad that the two countries signed an 
agreement to start joint major companies as a joint venture between the two. This 
was signed and the agreement "covers the foundation of seven various companies 
in the industrial, pharmaceutical, and telecom areas as well as cooperation in the 
fields of transport, health, and commerce. "100 In addition, the Syrian Minister of 
Trade and Economics announced in a visit Baghdad that the trade volume 
between Syria and Iraq had expanded to more than $2 billion and forecasted that 
it will go up to $3 billion by 2004, The Minister added that the two countries had 
signed a new agreement to establish joint companies for irrigation, cement, food 
oil, and glass factories. 10' 
95 AFP, 30 June 2001. 
96 Reuters, 26 May 2000. 
97 Al-Jazeera. net, 29 May 2001. 
98 Arabic News, 2 July 2001. 
99 Arabic News, 11 February 2002. 
IN Arabic News, 11 February 2002. 
101 1- aa, 26 June 2002, p. 11. 
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As for the transportation sector, Baghdad and Damascus planned the 
establishment of a joint transportation company, reopened its railway link from 
Mosul-Aleppo and "decided to link its ports to the Syrian ports through a railway 
line aiming to facilitate the transport of commodities and goods between the two 
countries. " 02 
In June 2002, the Syrian Zeyzoun dam collapsed, which killed 22 Syrians, made 
4000 homeless and destroyed crops and livestock. Saddam Hussein wasted no 
time and airlifted humanitarian assistance to victims in Syria with 20 Iraqi 
planes. 103 In addition, he ordered that Syria should receive 18 million Euros 
worth of oil to rebuild houses for the victims of the dam collapse. '04 It is also 
worth noting here that a rumour was going on in June 2002 among Iraqi and 
Syrian businessmen that Saddam Hussein had given 6000 luxury cars to Syrian 
political, military and parliamentary officials as a gift from him to these officials 
for their political support. 
In further upgrading of their relations, Syria and Iraq lifted visa restrictions on 
their citizens travelling between the two, while there was talk of both countries 
abrogating the passport and replacing it by identity cards. Merchants, businessmen 
and tourists do not need anymore permissions from the authorities to travel, as 
used to be required in the past, While the value of trade between the two was 
forecasted to climb: "We have agreed with Syria and Jordan to increase imports 
and bring them respectively to 1.5 billion and one billion dollars" announced 
Iraq's Commerce Minister Mohammed Mehdi Saleh. '°5 As well these series of 
road, sea and rail agreements, and the encouragement of tourism had been an 
important cultural aspect of the new relationship. Iraqi and Syrian tourists and 
also pilgrims visited each other's countries (where the Islamic holy shrine of 
Zeinab the granddaughter of the Prophet Mohammad and the Imam Hussein's 
daughter Roqiyah is in the Syrian capital while Iraq holds major Islamic saints 
like Imam Ali, Hussein, Hassan, Abbas, etc. ), which boosted expenditure in each 
country's domestic commerce, market and cities. 
102 Arabic News, 2 July 2001. 
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Another highlight of Iraqi cultural activities in Syria, which was also the most 
neglected part in any research on the Middle East, came from the traditional and 
regionally well-respected Iraqi music. Singers and bands went to Syria to perform 
traditional Iraqi songs, including some new songs related to current life in Iraq 
under sanctions. Singers who were sponsored or encouraged by the Iraqi Ministry 
of Information (or Propaganda Ministry) sang sad songs to thousands of Syrians 
with words reminding their "Arab brothers" of the daily sufferings of sanctions 
and the injustices of UNSCOM (the UN Special Commission in charge of 
disarming Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War) that is "prolonging the sanctions". Major 
hits like Baghdad, Jerusalem, and Ya Arab for the currently leading Iraqi/Arab 
singer Kathem Al Sahir have reached every Arab home. There was even a very 
credible rumour that he made a private party for the late Syrian President Assad 
and the Sheikhs in the UAE and Qatar. Songs came to play a major role in the 
Iraqi propaganda campaign for the Arab world, as they can inflame emotions, 
awaken conscious, and serve as a constant reminder to those with busy daily lives. 
In addition, the Syrian Ministry of Information forbade an Iraqi (Syrian-based) 
opposition newspaper from the market, in accordance with the recent Syrian-Iraqi 
rapprochement. 106 
Iraq's strategic importance for Syria was further highlighted by the possibility that 
a post-Saddam Iraq might chose to join the peace process. This could strategically 
and politically pressure Syria, placing it in a much weaker bargaining position in 
the peace process battle. 
This new international and regional environment had created a whole new set of 
interests. Syria's first priority, therefore, had been to ensure the survival of 
Saddam's regime in a stable united Iraq and the breaking of the economic 
isolation on it that became another potential determinate of Syrian foreign policy 
towards Baghdad. The Syrians felt that the sanctions' policy and the American 
efforts to overthrow the Ba'athist regime by force did not exhibit the slightest 
106 Al-flayat, 24 May 2002, p. 2. 
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concern for Syrian interests; thus they were compelled to protect its own strategic 
interests threatened by US policy and its ramifications. In this context, Damascus 
has not had much reason to support economic sanctions or military actions against 
Saddam. 
Many sceptics might have viewed the Syrian-Iraqi alliance as a minor 
development, yet it remained a disturbing and unwelcome development for the 
United States and its initiative for smart sanctions against Iraq. The smart 
sanctions' plan recognized implicitly that Iraq has managed to break the regional 
political and economic isolation and that its containment "inside the box" could 
not endure. It is widely argued that smart sanctions' success depends primarily on 
the willingness of Iraq's neighbours to fully accept, support and cooperate with 
the new US plan. Smart sanctions aimed primarily to re-contain Saddam again by 
curtailing and regulating his trading routes and activities with Syria, Jordan, 
Turkey and Iran. 
In a nutshell, the US plan of reinvigorating sanctions was at the mercy of Iraq's 
neighbours. Thus the American plan had no realistic chance without all the 
neighbours' full and honest border cooperation. However, Syria refused to accept 
any additional sanctions on Iraq, thus worsening matters and narrowing options 
for the United States. Not only Syria refused the plan but also among others 
Jordan and Turkey. For Baghdad, this was great news, as on the one hand, Iraq 
used Syria as an exit to smuggle oil and obtain illicit dual-use products. On the 
other hand, the alliance between the two undermined the containment policy and 
covert action option against the regime in Baghdad. "The biggest challenge to the 
success of smart sanctions comes from Syria. Trade with Iraq is rising from about 
$S00mn last year to $ Ibn this year, consisting mainly of cross-border oil deals 
and the export of Syrian supplies-outside the UN program. Even as the Security 
Council was deliberating the UK draft, a large Syrian trade delegation, headed by 
Minister of Economy and Trade Muhammad 'Imady visiting Baghdad and signing 
major agreements. 9007 
107 MEES, Vol. XLIV, No. 22.28 May 2001. 
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Complicating matters for the smart sanctions plan was the further, continual, and 
fast improvements in trade between the two countries. On the 23rd December 
2001, Syria used its permanent trade centre at the Baghdad International Fair 
grounds to display the products of 66 public sector Syrian companies and 20 
private companies to the Iraqi market1°8 while Iraq's imports from Syria were 
totalling more than $2 Billion according to Iraq's trade minister Muhammad 
Mahdi Saleh. 109 
Even though Syria wanted closer and better relations with Washington, many 
outstanding issues of concerns remained. Syria wanted the United States to 
account of its strategic interests, take it out from the terrorist list, and for the US to 
play the role of an honest broker in the peace process to reach an equitable 
solution. The Lebanese Daily Star explains: "There is limited serious external 
pressure on Damascus for change, as Syria is not under IMF tutelage nor is it 
seriously involved with the World Bank. In such a situation, regional links 
become more important. "110 Achieving the Syrian prerequisites for any serious 
Syrian approval and effective implementation of the smart sanctions' plan was a 
prominent problem for United States diplomacy, interests in the Middle East, and 
the achievement of effective economic sanctions on Iraq. 
To make matters worse, Syria is at odds with the United States over its backing 
for Hizbollah in Lebanon and harbouring some Palestinian groups including those 
who have claimed suicide bombings on Israelis. These issues became of major 
importance after the September 11th terrorists attacks on America. 
Ahmad S. Moussalli writes: "The collapse of Iraqi economic and military power 
has caused Syria much concern as Syria has historically viewed Iraq as its 
strategic depth. Its concerns were highlighted when the possibility of dividing Iraq 
became more probable after the declaration of a federal government in 
Kurdistan. ""' Moussalli pointed Syria's move towards Iraq as the need of Syria 
for "(1) a close market for its food and industrial goods in order to compete with 
'°8 A1-Jazeera. net, 23 December 2001. 109 Arabic News & www. tradearabia. com 24 December 2001. "o "Syria's Economy Opens to Regional Opportunities", The Daily Star 6 September 2001. 111 Ahmad S. Moussalli `The Geopolitics of Syrian-Iraqi Relations" Middle East Policy, Vol. VII, 
No. 4, October 2000, p. 100. 
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Jordan, (2) a strategic depth against Israeli challenges, (3) an alliance with Iraq to 
counterbalance the pressure of the Israel-Turkey relationship, and (4) achieving an 
understanding on dividing the Euphrates water between Syria and Iraq in 
anticipation of Turkish manipulation of this important weapon. "112 
Syrian policy makers translated this re-born strategic relationship with Iraq in the 
form of its staunch opposition to any war or economic sanctions against Iraq. "We 
believe the preservation of sanctions is not justified, " said the Syrian Foreign 
Minister, Farouq al-Sharaa. 113 Another important policy maker in Syria remained 
adamant in support of Iraq: "Syria and all Arabs reject an attack as part of a 
policies that seek more US hegemony and inflict harm not just on the people of 
Iraq but the Arab nation as a whole, " said Syrian Prime Minister Mohammed 
Mustafa Mero. 114 The Syrian president, Bashar Assad, told the crisis Arab summit 
in Egypt on 1 March 2003 that any attack on Saddam's regime was an attack on 
the legitimacy and security of every Arab regime. He warned them: "We are all 
targeted.. . we are all in danger. "ils He asked the Gulf monarchies not to provide 
their military bases as a launch pad in the same way as in the 1991 Gulf War. 116 
Mikhail Wehbe, Syria's UN ambassador, reiterated the Syrian official stance: 
"How can we talk about going to war against Iraq which no longer occupies the 
territories of others, let alone threatens its neighbours at a time when Israel still 
occupies Palestinian, Lebanese and Syrian territories? "' 17 Suleiman Qaddah, an 
aide to President Bashar Assad, spoke in front of more than 10,000 Lebanese and 
Syrian demonstrators, telling them that the United States was "obsessed with 
launching an aggression against a brotherly people of Iraq seeking to break its 
(Iraq's) sovereignty and unity and (to exploit) its resources. The United States 
determination to launch war against Iraq using the pretext of it (Iraq) having 
weapons of mass destruction is not convincing anyone in the world. . . The real 
danger to the region is Israel, not Iraq. "118 
1 i3 Ibid., p. 105. 
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All in all, this showed that the Arab world during the sanctions era was different 
from that in the early 1990s, when America could use its triumph on the Soviet 
empire and the emergence of the unipolar world to form a wide international 
coalition, including key Arab states, to attack Iraq. Syria, a key regional player, 
for instance, was a case in point to see how the Arab world was different from the 
1990s and how interests between nations and powers changed with time and geo- 
political and strategic situations. 
The difference was quite real and very significant. The United States, in its efforts 
to remove Saddam from Kuwait and attack his power in Iraq, managed to form 
not only an international coalition but also a vital regional coalition including that 
of Syria, who contributed troops and intelligence to the United States during the 
Gulf War. This Syrian cooperation did not come out of nothing. It came from real 
efforts from the United States to listen and also cater for all or some of Syria's 
national vital interests. That all came despite the fact that Syria was on the 
Washington list of countries sponsoring terrorism. Washington blinked an eye and 
worked with Syria to attack Iraq. It is worth mentioning that the issue then was 
ending an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the Arabs then were promised a fair 
Middle East peace process. 
During 2001-2003 however, Syria was one of the major lobbyists in the region 
against an American attack on Iraq. From the Syrian point of view, the Bush 
administration did not have any coherent or fair vision for peace in the Middle 
East that would satisfies Syria, and wanted to attack Iraq under a new strategy 
called pre-emptive strikes because Iraq represented a threat due to their 
development of WMDs. This strategy, together with the idea of regime change 
and instalment of a democratic regime in Baghdad made Syria anxious, and 
pushed it towards opposing any attack or regime change in Iraq. 
In fact, Syria started a propaganda campaign in its media and diplomatic circles to 
counter US threats to Iraq. Syria had economic and strategic relations with Iraq 
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that it managed to re-start in 1997, and losing those would cost Syria 
economically and strategically. Syria feared Washington was preparing a new 
government in Iraq that would more likely to be an American stooge in the region. 
It also feared that Washington might start with Iraq first but later move to Syria. 
"Syria next" if America succeeded to destroy the Ba'ath regime in Baghdad, was 
in the mind and calculations of the Ba'athist Syrian leadership. 
A Syrian government statement was clear about that when it criticized operation 
"Shock and awe" of 20 March 2003, saying Syria "condemns this barbaric 
aggression to which out Iraqi brethren are being subjected ... Syria calls for an 
immediate end to the war and the withdrawal of invading forces. "' 19 
11 Reuters, 22 March 2003. 
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4.2.2 Jordan 
The fact that Jordan is strategically located between key regional Middle Eastern 
states (Iraq, Israel, Syria and Saudi Arabia) made its national and economic 
interests dependent on securing strong political and economic relations with its 
regional environment. In fact, the Hashemite Kingdom is dependent on Iraq in 
many ways for the survival of the Kingdom's business community, energy 
security and the southern main port of Aqaba port. "We have nothing to live from 
in Jordan, even our sea is dead, " is a saying well known in Jordan. This 
compelled Jordanian leaders to pursue a strong alliance with Ba'athist Iraq based 
on economic, strategic and geopolitical interests. As for Iraq, cementing tighter 
links with its Hashemite neighbour was critical to assure a rapid break from its 
regional isolation, economically and politically. 
Jordanian agricultural, pharmaceutical, and other goods and materials were given 
priority in Iraqi local market, Regionally, Iraq was the largest market for 
Jordanian exports, as well as it topping Jordan's international trading partners like 
the United States and Germany. "Trade with Iraq in the first 11 months of 2001 
reached $819 million, or 13.4 percent of Jordan's total foreign exchanges of $6.1 
billion, up from $5.4 billion in the same period of 2000... Jordan's trade with the 
United States came to $548 million, or nine percent of the total, followed by 
Germany with $422 million (seven percent), Saudi Arabia with $261 million (4.2 
percent), China with $246 million (four percent) and India with $242 million (3.9 
percent). "120 
During the sanctions era Iraq became the first trading partner to Jordan in the 
world in terms of exports and imports, while the United States came second. Iraq 
remained the first and largest trading partner to Jordan even in the year 2002. A 
report from the Central Bank of Jordan's monthly report of 2002 shows "that 
trade with Iraq in the first two months of 2002 amounted to JD 100.3 million, 
while its trade with the US was valued at JD 80.2 million. Germany ranked third 
120 AF, 22 January 2002. ry ý 
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with JD 39.4 million, " the report said. According to the report, "Jordan exported 
goods worth JD 35.3 million to Iraq in January and February this year, while 
imports amounted to JD 64.9 million, mostly oil and its derivatives, " while "US 
exports to Jordan in the same period totalled JD 26.9 million and imports were 
valued at JD53.3 million. 99121 
Lacking oil, and battered economically by more than two years of Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict, Jordan got almost all its crude oil supply and petroleum 
products from Iraq in a combination of free and cheap oil. According to a special 
agreement with Iraq (called the oil protocol), Amman imports 5 million tons of 
oil, 50 % of that volume was for free as a gift from Saddam Hussein to the 
Jordanian people and the other 50% was at preferential prices less by $4-$5 
dollars than the market price. 122 In addition Jordan could export goods and 
products worth 450 million dollar annually under another commercial agreement 
between the Iraqi and Jordanian government (called the trade protocol). 123 
Jordan and Iraq renewed the annual oil protocol between them on 21 of November 
2002 for another year, where Iraq added to the normal volumes mentioned above 
an additional oil grant of $300 million to Jordan for the year 2003.124 Moreover, 
the trade ministers of Iraq and Jordan improved relations yet again by signing 
trade agreement to increase its commercial trade with Iraq "signed a memorandum 
for trade cooperation that calls for increasing trade between Iraq and Jordan to 
$310 million by 2003 up 19.2 per cent from the $260 million trade protocol for 
this year. " 125 To help meet and facilitate the Kingdom's daily energy needs, and in 
a further move that reflects the common economic and trade interests, the two 
countries decided to construct an oil pipeline that links one of Iraq's oil fields to a 
Jordanian oil refinery and asked foreign firms to help establish and finish that 
vital pipeline by the year 2004. This pipeline if had been allowed to finish would 
have been 750km in length with a total of $350 million and a capacity of 250 
121 Jordan Times, 15 July 2002. 
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thousands barrel per day. 126 Also, Iraq allowed Jordan to jointly explore in an 
Iraqi oil field that is near the Iraqi/Jordanian border called Al-Risha oil field. 
127 
The oil and the pipeline project clearly served as a stimulus for Jordan's gradual 
shift toward Iraq. Yet another critical part of their bilateral economic coordination 
that could explain the warming of ties comes through the Jordanian Red Sea 
Aqaba port. During the Iran/Iraq war, the port came to play a key transit route for 
Iraq and its international trade, especially after Iraq's two main ports of Basra and 
Umm Al-Qasr were badly affected by eight years of war. Jordan had always urged 
Baghdad to import its products under the "oil-for-food" deal through the port of 
Aqaba, thus Iraq asked many international companies to use the Aqaba seaport as 
a transit link. According to the Iraqi Trade Minister, Iraq's imports through the 
Jordanian seaport total 800,000 tons per year, while the Jordanian Prime Minister 
Ali Abu Ragheb asked Iraq to increase its imports through Aqaba port. 128 
Yet Iraq demonstrates its full economic and political potential through intensive 
efforts to bring Jordan political, academic and business communities under its 
patronage. Hence, this is not even the Iraqis working `underground' but is done 
mostly in public. To this end, Iraqi financial inducements were disbursed 
regularly-even though it is difficult to pin down- to Jordanians political 
candidates, journalists, writers, the press, poets, artists, tribal leaders, 
parliamentary, ministerial officials, religious clerics and businessman. Baghdad 
has been actually working for decades to create a block of an influential pro-Iraqi 
lobby in touching virtually every sector of Jordanian society to promote Saddam's 
propaganda and popularity in Jordan and the Arab world. It is worth mentioning 
that many influential Jordanian Arab tribes pay allegiance to Saddam, like the Al 
Abidat tribe and the powerful Beny Hassan tribe. They too got financial support 
from Saddam. In many demonstrations in the South of Jordan, targeted against 
government economic decisions and IMF rules, Jordanian tribes carried Saddam's 
pictures in a direct indication of how Saddam influenced these demonstrations and 
could destabilise Jordanian internal security at will, 
126 At-Jazeera. net, 27 May 2002. 
127 Azzaman Newspaper, 19 November 2001. 
128 Jordan Times, 6 August 2001. 
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Another explanation that has been advanced for Iraqi-Jordanian rapprochement 
included the argument that Amman was seeking to strengthen its manoeuvring 
power and regional position at a time when it felt challenged by a more right-wing 
Israel. Jordan was troubled by the return of the hard-liners in Israeli politics and 
the eruption of the Palestinian-Israeli dispute. Thus, closer Jordanian ties with 
Baghdad are a Jordanian step towards adjusting its regional orientation and a sign 
of dissatisfaction with Israeli hard-line policy. Problems begun to surface between 
the two countries when Netanyahu replaced the Nobel Peace Prize winner Shimon 
Peres; matters worsened between Amman and Tel Aviv "following Israel's 
decision to open a new exit to the Hasmonean tunnel in Jerusalem and the 
subsequent outbreak of violent clashes between Israelis and Palestinians. It was at 
this point that Jordanian-Israeli relations entered their worst crisis since the 
signing of the peace treaty. "129 
The crisis deepened even further when Israeli Prime Minster Sharon arrived in 
power. Jordan anxiety increased knowing that Sharon was the author of the idea to 
create an alternative homeland for the Palestinians in Jordan. Most significantly, 
this crisis of confidence served even more an Iraqi orientation argument. Asher 
Susser noted: "As the strategic understanding with Israel eroded, Jordan's attitude 
toward Iraq accordingly began to shift. Despite expressions of discontent with 
Saddam Hussein's regime, Jordan increasingly sought to normalize relations with 
Iraq. Disappointment with the economic dividends of peace with Israel was an 
added incentive for the kingdom to seek out new trade deals with Iraq, and 
consequently, Jordanians began to tone down their anti-Iraq rhetoric in 
preparation to benefit from new trading opportunities. "130 Jordan's sombre mood 
towards Israel was clear in many Jordanian media and newspapers. One such 
newspaper, al-Arab al-Yawm, speaking about US support for Sharon's attacks on 
the Palestinians, accused the United States of double standards: "Washington 
chose to back the most famous representative of terrorism and extremism in the 
history of Zionism. "131 
'29 Asher Susser Jordan: Case Study of a Pivotal State (The Washington Institute for Near East 
Policy, 2000), p. 98. 
130 Ibid., p. 101. 131 P, 4 December 2001. 
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King Abdullah, the son of the late King Hussein, continued his scepticism of the 
peace process and linked the Iraq issue with that of the Palestinians. In 2001, the 
King condemned sanctions and called for their total lifting, when he addressed the 
13th ordinary opening session of the Arab League: "As for our brethren in Iraq, its 
inconceivable suffering has gone on for far too long, It is time to end this 
suffering, and to lift the embargo on Iraq. " 132 And when Bush outlined his 
strategy after the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the King made his country's views 
clear: ""The problem is, trying to take on the question of Iraq with the lack of 
positive movement on the Israeli-Palestinian, Israeli-Arab track seems, at this 
point, somewhat ludicrous. " 133 Ali Abu Ragheb, Jordan's Prime Minister 
highlighted the economic factor behind Jordan's dislike of any war on Iraq "Iraq 
is our main trading and any future military strikes against it will bring havoc to 
the Kingdom's economy. That's for sure. i134 
Many Arabs viewed Iraq's isolation and territorial integrity in regional affairs and 
security arrangements as a liability. For Jordan it was a political, strategic and 
economic necessity Iraq would not be excluded from the region's affairs. Perhaps 
not surprisingly then, this was echoed in many Jordanian statements, including 
Crown Prince Hassan, and King Hussein who "subsequently observed that a 
threatened and weak Iraq was an added burden on the Arabs and constituted an 
unacceptable situation that should not be allowed to persist. " 135 
132 www. kin! abdullah io 133 AP, 28 July 2002. 
134 "Jordan's economy linked to Iraq" The Star Issue No. 112.21 September 2002. 135 Susser (2000), p. 102. 
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Table 4.2 Jordan imports from Iraq (Thousand JD), 1992-1996 
1996 
Jan-Jul Jul Jun May Apr Mar Feb 11995 11994 11993 (1992 
208,870 (30,065 (32,502(31,321 (28,757 1 28,767 (26,821(316,265 (298,351(307,007 
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Department of Research 
and Studies Vol. 32, No. 8, August 1996, p. 67. 
Table 4.3 Jordan exports to Iraq (Thousand JD), 1996 
Total Exports 96,159 
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Department of Research 
and Studies Vol. 37, No. 3, March 2001, p. 68. 
Table 4.4 Jordan exports/imports with Iraq (Thousand JD), 1997 
Total Exports 1997 142,072 
Total Imports 1997 364,266 
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin. Department of Research 
and Studies Vol. 37, No. 3, March 2001, p. 68,70-71. 
Table 4.5 Jordan exports to Iraq (Thousand JD), 1998 
Dec Nov Oct Sep 
5,218 11,171 12,936 12,284 
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin. Department of Research 
and Studies Vol. 35, No. 8, August 1999, p. 67. 
Table 4.6 Jordan imports from Iraq (Thousand JD), 1998 
Dec Nov Oct Se 
14,215 18,776 23,236 21,881 
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin. Department of Research 
and Studies Vol. 35, No. 8, August 1999, p. 69. 
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Table 4.7 Jordan exports to Iraq (Thousand JD), 1999 
Jan- 
Se 
Sep Aug Jul Jun May Apr Mar Feb Jan 
44,034 4,963 6,218 3,812 6,075 6,304 3,517 6,019 3,079 4,047 
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Department of Research 
and Studies Vol. 35, No. 12, December 1999, p. 67. 
Table 4.8 Jordan imports from Iraq (Thousand JD), 1999 
Jan-Sep Sep Aug Jul Jun May Apr Mar Feb Jan 
211,435 31,331 24,178 27,767 1_25,166127,214123,482121,293 14,525 16,479 
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Department of Research 
and Studies Vol. 35, No. 12, December 1999, p. 69. 
Table 4.9 Jordan exports to Iraq (Thousand JD), 2000 
Dec 10,413 
Nov 4,834 
Oct 4,114 
Sep 4,589 
Aug 10,412 
Jul 12.608 
Jun 5,827 
May 18,887 
Ar 11,963 
Mar 5,082 
Feb 5,855 
Jan 5,388 
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin Department of Research 
and Studies Vol. 37, No. 3, March 2001, p. 68-69. 
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Table 4.10 Jordan imports from Iraq (Thousand JD), 2000 
Dec 42,174 
Nov 44,753 
Oct 50,348 
Sep 45,724 
Aug 40,895 
Jul 31,181 
Jun 34,202 
May 41,818 
Apr 38,801 
Mar 35,470 
Feb 40,476 
Jan 39,316 
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin. Department of Research 
and Studies Vol. 37, No. 3, March 2001, p. 70-71. 
Table 4.11 Jordan exports to Iraq (Thousand JD), 2001 
Jan-Sep I Oct Sep- j Aug Jul Jun May Apr Mar Feb 
102,105 19,505 18,626 12,123 10,634 9,998 8,076 8,214 4,552 6,666 
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin. Department of Research 
and Studies Vol. 38, No. 1, January 2002, p. 69. 
Table 4.12 Jordan imports from Iraq (Thousand JD), 2001 
Jan-Se Oct Sep Au Jul Jun May Apr Mar Feb 
411,744 36,419 44,729 40,808 29,978 45,229 47,024 41,726137,446142,6"261 
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin. Department of Research 
and Studies Vol. 38, No. 1, January 2002, p. 71. 
Table 4.13 Jordan exports to Iraq (Thousand JD), 2002 
Dec Nov Oct Sep Aug Jul Jun ML Apr 
25,131 24,935 24,952 39,018 24,553 38,677 21,817 25,586 21,462 
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin. Department of Research 
and Studies Vol. 39, No. 3, March 2003, p. 69. 
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Table 4.14 Jordan imports from Iraq (Thousand JD), 2002 
Dec Nov Oct Sep Aug Jul Jun May Apr 
47,605 47,074 52,432 166,755_167,110_142,234 26,950 44,312 49,508 
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin. Department of Research 
and Studies Vol. 39, No. 3, March 2003, p. 71. 
Table 4.15 Jordan exports/imports with Iraq (Thousand JD), Jan-Mar 2002 
Total Exports 60,595 
_Total 
Iorts 105,340 
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin. Department of Research 
and Studies Vol. 39, No. 6, June 2003, p. 68-69,70-71. 
Table 4.16 Jordan exports/imports with Iraq (Thousand JD), Jan-Mar 2003 
Total exports Jan- 
Mar 
Mar Feb Jan 
52,870 16,240 16,463 20,167 
Total imports Jan- 
Mar 
Mar Feb Jan 
138,309 45,700 44,710 47,899 
Source: Central Bank of Jordan, Monthly Statistical Bulletin Department of Research 
and Studies Vol. 39, No. 6, June 2003, p. 69. 
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4.2.3 Egypt 
As with the alliance with Jordan, consideration of economic security of other 
Arab states was paramount. Baghdad's success in pushing for a lift of the regional 
economic and political siege around it included Egypt and touched numerous 
economic and social sectors in Tunisia, Morocco, Yemen and the UAE. 
Many reasons were behind Egypt's decision to reenergize ties with Baghdad. 
Egypt had many problems from population explosion, high unemployment, 
budget security crises, decline in tourism after Islamist terrorists attacks, the 
failure to modernize their export industry to western standards, insecurity about 
new loans and delays in funds arriving, in addition to the ongoing Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict coupled with the possible threat of a wider Middle East war- 
all these factors economically and politically oriented Egypt towards Iraq. Egypt 
needs the Arab markets and resources. It could therefore not maintain the regional 
isolation of Iraq for long. Nasser brought Egypt closer to the Arab world 
ideologically and developed Egypt's Arab identity, while Sadat oriented Egypt 
towards the West and Israel. 
Under Mubarak's third and fourth terms in office, Egypt saw an active foreign 
policy linked with national economic interests. Mubarak brought the business 
community closer to him as he promoted vital Egyptian economic interests. 
Anything that helped increase Egyptian exports was welcomed. At the same time, 
the Mubarak government had always stood for achieving the Arab Common 
Market instead of the American idea for a Middle East Common Market out of 
fear of Israeli economic and technological domination. For example, even though 
some independent businessmen did go, Egypt officially and politically boycotted 
the Regional Economic Conference in Doha, Qatar in December 1997 because of 
the stalemate in the peace process. Thus, it seemed logical and necessary for 
Egypt to engage Iraq economically and politically. 
Egypt and Iraq had resumed their diplomatic missions and political consultations 
in a symbolically political gesture to increase trade. Significant political 
statements from various Egyptian politicians was increasingly becoming against 
sanctions and for the rehabilitation of Saddam into the Arab fold. One such 
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significant statement came from the political advisor to Egypt's president 
Mubarak, Osama Al-Baz, said that sanctions on Iraq and its suffering must end 
and can not continue for ever. 136 From these political statements, to which Iraq 
attached considerable public importance, Baghdad rewarded Egypt with more 
trade. Egyptian exports to Iraq reached in year 2001 $1 billion and $628 million, 
increased from $1 billion in the year 2000. This volume increased to $3.8 billion 
by the 11th Phase of the "oil-for-food" deal in 2002.137 According to the Iraqi 
trade minister, out of 75 countries that Iraq traded with, Egypt came third in rank 
internationally (after France and Russia) and the first in the Arab-inter trade with 
Iraq. Sound financial reasons gradually moved Cairo into the Iraqi camp. 
A special free trade agreement, which was signed in January 2001, and came into 
effect in August of that year, between Cairo and Baghdad, allowed the financially 
struggling Egyptian private sector to exports its cheap goods and products to Iraq 
without any customs fees or trading quotes. 138 The total volume of contracts 
awarded to Egypt under the 11`h phase of the "oil-for-food" deal only (December 
2001- June 2002) was $350. And in April 2002, more than 94 Egyptian 
companies held a trade fair for their products in Baghdad where the private 
Egyptian sector signed contracts with the Iraqis worth $62 million. The Egyptian 
Commercial attache in Baghdad announced that the total of Egypt's exports to 
Iraq since 1997 was beyond $4.7 billion. 139 During the sanctions era, Egyptian 
companies were concentrating on construction, infrastructure, and residential 
blocks, complexes, and services projects in Iraq. 140 At the same time, Iraq and 
Egypt signed an agreement whereby Egypt agreed to rehabilitate Iraqi factories 
and provided all its badly needed spare parts. Moreover, the two countries 
established a joint-business board to increase the bilateral economic, commercial 
and industrial cooperation between them, 141 while in 2003 Egyptian, Saudi and 
Syrian companies won more than 22 housing complexes construction contracts. '42 
136 Arabic New, 15 January 2001. 
139 AI-Havat, 9 April 2002, p. 11. 139 
139 
AL-Jazeera. net, 6 December 2001. 
1-H at, 28 January 2003, p. 13. 
140 Al Hayat, 3 June 2002, p. 11. 141 
142 -Na a, 
23 June 2002, p. 11. 
AEP, 23 January 2003. 
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The rumour was going on that Egyptian businessmen had facilitated more than 50 
armoured Mercedes cars for Saddam's own use. 143 It was not sure if Mercedes in 
Germany knew of the deal, but it is certain that some German businessmen 
preferred dealing with Iraq through Egypt and the cover of Egyptian businessmen. 
Moreover, what made it easier was that German car manufacturers were already 
involved in joint ventures and investment in the Egyptian market. The free trade 
agreement aims was to make business easier for Egypt-Iraqi trade as well as 
benefited foreign firms who hesitated to directly deal with Iraq. Egypt and its 
companies also had routinely held trade and goods exhibitions in Baghdad. In the 
third such trade fair, 180 Egyptian companies participated, and at the fourth 
exhibition for Egyptian firms, held on 15 April 2002,102 companies from 
different industrial and commercial sectors participated. 144 
As a regional heavyweight and a strong ally of the United States, closer ties 
between Egypt and Saddam's regime signalled clearly Baghdad emergence from 
regional isolation. The Economic Intelligence Unit commented "Egyptian-Iraqi 
trade evidently has a political dynamic. Egypt is still viewed as the "leader" of the 
Arab world and is a key ally of the US, on which it can bring some influence to 
bear. Consequently it makes sense for the Iraqi government to source much of its 
imports needs through Egypt. " 145 It is worth noting that Egypt refused an 
American request to minimize the volume of trade relations with Iraq, and the 
United States voiced particular concern over the free trade agreement signed by 
Egypt and Iraq. 146 
It was not only commercial interests that played a key factor in Egyptian-Iraqi 
relations during the sanctions' era. Strategic and geopolitical considerations took 
their toll on Egyptian foreign policy makers too. The stalled peace process, the 
growing anti-Israeli feelings in Egyptian street, the unequal benefits of the 
Egyptian-Israeli trade, the Israeli nuclear power and missile programmes which 
many Egyptian politicians viewed as threat to Egypt existence, the myth about 
Israel's territorial dream of Greater Israel from the Nile to the Euphrates, all in all, 
143 Iraqi businessmen, private interview with author, The Netherlands, Late 2001. 144 
14s ' 
la a, 9 April 2002, p. 11. 
EIU Iraq Country Report, March 2002 p. 30. 146 
is ews, 13 December 2001. 
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contributed to a wide Egyptian anxiety and caution. Given the fact that Egypt and 
Israel had fought three major wars, this anxiety was heightened. This is evident in 
how the leader of Egypt expressed his government's concerns and frustrations 
with Israeli policy: "With Sharon there is no solution. He is a man who knows 
only murder, strikes and war. By nature, he does not accept peace, and very 
frankly, I don't believe there is hope with Sharon and his group, which includes 
"147 extremists. 
Like many of their counterparts across the Arab world, many famous Egyptian 
actress and actresses, singers and sportsman all visited and performed in Iraq and 
some even met with Saddam Hussein himself, meetings which were aired on 
many Arabic channels. Most of them, upon their return from meeting with 
Saddam, rallied the street and staged demonstrations in front of the American 
Embassy. Using Egypt's great influence on Arab media, print, literature, and 
films, Egyptian film directors, actors, poets, and writers made an impact among 
the Arab masses with movies that depicted general public resentment and 
frustration with US policy on Iraq and Palestinian issue. One such a movie 
showed students of the American University in Cairo demonstrating and burning 
the American flag against the US 1998 Desert Fox Operation, thus falsely 
portraying America as not the enemy of Iraq only but also of the Arab people. 
Many Egyptian intellectuals resented American policy, as well as propagating 
hard-line policies against normalization with the state of Israel. Some even called 
for the boycott of Israeli and American products. Such moves broke the cultural 
sanctions and silence on Iraq, and contributed to the propaganda campaign by Iraq 
among the Arab masses, thus helping to build sufficient popular resentment to the 
sanctions using the Palestinian issue to stir up anti-sanctions and anti- 
American/Israeli sentiments. For example, Arab intellectuals started The Arab 
Committee for Lifting the Sanctions off Iraq that held many of its meetings in 
Cairo. The Committee is a civil NGO made by intellectuals, and its aim was to 
create a civil awareness and to build popular resentment against the sanctions on 
Iraq. Its head, Ashraf El-Buyoumi, highlighted his people's difficulties with the 
sanctions on Iraq, when he said because of the sanctions on Iraq: "We as Egyptian 
147 A FP, 18 July 2001. 
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people are directly and spiritually and economically suffering. " 148Another vital 
Egyptian intellectual, and one that won the Noble Literary Prize in 1988, called 
the sanctions on Iraq "futile and outdated. " 149 
Due to the public pressure, Egypt's president allowed the Egyptian planes to fly to 
Baghdad carrying large Egyptian delegations and medicine. One such an airplane 
carried a sign written on it "The airplane of the martyr Mohammed El-Dorra" who 
was a Palestinian child shot dead by Israeli forces during the Palestinian 
Intifada. lso This clearly resembled how the Arabs linked the Palestinian issue 
with that of the Iraqi issue and how that helped to overcome and destroy the 
sanctions regionally. 
On the political front, Iraq benefited greatly from co-opting a state like Egypt, 
who was at the forefront of efforts to push Saddam troops out of Kuwait in 1991. 
Egypt even stood against any war against Iraq. Egypt's reasons were many. First, 
as with other Arab countries, it links the Palestinians issue with the Iraqi issue, It 
claims that it could not support a war on Iraq when Sharon was bombing the 
Palestinians. Second, it would lose a vital export market for its products, 
especially when realizing that after Saddam many of the big contracts could go to 
the victors of the war. Third, its tourist industry could suffer and could push 
unemployment in Egypt higher. The cost could be as high as Million, according 
to Egypt's Minister of Tourism's estimates, and that was only if the war was short 
and did not expand beyond Iraq to the region. 151 Fourth, loss of expatriates' 
remittances from Egyptian workers in Iraq and possibly even from workers in the 
Gulf region would be significant for the economy. It is estimated that in Iraq alone 
there was 200,000 Egyptian workers. 152 Fifth, Egypt realized that any new 
government in Iraq will eventually be more Western oriented and democratic in 
nature, which could put pressure on the Egyptian government concerning the 
bargaining chips in the peace process or domestic political and economic reforms. 
148 Arabic Nmws, 23 September 2000. 
149 Arabic News, 7 September 2000. 
ISO Arabic Ne , 18 October 2000. isl 
-Ha a, 4 March 2003, p. 11. 152 "Egypt Preparing for the Worst" Al-Ahram Wee ly 1 February 2003. 
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The Egyptian resistance to operation Iraqi Freedom was evident in its organizing 
of a crisis Arab summit to reject any war on Iraq. Also on the 5t' of March 2003, 
the ruling national party of President Mubarak organized a big demonstration of 
more than half a million people rallying against war in Iraq and in support of the 
Palestinians. By that time, the issue of Iraq had transformed itself into a vital 
domestic political card for the many parties and political figures inside Egypt. 
Even the ruling national party could not ignore it and wanted to take the initiative 
at the forefront of those who were against war. 
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4.2.4 The UAE 
Since the mid 90's, Sheikh Zayed Al Nahyan, President of the UAE, had called 
for the rehabilitation of Iraq into the Arab fold. In 1998, Dubai restarted its 
maritime route from the UAE to the Iraqi port of um-Qasr. Six passenger and 
commercial boats sailed to Iraqi ports and back to Dubai and Bahraini ports every 
day. 153 The total volume of trade between the two toped $5 billion in the last five 
years, '54 $ 20 million worth of trade between Iraq and UAE was taking place 
every month. 155 Commerce trading and re-export with Iraq in 2001 was 8 times 
more that of commerce in 2000. Trade was topping to 1.7 billion UAE Dirhams 
($468 million) in 2001 from around only 196 million UAE Dirhams for the year 
2000. According to the Chamber of Commerce in Dubai, Iraq stood at number 
five in the list of countries that Dubai exports and re-exports to. 156 
The United Arab Emirates took the lead among the Gulf States in calling for the 
rehabilitation of Baghdad, and ever since, trade between the two countries reached 
an unprecedented amount. In order to promote that trade, the two countries signed 
a free trade zones agreement in Baghdad in 2001: "The agreement provides for the 
free flow of goods between the two countries and removal of all tariff barriers. "' 57 
This preferential trade agreement provided for the free flow of capital between the 
two countries: "The signing of this agreement has made Iraq and the UAE one 
market by scrapping customs duties and administrative restrictions governing the 
issuing of imports licences, " declared Mohammed Mehdi Saleh, Iraq's Trade 
Minister. i5a 
Iraq favoured UAE companies as a reward for the Sheiks political support. For 
instance, A Dubai-based Company, Process Automation Consultants and Systems 
Integrators (Pracsi), had completed more than 40 projects under the UN's `oil-for- 
133 l_ a, 19 May 2002 p. 11. 134 Ai-Jazeera. net, 2 November 2001. 135 www. tradearabia. com, 15 March 2002. 136 1- is at, 20 November 2002, p. 11. '37 Khaleej Times, 3 November 2001. 
158 Ibid. 
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food" programme. One such project was installing Million worth of control 
systems for Iraq's oil and gas industry in northern Iraq's Baji project. ls9 
For the UAE, Iraq was a vital counterweight to Iran in the Arabian Gulf. The 
UAE leaders feared Iranian intervention in disputed Abu Musa and Tunbs Islands. 
Iraq's importance to the UAE was reflected in many of the official statements 
coming from there since the mid 90s. 
Sheikh Sultan Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the deputy Prime Minister of the United 
Arab Emirates, stated: "we intend to establish bridges of friendship with Iraq, 
especially the beleaguered Iraqi people, who are victims of mistaken policies- 
both by Baghdad as well as major Western powers who seek to influence 
President Saddam Hussein by punishing a hopeless population-because Iraq is 
our neighbour and because the Iraqi people are part and parcel of our societies. 
We must forgive past errors, open new pages, and eradicate the scourge of war 
from our area. To accomplish those objectives, it is essential that we look at Iraq 
with a human face rather than the cold and calculating realpolitik perspectives that 
seek to reward the strong and punish the weak. " 160 
The deputy Prime minister added, "After a decade, and at the dawn of the twenty- 
first century, it is vital that we re-evaluate the current United Nations-imposed 
policy that is literally choking Iraqis. " Sheikh Al Nahyan admitted "Iraq was and 
remains of strategic value to the Arab world because it offers geographic depths, 
provides trained manpower, and controls substantial natural resources, including 
water and oil. We value Iraq as a determinant factor in Arab affairs". He 
contended, "UAE strategic interests require that Iraq be bought out of its current 
doldrums and be re-integrated in the family of nation-states. " The Sheikh stressed 
"We value the Iraqi populace and wish to cooperate with it to foster mutually 
beneficial policies, enhance trade opportunities, and intensify our cultural, 
education, and scientific links. In addition to these concerns, our openness to Iraq 
is also a matter of basic human rights, for it is unconscionable to allow Iraqi men, 
women, and children to wallow in misery, the way they are through no fault of 
159 Khaleej Times, 6 June 2002. 
160 Sheikh Sultan Bin Zayed Al Nahyan "The UAE Vision for Gulf Security" in Joseph A. 
Kechichian (ed) Iran. Iraq and the Arab Gulf States (Palgrave Publishers, 2001), p. 384. 
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their own. Future generations of Emirates and Arabs will not look kindly on 
leaders who turned their backs to the sufferings of the Iraqi population, and this 
too must change, if long-term Emirati interests are to be preserved. ""61 
UAE officials highlighted their different opinion with the United States and linked 
the Iraqi issue to the failure of the Middle East peace process: "The US, while 
seeking to revamp sanctions on Iraq, gives different measures to international 
legitimacy. At the time, Washington seems to be very strict in implementing 
international Resolution on Iraq, it stands strongly against any form of 
condemnation of Israel's aggression against the defenceless Palestinian 
civilians. 99162 
This development in relations between the two countries was music to the ears of 
some foreign companies who did not wish to be in the forefront of making 
business directly with Iraq. Instead, they simply used Dubai as a cover instead of 
the EU or the United States. Moreover, hundreds of Iraqi businessmen were 
allowed to conduct their businesses freely from Dubai. Due to Dubai's close 
proximity to Iraq and its southern ports of Basra, these businessmen were making 
a brisk business from oil smuggling and other goods including foreign-made 
technology products and armoured protected and sports cars for the Presidential 
palace. They had been permitted to build business empires in the UAE and were 
holding vital positions in banks, media and trade. The two countries also 
established bilateral committees to coordinate efforts in the industrial and 
commercial sectors and also to jump start joint projects and exchange know how 
and establish workshops to train technicians in various industrial fields. They even 
discussed the establishment of a joint Iraq-Emirate airline. 163 
161 Ibid., p. 388. 162 Deputy Prime Minister Sheikh Sultan bin Zayed Al Nahyan, in an interview with the Arabic daily-Al Sharq Al Awsat "Partiality to Israel Damages US credibility-Sheikh Sultan" Quoted in 
Gu ws, 20 July 2001. 
163 AL-Havat, 20 November 2002, p. 11. 
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In the latest studies on Iraqi-UAE trade relations, according to private estimates 
the volume of trade and contracts with Iraq in the next ten years-if Saddam was 
still in power- would have reached $250 billion, involving restructuring projects 
for Iraq's infrastructure, oil industry, electricity, and consumer goods and 
products. 
4.2.5 Saudi Arabia 
Iraq is one of the largest consuming markets in the region. Saudi realized that fact 
and started acting upon it. Saudi Arabia had restored its trade with Iraq since 
1999. Later, a thaw in relations happened at the Arab summit in Beirut on March 
2001, which helped boost trade even further. 
Saudi Arabia who wanted to promote its national products and improve its export- 
oriented Saudi companies in the non-oil sectors found Iraq as an ideal market for 
its national products. The Iraqi Trade Minister was quoted as saying to the daily 
Al-Iraq: "Economic cooperation between Iraq and Saudi Arabia is growing, and 
Iraqi purchases from the kingdom have exceeded one billion dollars. "164 Saudi 
companies who were exporting to Iraq in millions were being encouraged even 
further by Saudi officials to do more to maximize their commercial opportunities 
and market share in Iraq. "Saudi businessmen should focus on the Iraqi 
market... and participate in commercial exhibitions in Iraq, either directly of 
through agents, to preserve our market share in Iraq. The Iraqi market is seen as 
an extension of the Saudi market, given its proximity and the fact that Iraqi 
consumers are more acquainted with Saudi products. s165 During the period from 
1999-2003, Saudi Arabia exported foodstuffs, chemicals, medicines, 
pharmaceutical products, spare parts, cars, and agricultural equipment to Iraq. 
In addition, in another signal of normalization of relations and increased trade 
activities between the two Arab states, the Saudi Ministry of Commerce had 
'64 Ate, 10 May 2002. 
165 Dr. Abdul Rahman Al Zamil, Chairman of the Executive Council of the Saudi Export 
Promotion Center (SEPC). Arab News, 05 February 2002. 
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allowed Saudi businessmen to export non-Saudi products to Iraq. 166 Thus the 
government encouraged re-exports to Iraq as well. In addition around 100 Saudi 
companies and an official Saudi business delegation comprising 35 members 
participated in the Baghdad International Trade Fair in Ist November 2002.167 
In a similar vein, in early November 2002 Saudi Arabia opened its Northern 
borders with Iraq at Arar gate (450 Km from Baghdad) after 11 years of closure. 
This was another sign of a development in relations between the two countries. 
Since 1999, Saudi Arabian trade with Iraq had reached $1.1 billion. 35 Saudi 
companies were trading with Iraq. Many viewed the opening of this trade route as 
being of great importance because it helped financially Saudi industrialists who 
were reluctant to trade with Iraq through third countries such as Jordan due to the 
high transit and supply costs. So this move was expected to help cut the costs of 
transportation and cut more bureaucratic problems in turn helped increase and 
facilitate trade between the two countries. At the same time, discussion was under 
way to sign a free trade agreement with Iraq in order to lift the 30% tax Saudi 
companies had to pay for customs duty. 168 
Therefore it was not surprising to see a rush of Saudi companies participating in 
the November 2002 Baghdad international trade fair. 155 Saudi businessmen and 
42 Saudi companies participated in that trade fair. 169 The trade and political 
relations were enhanced further when Iraq's Industry and Minerals Minister, 
Mayssar Rija Shalah, visited the Saudi kingdom for ten days. He discussed 
relations with Saudi officials and businessmen, and at the end of the visit he stated 
that the two countries "agreed on a scheme to make irrigation equipment, which 
will be the first investment project in Iraq financed entirely by Saudi 
businessmen. "170 
Due to Saudi government cuts in expenditure, there was a reduction in big 
infrastructure projects inside the kingdom, in areas such as housing and other 
projects like building hospitals, health centres and schools. It was estimated that 
166 b News, 21 July 2002. 
167 www. tradearabia. com, 29 September 2002. 168 1- Ta at, 6 November 2002, p. 2. 169 AI-Jazeera. 
net. 1 November 2002. 170 EIU Iraq Country Report, June 2002, p. 32. 
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Saudi private businessmen had a surplus in machineries and materials worth of 17 
billion Saudi Rials or $4.533 billion. Noticing this gap, Iraq, in 2002, proposed 
some twelve housing projects to Saudi businessmen, which included the building 
of 6000 housing units at a cost of $400 million, while at the same time Saudi 
companies won tenders to build 12 hospitals and 90 health centres. Even though 
the trade Saudi-Iraqi relations were relatively new when compared with other 
Arab countries, by February 2003, Saudi commercial trade volume with Iraq had 
reached around $1.5 billion. "' 
AFP reported that in January and February of 2003, Saudi companies won 
contracts worth $146 million, and about $100 million worth of contracts were 
allocated to the Saudi in February alone. This all came despite the threat of war 
looming around Iraq. 172 
The failure of the Middle East peace process also played a role in Saudi strategic 
perceptions of the region. Its newspapers echoed the Saudi perception: "Before 
one condemns those who exploded these bombs, it is necessary to know the real 
cause of such actions. The US refuses to acknowledge that the cause is Sharon's 
penchant for crimes against humanity. That is where the cycle of violence starts 
and ends. And it cannot end unless the US does something to end Israeli terrorism 
spearheaded by Bush's friend Sharon. i173 
Later, the Saudis challenged and rejected the Bush administration's vision of pre- 
emptive strike or an invasion of Iraq to topple Saddam Hussein and his regime. 
Ever since the tragic events of September 11th, the Kingdom has been at the 
forefront of regional states that oppose any war against Iraq. This can be seen 
clearly from the Saudi officials' statements on the Iraq crisis. "The kingdom does 
not support a war or strike against Iraq, " said Saudi intelligence Chief Prince 
Nawaf bin Abdul Aziz in an interview with As-Sharq Al-Awsat newspaper. 174 
Prince Saud al-Faisal, Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, attacked Bush's vision 
that peace in the Middle East would come through removing Saddam when he 
17z l- at 28 February 2003, p. 13. 
QFP, 6 March 2003. 
174 
73 Quoted in the English-language Saudi Gazette Washington Post, 3 December 2001. 1 
AF P, 29 June 2002. 
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told CNN: "I think (that) removal of Mr. Sharon will be more apt to bring a 
solution to the question of the Palestinians than the removal of Saddam Hussein. 
He (Sharon) is the obstacle to peace. ""' 
At the Arab Summit of 1 March 2003 in Egypt, Gaddafi's remarks insulted the 
Saudis, who decided to walk out of the summit-opening meeting. The surprising 
move was that the Iraqi and the Syrian delegations, in protest of Gaddafi's 
remarks against Saudi Arabia, followed them. '76 
This was a sharp contrast to what happened in the Arab Summit in Egypt in 1991, 
when Saudi and the rest were against Iraq, and Gaddafi was among the few who 
defended Iraq inside the summit. In addition, the final communique of the crisis 
Arab summit in Egypt of Vt of March 2003 rejected completely any American 
war on Iraq and called any attack on Iraq as a threat to Arab national security, 
calling on Arab countries not to take part in this war. '77 
This communique was not possible without the Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah. In 
their speech inside the summit, the Iraqis acknowledged that, and thanked the 
Crown Prince for his personal efforts to keep the Arab united and prevent a 
war. "8 
Later, Crown Prince Abdullah, the effective ruler of Saudi Arabia after his half 
brother, King Fahd, fell ill, said, "The kingdom will not participate in any way in 
the war on brotherly Iraq and our armed forces will under no circumstances enter 
a foot of Iraqi territory, " adding that the Kingdom "strongly rejects any blow to 
Iraqi unity, independence, and its security and the country's military occupation 
and have clearly told the United States about the Saudi stance. " 179 
Certainly economic and political reasons were behind the overtures to Baghdad by 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE, yet the cultural factor and specifically the tribal values 
and its informal interactions played a powerful determinants too however behind 
the scene. Many factors played a key role in facilitating and successfully closing 
'75 Reuters, 1 March 2003. 
176 C& A1-Jazeera. net, 1 March 2003. 
177 Ibid. 
178 Ibid. 
179 CNN ,1 March 2003. 
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commercial deals between Iraqi businessmen and Saudi as well as Emeriti's 
counterparts' private and public sector. In general, seven factors profoundly 
affected indirectly the efficiency and logic of the regional embargo. 1) The 
concept of jiwar or neighbourhood. 2) The supremacy of ghara'ib or foreigners 
against the pan-Arabism through aylaqat al dam. 3) The notion of Arab 
brotherhood. 4) The tribal concept of nasab or lineage. 5) Tribal cultural values 
stressing courage, forgiveness, and manhood against external threat. 6) The 
asabiya or solidarity concept. 7) Religious dimension and the silat al raham or 
kinship. However, the Middle East urbanized and commercialised environment 
made most tribal figures prominent businessmen, the educated middle class, and 
civil servants. They became an instrumental and integral part of the chambers of 
commerce, landlords, industrial leagues and the private sector. While many of the 
contemporary tribal figures are businessmen and live in luxury, the Bedouin 
nomadic aspects mentioned above remained in many ways significant, resilient, 
and persistent in Arab society. '8° 
In the words of one observer: 
Kahilji businessman approached me, who happens to be the youngest 
prince of Saudi Arabia; he was wearing the traditional iqal and kofayya 
(the tribal head ware). After briefly introducing himself and naming 
his tribe, we kissed on the nose; I then welcomed him with traditional 
tea. Political discussion came in fore, he said we are one Arab family 
and of the same tribal traditions and that our religion oblige us to 
forgive each other. We agreed that it was time to forgive the past and 
open a new page so we don't let the ghara'ib (foreigners) get between 
us. He said our factories and economies needed to benefits too. They 
asked me to help and smoothen the way for them to enter the Iraqi 
market. This signified their readiness to do business again and openly 
with us. '8' 
'so Faleh Jabar & Hosham Dawod (eds. ) Tribes and Power; Nationalism and Ethnicity ;ý the 
Middle East (Sagi, 2003), pp. 15.159. 181 Iraqi businessman, private interview with author, The Netherlands, Mid 2001 
123 
This commercial action between the Iraqi and Saudi businessman symbolised the 
importance of traditional representation and the informality of commercial 
interaction to reach peculiar commercial arrangements. It came to my attention 
that these kinds of political rehabilitation and commercial alliances was also 
taking place between Iraqi businessmen and businessmen from the UAE whose 
state were build on tribal political structure and headed by tribal sheikhs. 
Although it is rather more difficult to pin down: the tribal way of thinking in the 
UAE and especially by Sheikh Zaid influenced how the UAE commercially 
approached Iraq and this could be also seen in his and the other officials in the 
UAE (see the section in the UAE) public statements that clearly called for the 
lifting of sanctions against Iraq. 
One important note that must be mentioned here is that when mentioning tribal 
factors played a key role in the commercial and political rehabilitation of Iraq with 
its neighbourhood, it is meant by it the Iraqi Sunni tribal figures with the Arab 
Sunni tribal figures. Saudi Arabia has traditional and religious links to the Anbar 
province in Iraq where most Sunni Iraqi businessmen originate. At the same time, 
by agreeing to trade with Iraq, Saudi Arabia was in fact trading and strengthening 
the hand of the Sunni dominated government of Saddam Hussein. The reason is 
difficult to pin down but at the same time can be obvious for two factors: 1) Saudi 
Arabia feared that Arab Shiite tribes which represents the majority of the Iraqi 
population to have the upper hand if sanctions succeeded in undermining 
Saddam's regime and topple him, the Ba'ath party, and his military establishment 
which all largely were dominated by Iraqi Sunni's. 2) By dealing directly with the 
influential Sunni tribes. By doing so the Saudi's had hoped it would guarantee 
smooth access to the Iraqi market and win lucrative commercial deals. 
The demise of the American containment policy can also be seen from other 
angles especially that of the shifting position of the Gulf countries towards Iraq. 
The Gulf countries saw the Oslo agreement collapsing, arms sales to Israel 
increasing, Saddam ever more strongly entrenched in his position, Iran gaining 
more military power, the fear of the possible break up of the Iraqi state with the 
possibility of a Shia reaching power in Baghdad, America's opening up to Iran 
Khatami, the Arab Street boiling, resentments and attacks against US troops 
124 
positioned in the Gulf, in addition to the large economic and commercial deals for 
their industry and economies: all these factors pushed the Gulf countries to 
embark on an independent policy to rebuild the regional relationships. They could 
not ignore Iraq forever as the American wanted them to do. They had their own 
regional concerns and therefore their own agenda to deal with and solve. Local 
arrangements with their neighbourhood became thus a priority. Thus the mutual 
visits and complementary statements and the increased trade between Baghdad 
and the Arab Gulf capitals including Riyadh were the core factor behind the 
collapse of the American containment policy. Saudi is a case in point. One of the 
results was that the United States was denied the use of the local airbases to attack 
Iraq. "The February 1998 crisis was marked by a distinct lack of Saudi support for 
US efforts to pressure Baghdad. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's visit to 
drum up support for a military strike was met by a stone wall in Saudi Arabia. She 
left without getting `Abdallah's approval for the United States to use Saudi 
airbases. When Secretary of Defense William Cohen followed, he still could not 
get approval for the use of Saudi airbases. Defense Minister Sultan bin `Abd al- 
Aziz later rejected the possibility. The US effort was seen as insensitive to local 
concerns, bullying, and embarrassing. " 182 
182Joshua Teitelbaum "The Gulf States and the End of Dual Containment" Middle East Review of 
International Affairs (MERIA), Volume 2, No. 3, September 1998. 
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4.3 Non-Arab neighbours 
Other key international actors beside the Arab world were Iraq's non-Arab 
neighbours. This section discusses the relations with two key states around Iraq: 
Turkey and Iran. 
4.3.1 Turkey 
Turkey, which had been facing a severe economic crisis since 2001, since which 
time scores of Turkish businesses have closed, banks collapsed, thousands of 
workers laid off, and the lira tumbled massively against the dollar, started pushing 
for a total revitalization of its economic ties with Baghdad. According to Turkish 
officials, Turkey claimed that it had suffered a loss in trade of $35 billion to $50 
billion under the twelve-year UN sanctions. Turkey restored full diplomatic 
relations with Baghdad, and sent various delegations to Baghdad in February 2000 
as well as in September, October, March, and May 2001. Despite US misgivings 
and warnings not to go ahead with the visits, Turkey sent a big Turkish business 
delegations, led by Trade Secretary Kurzad Tuzmen, and composed of hundreds 
of businessmen representing Turkish companies as well as hosted many Iraqi 
officials in Ankara. In addition, it resumed its train services between Ankara- 
Baghdad, 183 as well as its commercial flights into Baghdad 184 and planed to build 
gas pipeline (1,380-kilometres with estimated cost of $2.5 billion). This was in 
connection with an agreement that Turkey had signed with the Iraqi government 
at the end of 1996, under which Iraq would deliver up to 10 billion cubic meters 
of natural gas a year to Turkey. 185 Turkey also signed a memorandum of 
understanding on promoting cooperation in the oil sector and trade. 186 
Relations continued to improve and in June 2002, another Turkish delegation 
traveled by air to Baghdad, headed by Turkey's State Minister and 300 officials 
and businessmen. In their four-day visit they met with Iraqi officials from the 
183 B-K, 6 May 2001. 
194 6a, 15 June 2001. 
tB5 AF P, I April 2001. 
1B6 China's People Daily, 27 July 2001. 
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health, trade, agriculture, irrigation, internal affairs, electricity, and oil ministries. 
At the same time, Iraq's Oil Minister reported that the total trade value between 
Turkey and Iraq had reached, in the year 2001, $2 billion. 187 
Turkey, who had been Baghdad's largest trading partner before the Gulf War of 
1991, and was, at the same time, a NATO member and Washington's main ally in 
southeastern Europe and the Caspian region, favored a total lift of economic 
sanctions on its neighbor Iraq, hoping to increase its trade ties with Iraq to the pre- 
1990 level of annual $2.5 billion. This aim was slowly materializing throughout 
the years from 1999 to 2002. Turkey moved steadily towards rebuilding ties with 
Iraq. The volume of commercial exchange between Baghdad and Ankara had 
risen to $2 billion by the end of July 2001 and with a forecast of reaching $3 
billion for the following year. 188 This represented a significant increase in 
Turkish exports to Iraq from 1999, where trade between the two countries 
amounted to $661 million and to $1.26 billion in 2000.189 
For the Turkish government, it was becoming increasingly difficult to support the 
economic sanctions on Iraq, which was clearly reflected in the words of Turkish 
Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit: "Iraq was one of our main trade partners before the 
Gulf War" adding "Turkey has been the major sufferer of the embargo on Iraq". 
Even with the knowledge that Saddam was repressing his people, threatening 
Iraq's neighbors, and both seeking and retaining weapons of mass destruction; 
Mr. Ecevit went on to say that: "It's not our concern who continues the leadership 
of this or that or any others country. Saddam is there in the position of leadership, 
and that's a fact we cannot change. The United States has tried to change it for 
several years, but to no avail. "190 Turkey's thirst for its own commercial interests 
with Baghdad drove a wedge in the sanctions aim and system, in addition to 
creating differences among allies. By trading with Iraq, Ankara seriously 
challenged and publicly criticized Washington's policy on Iraq especially in 
relation to the economic implications of the sanctions, 
187 
-aa, 1 July 2002, p. 2. "'Arabic News, 31 July 2001. 
189 China's People Daily, 27 July 2001. 
190 John Ward Anderson "Ankara Supports Lifting UN Sanctions Against Iraq" Washington Post 
26 January 2001 p. A17. 
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Aysegul Sever, an Assistant Professor in the Department of political science and 
International Relations at Marmora University in Istanbul, Turkey, stated that the 
Economic embargo, which was applied in August 1990, adversely 
affected the Turkish economy, especially that of South Eastern Turkey 
where Kurds live in large numbers. Ankara therefore expressed its 
unease with the embargo as early as 1992. Since then Turkey has 
suffered great economic losses due to the end of a large-scale trade 
with Iraq, and the loss of transit revenues from the Kerkuk-Yumurtalik 
pipeline. By 1998 some estimates put Turkey's losses as high as $35 
billion. This was a serious setback since Iraq was Turkey's largest 
trading partner in the mid-1980s. Consequently, Turkey consistently 
called for a special treatment as was the case with Jordan, but no 
success has been achieved. Ankara's application to the UNSC's 
Sanctions Committee to conduct the so-called Jordan model border 
trade with Iraq under the Article 58 of the UN Charter was turned 
down. 191 
The Turkish side managed to win an advantageous position in their efforts to 
improve economic ties with Baghdad and to restore their badly-hit economy 
through dialogue policy just similar to that of other EU and Arab states rather than 
the isolationist policy of the United States. Saddam returned these favors with 
similar gestures of support towards Ankara, as Sever indicated: "in the disastrous 
earthquake of August 17, Iraq surpassed some of Turkey's Western allies in the 
amount of aid provided by pumping $10 million worth of oil through the Turkish- 
Iraqi pipeline after a special UN permit was issued. "192 
In Ankara's mindset, the continued Kurdish nationalist aspirations towards an 
independent Kurdistan in Iraq, as well as in southeastern Turkey, remained a 
deeply troubling issue. It was an additional priority for any Turkish government 
79'Aysegul Sever "Turkey's Stance on 'Dual Containment' " Journal of South Asian and týr_ fiddle 
Eastern Studies, Vol. XXIV, No. 2, winter 2001, p. 53. 
192 Ibid., p. 60. 
128 
after the economic ties and considerations. However, Turkey found a great partner 
in Saddam who shared these same concerns when it came to the Kurdish question. 
To prevent the Iraqi Kurds from creating an independent state of their own, a 
solution was found through intelligence cooperation and the regular Turkish 
cross-border invasions into northern Iraq. The Iraqi regime's approach towards 
these incursions was accommodating. 193 
Turkey, long one of America's key strategic allies in the region, also clearly 
expressed its opposition to military action against Saddam regime. A government 
spokesman raised the question: "Is there any new mistake committed by Iraq or 
are accounts of ten years ago being settled? " Furthermore, General Huseyin 
Kivrikoglu, Chief of Turkey's General Staff, has made it plain that he feared an 
attack would have consequences detrimental to his country's own security 
interests. An Associated Press report from 25 December, 2001, stated: 
"Kivrikoglu indicated that if Saddam is ousted, Iraqi Kurds would take advantage 
of a power vacuum to set up a Kurdish state, which may boost the, aspirations of 
autonomy-seeking Kurds inside Turkey. (He commented) `Nobody would like 
this country (Iraq) to fall apart leading to the emergence of new ethnic states. "'194 
In a conference on Turkey held in London on 14 November 2002, the speakers 
spoke of the financial losses that were estimated to reach as much as $15 billion if 
the war started and lasted for a while. Tourism, oil smuggling, oil transit charges, 
ports, and Turkish factories and companies could suffer, according to the 200 
bankers and economists who participated in that seminar. 195 
193 Ibid. 
14 AR, 25 December 2001. 
195 1- is at, 17 November 2002, p. 11. 
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4.3.2 Iran 
Despite the fact that Iran and Iraq had not formalized an official peace agreement 
a decade and half after the end of their eight years war, the two countries agreed to 
boost their commercial exchange to $500 million a year under the UN "oil-for- 
food" deal. The two countries also saw some improvement in their political 
exchanges, their embassies opened, and they exchanged large numbers of war 
prisoners and dead. The improvements in relations were reflected in Baghdad's 
annual international trade fair of November 2002, in which more than 50 Iranian 
companies participated. 196 
There were other examples of the increase in the normalization of relations 
between the two countries. When Iran hosted the Islamic Conference Organization 
(ICO), Saddam was invited to attend. Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi 
officially visited Baghdad on an Iranian plane, and often many senior Iraqi 
officials visited Tehran and met with Muhammad Khatami, Iran's President. Both 
sides exchanged POWs while Saddam, for the first time since the Iranian 
revolution of 1979, allowed Iranian pilgrims to visit the Shia holy places in Najaf 
and Karbala. 
Iran-Iraq relations also showed signs of smuggling cooperation across the long 
land border between them sometimes via the northern Iraqi governorates as well 
as through the Iranian territorial waters. "Illicit oil exports via the Persian Gulf 
averaged about 70,000 barrels per day in November, and that represents the 
highest level since sanctions have been in place. "197 
This all came on the backdrop of hostile relations between the two countries prior 
to the economic sanctions on Iraq. Moves to improve relations between the two 
governments during the sanctions era seemed to have two factors behind it 1) the 
US military presence in the Gulf area and Afghanistan which was close to Iran's 
land and water borders. Iran probably wanted to defy and render useless the US 
imposed dual-containment policy on it and on Iraq. 2) Iran under Khatami was 
196 ýfp, 5 November 2002. 
197 lSltlalte Department report on Iraq oil smuggling by State Department Spokesman James Foley, 
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moving towards more political and economic opening. An opportunity for Iranian 
exports to increase by selling their products to the Iraqi market. 3) Cutting down 
on Iraq interference inside Iran through Mujahedin-e Khalq, and the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party of Iran. 4) Extra money for the Iranian military and traders via 
smuggling Iraqi oil and goods. 
As for Iraq, opening to Iran was important from many ways: 1) It was another 
country infringing the regional economic sanctions. 2) Another opportunity to 
build support from within the region 3) Although symbolic in nature, Iraq had 
hoped by opening up to Iran it would win an ally- even symbolically- especially 
when considering the regional political weight such an alliance-although 
symbolic- can impact on the US sponsored dual-containment policy. 4) A vital 
smuggling route to facilitate Iraqi smuggling efforts. 5) Cutting down on any 
destabilizing activities by a possible Iranian involvement in the south or north of 
Iraq. 
Although a long-time enemy of Saddam, the economic and political relations 
between the two had improved and risen steadily in defiance of the sanctions and 
the containment policy. Anoushirvan Ehteshami asserted that "dual containment 
effectively placed Iran and Iraq in the same boat, " while "Iran's anxiety" 
increased even more when the Bush administration placed the two countries again 
under the category of evil regimes. 198 Thus Ehteshami asks "Why should Iran help 
overthrow Saddam when rapid success may have facilitated U. S. efforts then to 
overturn the regime in Tehran? " 199 He added that "the two neighbors have 
demonstrated a remarkable capacity, despite lasting tensions, for bilateral 
cooperation in pursuit of each of their interests in Gulf security since the end of 
their war in 1988. The two countries reestablished diplomatic relations, rebuilt 
some of their old economic ties, and broadened intergovernmental exchanges 
during the 1990s on the issues of war reparations, their common border, and 
prisoners of war. , 200 
198 Anoushirvan Ehteshami "Iran-Iraq Relations after Saddam" The Washington Ouarterly Autumn 
2003, p. 122. 
199 Ibid, p. 123. 200 Ibid, p. 121. 
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4.4 Summary 
In an effort to get out of sanctions, Iraq had signed 11 free-trade agreements: with 
Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen 
and the United Arab Emirates. However, Iraq's rapprochement with the Arab 
world continued even if there were no free trade agreements, and it also extended 
beyond the Mashreq and the GCC states. This was evident in the case of Morocco. 
The two countries established a joint business council to increase liberate and 
encourage trade and commerce between them. Trade volume between the two 
countries in the year 2001 reached $240 million in Moroccan exports to Iraq while 
Morocco imported $450 million of Iraq's oil. 201 
Oman had activated trade and economic co-operation with Iraq too. There was an 
Omani-Iraqi joint committee that met to discuss these issues, while the two 
countries had signed a deal to increase trade ties and expand interactions 
commercially. 202 Oman and Iraq also inaugurated the maritime routs between 
their two countries to enhance trade between the two countries. Three boat trips 
travelled between Iraq and Oman. This materialized due to the immense pressure 
from the Omani business lobby to restore trade routes with Iraq. 203 In addition, 
Sultan Qaboos of Oman ratified an agreement establishing a free trade zone 
between the two countries to enhance and increase trade between the Sultanate 
and Iraq. 204 
At the same time, Qatar, a gas rich Gulf state, signed a free trade agreement with 
Iraq during June 2002 in a visit to Baghdad by Sheikh Hamad Bin Faysal al-Thani 
with a 50 man delegation of Qatari business and government officials where the 
Sheikh stated: "It's a natural step on the way to develop relations between the two 
brotherly countries. s205 The Qatari Economy and Trade Minister added, "During 
our visit, we have signed deals (with) Iraq worth more than £200 million. 9406 
Moreover, the two sides agreed to open their maritime links between their 
201 AI-Hayat, 15 June 2002, p. 2. 
202 Reuters, 18 March 2003. 
203 1A Hayat, 7 July 2002, p. 13. 
204 "Oman-Iraq free zone agreement ratified" Gulf News, July 8,2002. 
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harbours, and to establish a joint company for maritime transportation. 207 In 
addition, Saddam Hussein received two Boeing airplanes from visiting Arab 
Emirs and businessmen. They said that they were a gift of appreciation for his 
Arab leadership and a gesture of solidarity with the Iraqi people. The first came 
from Sheikh Hamad bin Ali Al-Thani, a member of Qatar's ruling family. The 
second came from Egyptian, Jordanian, Lebanese, and Moroccan businessmen. 208 
Saddam was eager to show how his strategy of defiance and breaking through the 
regional economic sanctions was working. 
Qatar also used the issue of Iraq to play a more influential role in regional affairs. 
Echoing Sheikh Zayed of the UAE Qatari diplomacy under the Foreign Minister 
Sheikh Hamad Al Thani saw a policy calling for the lifting of sanctions to 
alleviate the agony of the Iraqi people. In mid 2000, Al Thani even made this very 
clear in Kuwait when he called on Kuwait to forget the 1990 invasion and allowed 
the rehabilitation of Iraq to the Arab fold. 209 
A country that went to war against Iraq in 1991, Bahrain had opened its embassy 
in Baghdad and resumed trade links. Iraq also opened its embassy in Bahrain. In 
mid 1998, Bahrain's Minister of Finance and the National Economy announced 
that his country had decided to free its foreign trade with 10 Arab countries 
including Iraq. 210 The two countries opened their navigation line in 1999 and 
since then, people and goods had been able to travel between both countries. 
In 2002, the Iraqi Chamber of Commerce and the Bahraini Chamber of Industry 
and Commerce signed an agreement to promote trade ties and enhance economic 
relations, It also stipulated the implementation of joint projects, organizing trade 
fairs, and the exchange of visits and information. 21 Many Bahraini businessmen 
visited Baghdad; the most notable occasion was in March 2002 where a 
delegation of 50 businessmen visited Iraq. In 2002, the trade volume stood at $6 
207 Al-Hayat, 9 June 2002, p. 2. o AEE, 18 August 2001. 
209 Ghanim Alnajjar "The GCC and Iraq" Middle East Policy. Vol. VII, No. 4, October 2000, pp. 98.. 99. 
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million. At the same time, the two countries signed a free trade agreement, which 
was expected to increase trade. 212 
As for Lebanon, in late 2001 Iraq began to extend economic support to the ailing 
Lebanese economy. In 2001, the volume of trade between the two countries 
reached $ 400 million, while Lebanese trade delegations visited Iraq extensively 
during 2001 and 2002.213 In addition, Iraq decided to export 150,000 to 200,000 
barrels of oil to Lebanon per month at a reduced price. This was confirmed by the 
Daily Star, which stated that Iraq and Lebanon signed a memo in April 2002 
reading: "Lebanon is to receive its oil needs, estimated at 150,000 to 200,000 
barrels per month, at reduced prices to be specified later. "214 In addition, Lebanon 
participated in the November 2002 Baghdad International Trade Fair with a total 
of 85 companies specializing in food, medicine, electronics, chemicals, 
agriculture, detergents, computers, cosmetics, and textiles. 215 
In summary, the evidence suggested strongly that Iraqi policy had not changed 
towards vital United States' interests, while Saddam Hussein managed skilfully to 
trade and interacts effectively with Arab and non-Arab neighbours creating an 
economic dependence for some and strategic need from others. It is also 
recognition that in practice, sanctions had failed to deter Iraq's neighbours from 
re-starting their economic and political relations with Saddam regime. 
The actual aim of sanctions was supposed to discourage trade and cooperation 
with Saddam, especially from front-line states. This proved ineffective as the 
security concerns and economic benefits of regional states was more vital than 
UN sanctions rules and regulations. Arab and non-Arab states saw that it was in 
their national interests to support Saddam diplomatically and even economically 
to get him out of the sanctions box. During the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam replaced 
Israel briefly as the enemy. However, full cooperation with the United States was 
too hard for Arab governments at a stage when Israel was seen as the enemy 
number one by the Arab public opinion and perceived to be harmful to their 
interests and the relations with their population. These governments, including the 
212 Arabic News, 22 February 2002. 
213 Arabic News, 10 June 2002. 
214 "Baghdad 'Committed' to Helping Lebanese Economy" The Daily Star 6 April 2002. 
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more moderate amongst them, were cautious in supporting the continued 
bombardment of Iraq and the UN sanctions. Moderate Arab states feared the rise 
of extremism due to the intensity and sensitivity of the Iraqi and the Palestinian 
issues which served to fuel extremism in the Muslim world. 
Pressing domestic needs pushed the Arab states to Iraq. Linguistic, cultural, 
common history and religious affinities between Iraq and the Arab world also 
helped the push towards the rehabilitation of Iraq. An essential component of 
Arab informal interactions and politics was the tribal and marriage affinities 
complementing these factors were the cultural, language, history, geography and 
religion they share. This informal interaction with Iraq and the Iraqi elite and 
ordinary people was reflected indirectly on some Arab governments' foreign 
policies especially the Arab Gulf area. Indirectly this helped an Arab policy that 
favoured the lifting of sanctions and the rehabilitation of Iraq. It can be called an 
informal process of elite bargaining and is crucial in Arab conflict management 
and problem solving. This informal bargaining procedure seeks to promote 
consensus among Arab businesses as well as political elites: however, it may turn 
out to be fragile and depends on key political actors' willingness to accept, 
accommodate, and compromise for the sake of tribal, religious and cultural sake. 
Convinced that America would not officially lift UN sanctions against Saddam 
Hussein as long as he stayed in power, and even more convinced that years of 
economic sanctions could not unseat him or even destabilizes his rule, realpolitik 
had to follow: dealing with Saddam Hussein economically and politically became 
a reality. 
One thing that should be clear from the above discussion is that the regional 
sanctions on Iraq had all but collapsed. Regionally, Iraq became politically and 
economically rehabilitated. In the years of sanctions, Iraq managed to complete 
the process of restoring relations with all Arabs states (with the exception of 
Kuwait) and also managed to change the political, economic and strategic 
alignments in the Arab world to its advantage. 
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Iraq also managed to extend its diplomatic and economic relations with non-Arab 
countries such as Turkey and Iran. All the profound changes discussed above 
brought new opportunities for Iraq and helped to accelerate its drive for a vital 
regional role again. Thus, through these new regional relations, Iraq managed to 
place more stresses, complications, and strains in US policy in the Middle East in 
general, and on Iraq in particular. This was evident when Colin Powell's and Dick 
Cheney's visited the Middle East in the year 2001 and failed to win support for 
Powell's vision of smart sanctions or Cheney's call for the separation of the issue 
of Palestine and Iraq and regime change in Iraq. 
The years of sanctions showed that the region including the Arabs ignored all US 
pleas to put an end to illicit trade or close their land borders with Iraq, or even to 
accept full UN monitoring on Syrian border or endorse the concept of regime 
change in Baghdad by force. 
The following chapter focuses on the international economic relations with Iraq, 
and illustrates to what degree the world traded with Iraq by selecting key 
international actors and how this helped the de-containment of Saddam and the 
erosion of the multilateral comprehensive economic sanctions. 
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5. INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
AND IRAQ 
5.1 The long-term international strategic importance of 
Iraq's oil 
In this section, particular attention is given to the importance of Iraq's natural 
resources and how these have featured in the international consensus behind the 
international de-containment drive towards Iraq. One thing should be clear from 
the preceding discussion: Iraq managed in a greater extent to tie the world's 
economy and some multinationals to its vast oil and potential market thus helped 
the economic siege on Iraq lose its political effectiveness and logic. 
Iraq is rich in natural and human resources. Its oil riches altered the political 
chessboard at the UN Security Council. The world needed Iraq's riches and 
strategic position. Consequently, the world community pushed for the "oil-for- 
food-deal" to enable them to trade with Iraq. With every year, this programme 
expanded to the point that sanctions became more theory than practice. All of the 
UN Resolutions on Iraq had been compromised by one single exception that kept 
on being enhanced and expanded: the "oil-for-food" programme. Despite its 
initial humanitarian nature, the "oil-for-food" deal compromised all UN 
Resolutions on Iraq for the sake of economic and companies' interests. The 
importance of Iraq in the world economy, and especially that of its oil and grand 
infrastructure projects, had made Russia, France, China and other UN member 
states push for more compromises on the "oil-for-food" deal enlarging this deal 
according to each nation's own narrow national political, strategic and economic 
interests. 
The importance of Iraq to the world economy and oil market was highlighted in 
an interview with A. Zallom, an Oil expert and is the executive of Zallom & 
associates for oil consultancy. The interview quoted statistical studies that 
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estimated Iraq was sitting on 11% of world oil reserves, which equalled to 112 
billion barrels while there were other studies that put Iraqi oil reserves to 200 
billion barrels. These estimates were taken from 15 Iraqi oil fields out of 74 
known oil fields, meaning that there were 60 oil fields still not under production. 
Iraq's oil was considered to be the cheapest to produce, and Iraq is seen to be the 
last place on earth where oil will dry up. With world demands growing by 2020 
up to 112 million barrels per day, Iraq's economic and strategic importance was 
forecasted to increase. The interview took the United States as an example, where 
US oil reserves were estimated to last for ten years only (The US have 22 billion 
in oil reserves only) while the average American citizen consumes 28 barrels 
annually compared with an average Chinese citizen who consumes 2 barrels 
annually. This indicated the increasing need for oil in the West. According to 
Zallom, Iraq's known oil reserves equalled that of the oil reserves of United 
States, Mexico, Canada, Western Europe, Australia, New Zealand, China and the 
rest of Asia all combined (116 billion in oil reserves), with the exception of the 
216 Middle East alone. 
Steve Kretzmann, an oil expert with the Institute of Policy Studies in the United 
States, valued the importance of Iraq to the world economy. "The fact of the 
matter is that if you look overtime, the next 30 to 50 years, Iraq will be 
strategically important for years to come and that importance is going to increase 
as other reserves around the world deplete. "217 Many oil industry executives and 
experts saw the United States liberation of Iraq and the European objection to any 
US move as a worldwide oil competitiveness between the two "When the US goes 
to Iraq, we are not only talking about just profit, but we are also talking about 
control, " said Steve Kretzmann. He added, "Who's controlling the tap and who's 
got their hands on the spigots is what really matters. It has everything to do with 
oil. " 
Michael Renner of the Washington-based World Watch Institute confirmed that 
line of thought, "I think that to the extent that you have a country with a lot of . 
216 Interview with Dr. A. Zallom, Al-Jazeera. net, 19 February 2003. 217 "US Seen Reaping the Biggest Oil Benefits From War" IPS-Inter Press Service, 27 February 
2003. 
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cheap high-quality oil, that at least potentially represents an enormous competitive 
advantage vis-a-vis someone who doesn't have access to that oil. " He added 
"With low production costs relative to world market price, obviously there's a 
whole lot more money to be divided up than somewhere in the US or the North 
Sea where it's far more expensive to produce oil in the first place. "218 
Issam al-Chalabi, former Iraqi Oil Minister, and the executive director of the 
London-based Center for Global Energy Studies, told the CERA Oil Summit, held 
on 10th February 2003: "Iraq is viewed by the oil industry as one of the world's 
Prime exploration and development plays: not only are the reserves second only to 
Saudi Arabia's, but much less has been developed. Also like Saudi Arabia, Iraq 
has the advantage of low costs for discovery, development and operation of 
"219 oilfields. 
Another example can be seen from the increased volume of trade between Iraq 
and the EU during the era of sanctions. According to UN estimates on the "oil- 
for-food" deal between the UN and Iraq, since its inception, the "oil-for-food" 
programme had made Iraq $58 billion, with 24 thousand contracts worth $44 
billion, profiting international corporations and industry from more than 70 
countries. 220 While the United Nations Office of the Iraq Programme declared 
that between December 1996 and 20 March 2003 Iraq exported 3.4 billion barrels 
valued at about $65 billion. 221 This success in increasing oil production despite 
sanctions had eroded sanctions further and pushed many business executives to 
lobby for trade with oil-sanctioned countries, including Iraq. 
According to the EU official web site, EU-Iraqi trade "grew considerably in 1997 
after the start of the implementation of the UN "oil-for-food" programme. In 
2001, EU imports (99% oil products) from Iraq amounted to 3 494 million euro, 
218 IPS Inter-Press Service: Loc. Cit, 
219 MFES, VoL. XLVI, No. 7,17 February 2003. 
220 
-a at, 24 November 2002, p. 11. 221 The United Nations office of the Iraq Programme, IS July 2003, 
http: //www. un. org/Qents/oip/index. html 
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about 50% higher than they were before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the EU thus 
making up about 25% of the Iraqi export markets. "222 
Moreover, many in the business community were against sanctions. One such 
businessman was the Ex-Chief Executive and Chairman of Mobil Corporation, 
one of the largest oil, gas and petrochemical corporations. Lucio Nato clearly 
highlighted state/business community conflicting perception when speaking 
against sanctions on Iraq, during a lecture to the Center for Contemporary Arab 
Studies in Washington: "We may not like the guy who runs the store, but the 
merchandise in the store sure is attractive. " He added, "My business cannot thrive 
unless there is a free flow of money, products, people, and ideas. " Noto continued 
to highlight facts and figures of the shortcomings of sanctions: "If you look back 
at the history of sanctions, it doesn't give you much comfort. We have had 
sanctions against Cuba for 37 years. I'm not sure what anyone thinks we've 
accomplished. " After promising to stay an outspoken critic of economic sanctions 
and after much explaining about the historic relationship of the energy industry 
with Iraq, Iran and Middle East in general he raised the need for sincere sanctions 
debate: "We need an honest discussion and dialogue on sanctions. We cannot 
allow the debate to go forward in the way it had gone forward to date. "223 An 
article in Newsweek magazine confirmed this thinking: "The big oil companies are 
global adventurers, willing to explore in war zones, opposing sanctions on pariah 
states like Libya and Iraq. They know they can't meet US fossil- fuel needs from 
US reserves. 9t224 
In his lecture, 225 Lucio Noto nicely articulated the stance of most of the major oil 
companies in the following comments: 
From the narrow perspective of the energy industry, and from the 
broader perspective of US national interest, unilateral sanctions are a 
222 The EU's Relation with Iraq, October 2002, 
ttn: //eurona. eu. int/comm/external rel ations/irad/intro/ 223 Rethinking Sanctions: Lecture by Lucio A. Noto; The Center for Contemporary Arab Studies; 
United States of America, April 1998. 
224 Tony Emerson: "The Thirst for Oil" Nei sw April 8/April 15,2002. 225 Noto, Op. Cit. ` 
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failure. You would think that the US government would encourage 
globalisation, free trade, and transfer of goodwill across boundaries. 
My business cannot thrive unless there is a free flow of money, 
products, people, and ideas. In the past, the US was often the only 
game in town. If there were US economic sanctions against you, you 
were in big trouble. Today, countries around the world have access to 
other markets. They have access to other sources and funds. They have 
access to technology from many sources. Why do we think that 
somehow the US is special, that we can impose what we want on 
others and that we will be effective in doing it? We end up putting 
sanctions on countries in a way that hurts the wrong people. We 
remove ourselves from the process of change, from being able to be a 
catalyst of constructive movement on other countries. And, we 
disadvantage US companies... Every year, the world uses roughly 75 
million barrels a day of oil and gas. We have to replace it. We have to 
make sure that our children have access to clean, efficient energy. 
Therefore I'm going to have to live in places that most people in 
Washington wish were never put on a map. But they exist and they're 
important to us, and to the free world. I'm ready to take risks to find 
new sources of energy, but sanctions have the effect of tying one hand 
behind my back. They disadvantage Mobil competitively... I have a 
rather emotional view of sanctions. Forgive me for that, but I think this 
is a bread and butter issue for America: not just for Mobil, and not just 
for the oil industry, but for the whole of America. 
As Noto's comments strongly suggested, the world business community would 
reject the charge that its growing opposition to the sanctions had been based on 
nothing more than simple desire for profit. There seemed to be a philosophical 
consensus among business interests, and those elements in world governments, 
which support them, that the sanctions represent a policy founded on a false 
assumption that isolation and punishment were the best ways to influence a 
country to change its behaviour. In essence, the elements that had been pushing so 
strongly for a suspension of sanctions were proposing that the best way to get the 
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Iraqi regime to respect the concerns of the international community was to pursue 
a policy of constructive engagement, which gave the regime a real stake in doing 
S0. 
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Table 5.1 The stakeholders in Iraq's oil industry 
Company Home Country 
Trafigura The Netherlands 
Shell Britain/The Netherlands 
Petroplus The Netherlands 
Socap France 
Total France 
Aredio France 
Elf Aquitaine France 
Perenco France 
Coastal USA 
Phoenix International USA 
Oilexco Canada 
Ranger Oil Canada 
Bow Canada 
Nexen Canada 
Eni Italy 
Agip Italy 
API Oil Ltd Italy 
Costieri Genovese Petroleferi Italy 
Industria Petroliferi Siciliana Italy 
Italiana Energia Italy 
Italtech Italy 
IPS Italy 
IES Italiana Italy 
Repsol Spain 
Sirecox Spain 
Lubna Trading Spain 
Expansion Exteriur Spain 
Petrofina Belgium 
Delta Turkey 
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Emin Turkey 
Erdem Turkey 
Seta Insaat Petrol Turkey 
Tekfen Turkey 
Tupras Turkey 
Besler Nakliyat Turkey 
KCK Insaat Turkey 
China United Oil China 
Fortune China 
Sinochem China 
China Warbao Engineering China 
Purich China 
Unipec China 
Zhen Rong China 
CNPC China 
ONGC India 
Reliance India 
India Oil Corp. India 
Alfa Eco Russia 
Lukoil Russia 
Machinoimport Russia 
Nafta Mockova Russia 
Onako Russia 
Rao Mes Russia 
Sibneft Russia 
Sidanco Russia 
Tatneft Russia 
Tyumen Russia 
Zangas Russia 
Zarubezhneft Russia 
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ACTEC Russia 
Bashneft Russia 
Gazprom Russia 
Rosneft Impex Russia 
Slavneft Russia 
Transneft Russia 
Stroyexport Russia 
Mastek Malaysia 
PETCO (Petronas) Malaysia 
Petmal Malaysia 
Quantum Malaysia 
Trade Year Malaysia 
PT Condor Oil Indonesia 
Java Atlantic Oil Indonesia 
Medco Indonesia 
Perta Indonesia 
PT Unichem Indonesia 
Korean consortium South Korea 
PetroVietnam Vietnam 
Petroleum Technical Services Vietnam 
PG Pongboon Intertrade Thailand 
Chaiyaporn Rice Thailand 
PTT Thailand 
Mocoh Services South Africa 
Hyson Nigeria 
Addax Switzerland 
Delta Switzerland 
Genmar Switzerland 
Petrogas Switzerland 
Vitol Switzerland 
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Harrico Switzerland 
VTT Vulcan Switzerland 
Zerich Switzerland 
Amos Kenya 
Petrobras Brazil 
PDVSA Venezuela 
Gamoco Gambia 
Gulf Erdohandels Austria 
OMV Austria 
Vavilon Ukraine 
Belmetalenergo Belarus 
Lada OMC Belarus 
Vassilevi Brothers Bulgaria 
Samir Morocco 
ZSA Services Yemen 
Bula Ireland 
Hellenic Petroleum Greece 
Marbel Resources United Kingdom 
Benzol UAE 
Camtech UAE 
Jewan UAE 
Crescent International UAE 
Loyoil UAE 
Income Egypt 
Pettrade Morocco 
Raymen Yemen 
ETAP Tunisia 
SPC Syria 
Samasu Sudan 
Sonatrach Algeria 
Source: Various issues of MEES. 
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Despite the destruction resulting from the wars and the additional economic 
damage caused by the subsequent years of economic blockade, Iraq remained a 
country rich in current key natural resources but also in its future potential 
especially in terms of oil and gas. Future Iraqi aims were highlighted by Iraq's Oil 
Minister, Amer Rashid, who spoke of the future: "Iraq aims to increase its oil 
reserves to 270 billion barrels and overtake Saudi Arabia ... By transforming 
potential reserves into proven reserves, Iraq will occupy the top position in the 
world"226 
Moreover, Iraq was planning to increase its oil capacity and had announced to 
major international companies the opportunity to invest in Iraq's oil sector. Iraq 
was planning to increase production to 6 million barrels per day (bpd) by the year 
2010. Iraq forecasted that its energy sector needed investment of 50 billion dollars 
to reach that target by 2010. Plans and negotiations were already at an advanced 
level with Turkey, Syria and Jordan to build new and additional oil and gas 
pipelines to these countries and from it to Europe. In 1990, before the Gulf War 
and economic sanctions, Iraq's average oil export was standing at 3.2 million 
barrels per day (bpd) with plans to increase it to 4.2 million barrels per day (bpd). 
Early in 2001, Iraq announced that it was planning to drill 350 new oil wells to 
increase its oil reserves capacity. Iraqi and foreign oil experts had pinpointed 514 
geological areas that had potential for oil given at a 70% chance of success, while 
400 potential oil spots were waiting for discovery plans, 227 For that purpose, Iraq 
held many international exhibitions for world companies in Baghdad. For 
example, Iraq had planned to host an oil equipment exhibition in 24 June 2002.228 
That was hardly a country under sanctions. 
Iraqi oil exports were 2.27 million barrels per day at the end of July 2001.229 
Within the first week of August, exports jumped to 2.43 million barrels per day23° 
and by the last week of November 2001, Iraqi average daily exports rose to 2.67 
226 A, 4 August 2001. 
227 AJ-Havat, 10 April 2002, p. 11. 
228 Gulf Daily News, 21 May 2002. 
229 Reuters, 25 July 2001. 
230 Reuters, 8 August 2001. 
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million barrels of oil. 23' According to UN statistics of 2001, Iraq had earned 
"close to $ 40 billion since the start of the United Nations "oil-for-food" 
programme. , 232 
Even with the economic sanctions in place, Iraq derived considerable revenue 
from oil sales even though this was put in BNP Paribas Bank in New York, which 
was selected in 1996 as the exclusive bank for the oil-for-food deal and held the 
UN Iraq account. Iraq was still the authority that allocated commercial contracts 
to companies and it was Iraq with whom companies had to negotiate with for 
commercial contracts. Iraq was expected to submit a distribution plan to the UN 
for the products it wanted to import, and Iraq was the power that authorized the 
BNP Bank to open Letter of Credit or pays these companies. The only function 
the bank had with these revenues was to theoretically keep them away from 
Saddam's hand so he does not buy weapons of mass destructions with them. 
From a business perspective, while recognizing that Iraq could pay for contracts 
through its oil sales under the UN programme, one implication of Iraq's wealth 
was that it was clearly able to pay the massive amounts of money that was needed 
to reconstruct the infrastructure and restore the economy during the sanctions or 
whenever the remaining economic restrictions were lifted. This had meant that 
projects in Iraq had been very attractive to investors and to companies interested 
in exploring the Iraqi present and potential market. The country's need for 
imported goods extended across the economic spectrum from minor items like 
pencils to major purchases like airplanes. 
Major reconstruction was needed in various economic sectors. Consequently, 
international companies had found potentially very lucrative business 
opportunities in Iraq during the sanctions era in a vast number of different areas 
such as: general industry; desalination; water treatment plants; water distribution 
networks; pipes; pumps; compressors; turbines; tubes; cables; diesel generators; 
trucks and other heavy vehicles; drilling equipments; electricity projects and other 
23 Reuters, 6 December 2001. 
232 UN News Service, 13 March 2001. httv: //www, un. or ews/ 
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power generation networks; transportation; voice communications; internet; 
mobile, satellite systems; telephone equipment and accessories; and other 
telecommunications systems; railways; seaports; airports; schools; roads; housing; 
general construction; fire detection and fighting systems; solar energy systems; 
security, safety and surveillance systems; wood products; engineering services; 
training and consultancy services; consumer goods; food and beverages; 
cigarettes; detergents, soap and other toilet accessories; clothing; consumer 
electronics; air conditioner; cars; education; agricultural fertilizers, tracks and 
irrigation; pesticides; sprayers; vegetable/fruit seeds; cultural and environmental 
restoration projects; spare parts; eco/historic/religious tourism; oil refineries; 
exploration and drilling for iron; gold; cooper; silver; platinum; zinc; phosphates; 
medicine, vaccines; x-ray and laboratory equipments; medical centers and 
hospitals. 
The United Nations acknowledged that "The Programme (Oil-for-Food), as 
outlined by the Security Council beyond its initial emphasis on food and 
medicines to include infrastructure rehabilitation and 24 sectors: food, food 
handling, health, nutrition, electricity, agriculture and irrigation, education, 
transport and telecommunications, water and sanitation, housing, settlement 
rehabilitation (internally displaces persons-IDPs), mine action, special allocation 
for especially vulnerable groups, and oil industry spare parts and equipment. " The 
UN Office of the Iraq programme admitted that the Government of Iraq requested 
it to add new 10 sectors to the Oil-for-Food scheme which the UN accepted. 
These sectors were "Construction, industry, labour and social affairs, Board of 
Youth and Sports, information, culture, religious affairs, justice, finance, and 
Central Bank of Iraq. "233 
233 Office of the Iraq Programme, 18 July 2003. 
http: //www, un, orglDepts/oil2/Kickground/index, htmj 
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Ironically, before the collapse of the travel ban, one of Saddam's key mechanisms 
for enticing foreign companies to involve themselves in Iraq was the ostensibly 
humanitarian "oil-for-food" programme. Initially, the programme only allowed 
Iraq to sell oil so that it could purchase basic needs: items like food and 
medicines. However, it was not long before Saddam found a way to subvert this 
to serve his more ambitious political ends. The bitter long battle between Iraq and 
the UN over weapons inspections gave the Iraqi regime an ideal opportunity to 
make successive demands that the programme should be broadened. While the US 
and Britain favored forcing Iraq to submit to the inspections with military 
measures such as bombing raids, and did not fail to make periodic use of these, 
the other major Security Council members preferred to attempt to resolve 
differences through negotiations. Consequently, after each eruption of the dispute, 
the US found itself being forced by its European and Arab allies to allow the UN 
to broaden the scope of the "oil-for-food" programme. Each new amendment 
created new windows of opportunity within the programme's parameters. The 
more the business community saw new opportunities to make more money in 
Iraq, the more they lobbied governments for further openings, and the more the 
Iraqi regime was able to use the programme as a means of working its way back 
into trade relations with the international community. 
Since Russian, French and Chinese companies, amongst others, profited 
considerably from periodic expansions to the oil-for-food programme, one might 
be inclined to question the purity of these countries' motives for pursuing 
successive rounds of negotiations with the Iraqi regime and granting such 
significant concessions. Did the policy makers in these countries actually think 
that opening the Iraqi market to an ever-greater extent would really get Saddam to 
cooperate with the UN weapons inspectors, or did they grant concessions because 
it benefited their own economies? It almost goes without saying that, once the 
sanctions was effectively in tatters, there was practically no ways to induce the 
Iraqi regime to cooperate with UN rules other than the threat of overwhelming use 
of force used by the USIUK in 2003 to persuade Saddam to accept back the 
weapons inspectors. The British newspaper The Guardian posed the apt question: 
"Who's got who in the box here? " The editorial went on to observe: `"These days 
Saddam does not even make a pretence of cooperating with the UN, refusing to 
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allow its weapons inspectors to return while, at the same time, finding more and 
more ways, with growing Russian and regional connivance, to circumvent 
sanctions. 99234 One western diplomat commented to the BBC: "The large turnout 
and number of planes have turned Baghdad into an open capital, not one under 
siege"235 
The erosion of international support for the UN embargo, and the cementing of 
renewed friendship with Paris, Brussels, Amsterdam, Ankara and Berlin, among 
others, was really more than just a humanitarian cause but rather a long and 
established stand by the world business community of a combination of 
engagement and mercantilism which boiled down really to an amoral foreign 
policy. The Times, a British newspaper, confirmed: "Most of the leading foreign 
trade delegations were drawn to Iraq by lucrative contracts on offer for rebuilding 
the country's infrastructure. Iraq is pumping more than 2.3 million barrels of oil a 
day and has granted billions of pounds-worth of contracts to France, China and 
Russia, all permanent members of the UN Security Council. "236 
In addition to using Iraq's massive oil wealth to attract international businesses 
interested in reconstruction and trade contracts, Saddam also worked very 
skillfully to enlist the support of major oil companies in his attempt to bring down 
the sanctions regime. The world had been struggling with rising energy costs and 
the consequences of an economic slowdown, In this environment, the need for 
more oil in the market to bring prices down and satisfy the world's energy 
demands was ever greater. 
Baghdad, which had been the birthplace of the Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries in September 1960, retained its oil power once again through 
the "oil-for-food" deal despite the theoretic existence of sanctions. Oil industry 
source confirmed, "Iraq is the big prize. It has huge reserves. "237 The rise of oil 
234 The Guardian, Thursday September 21,2000. 
235 BBC, 1 November 2000. 
236 Richard Beeston "Foreigners Flock in as Saddam Mocks Sanctions" The Tim 02 November 
2000. 
231 Beeston (2000) Loc. Cit. 
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prices in 2000,2001, and even 2002 has considerably strengthened the hands of 
both Iraq and the energy companies in most of the major oil consuming nations. 
The fact that Iraq had been successful in increasing and sustaining its oil 
production capacity to nearly 3 million barrels per day, in spite of twelve years of 
economic sanctions and poor infrastructure, had dramatically increased its 
creditability in the world market and increased world competition for its oil. The 
Middle East Economic Survey reported that: "Iraqi Oil Minister `Amir Rashid 
stated that Iraq are close to it aims of retaining the pre 1990 production capacity 
level of approximately 3.5mn b/d, while this target has not yet been met, Baghdad 
has been able to increase its sustainable capacity from 2,4mn b/d in 1998 rising to 
2.8mn b/d in 2000 and 2001 to the current level of 3.05mn b/d and with a 
programmed boost to 3.1mn in the next few months. v9238 
A Washington based energy consulting firm (Washington Policy & Analysis Inc 
[WPA]) confirmed the importance of a sanctions-free Iraq, Libya and Iran in a 
study released in June 2001. According to that study: "Removing US and 
international economic sanctions against Iran, Libya and Iraq would lower oil 
prices and increase global crude supplies by 3.5 million barrels per day (bpd) over 
the next three years" The study predicts that, "Iraq's oil output would climb from 
its current 2.7 million bpd to 4 million bpd if sanctions are lifted. s9239 
It was clear that the message from the oil companies and think tanks had been 
received and accepted at the highest levels of the American political 
establishment. President George Bush, Vice President Cheney and many of the 
administrations most important officials and advisors had an oil industry 
background. Particularly given concerns about energy, it was no surprise to see 
that increasing oil production, both domestically and internationally, had been a 
very high priority since the Republicans returned to the White House in 2001. 
Cheney, who was chief executive of the American Oil Services Company 
238 "Iraqi Oil industry in 2002: A Turning Point" The Middle . as Economic Survey Vol. XLV, No. 2,14 January 2002. httn: //www. mees. com/postedarticleslenerev/iran a45n02tire 
239 Reuters, 30 June 2001. 
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Halliburton before joining Bush election campaign, headed an energy task force in 
April 2001, which openly recommended ending economic sanctions "against Iran, 
Libya and Iraq as part of a plan to increase America's oil supply". Realizing the 
importance of these countries with respect to the world oil supply, the energy task 
force acknowledged that extant sanctions, "affect some of the most important 
existing and prospective petroleum producing countries in the world. " The task 
force report indicated: "The administration will initiate a comprehensive sanctions 
review and seek to engage the Congress in a partnership for sanctions reform. "240 
The American economy depends on massive consumption of cheap fuel and 
energy, and the less reasonably affordable energy is available, the more the US is 
obliged to seek alternative sources of energy to provide the supplies needed. Some 
argued that the US could turn into a third world country if these supplies stopped 
and its limited reserves dried up after few years. Thus, the US wanted a more 
predictable and stable process of supply. The major oil companies had not been 
slow to point out those countries like Iraq, Libya and Iran, which are now under 
US embargo, were an immediate and cheaper way to provide the badly needed 
supplies. 
Oil companies considered sanctions as the factor in wasting hundreds of billions 
of dollars while leaving these biggest oil reserves to depreciate. According to a 
report from the United States Energy Information Administration (EIA), "Iraq 
contains 112 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, the second largest in the world 
(behind Saudi Arabia) along with roughly 215 billion barrels of probable and 
possible resources. Iraq's true resource potential may be understated, as deeper 
oil-bearing formations located mainly in the Western Desert region could yield 
additional resources, but have not been explored, "241 While Iraq's proven oil 
reserves and its super giant fields and many other smaller fields, which awaited 
development, were vital to world energy security and business, its natural gas 
reserves and production was no less important: "Iraq contains 110 trillion cubic 
24° "Cheney Panel Seeks Review of Sanctions" The Washin ton Post 19 April 2001, p. A13. 241 The United States Energy Information Administration (EIA): www. ei , doe, =- September 2001. 
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feet (Tcf) of proven natural gas reserves, along with roughly 150 Tcf in probable 
"242 reserves. 
In May 2002, Iraq announced the discovery of yet more gas wells. This time it 
was 12 big gas wells: one near Baghdad and the others in Iraq's western desert 
close to Syria. According to Iraqi ministry officials, the estimated gas reserves in 
the field were more than 60 billion cubic metres. 243 Not only rich in oil and gas, 
Iraq also contained a sizable amount of phosphates. According to the Economic 
Intelligence Unit, Iraq's "non-hydro carbons resources include phosphate, 
"244 estimated by the Iraqi government at 10bn tons. 
With huge opportunities for the oil companies in exploration, profit sharing, 
drilling, spar parts, reparations, and training in the Iraqi oil sector, experts 
predicted a sanctions-free Iraq to be one of the most profitable markets. One such 
expert was Fadhil J. Chalabi, Executive Director of Centre for Global Energy 
Studies in London and Ex-Iraqi oil minister before the Second Gulf War: 
Iraq's dormant oil potential is so huge that once it is activated and 
released it could cause drastic changes in world oil and energy politics. 
Iraq's present recoverable reserves, amounting to 112 billion barrels 
(bbl), are more than enough to sustain production at Iraq's pre-UN- 
sanctions levels for over 100 years. But this is not all. A very in-depth 
study undertaken by the Centre for Global Energy Studies (CGES) 
tries to prove that reserves yet to be discovered exceeds those known 
to be recoverable. Accordingly, a totally rehabilitated and sanctions- 
free Iraq could expand its production capacity way beyond 8 million 
barrels per day (mb/d), easily reaching 10 mb/d, and theoretically even 
12 mb/d under certain conditions, when UN sanctions are lifted or Iraq 
is allowed to develop oil under Security Council Resolution 1284.245 
242 Ibid. 
244 Reuters. 8 May 2002. 
J (1999-2000), p. 15. 
245 Fadhil J. Chalabi "Iraq and the Future of World Oil" journal _of 
Middle Fat Policy, Middle 
East Policy Council, October 2000, Vol. VII, No. 4. 
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Not only was Iraq a vital petroleum provider to world markets, but also the 
opportunities were real and huge for large scale projects for oil, gas and energy 
service companies. Iraq's oil and gas industry had been starved of the latest 
technology during the sanction era. Potential projects in the energy sector 
included huge field development programmes, creation of new oil export 
pipelines, building new marine terminals, oil tanks, rebuilding refineries, 
petrochemical plants, electricity generation, and water support plants. In addition, 
foreign contractors could find huge projects in exploration, production, 
environmental technical services, upgrading storage facilities, spare-parts 
supplies, banks and consultants. 
Not surprisingly, many countries, including EU countries, China, and Russia, had 
lobbied for the end of 12 years of UN economic sanctions, especially the oil 
export ban. In the race for oil reserves and commercial contracts, each country 
was competing with the others in an attempt to cover as much of Iraq's market as 
possible. Each state had been acting according to their country and company 
interests, with the exception of the United States government, as European and 
Russian governments were much more interested in Iraqi oil profits and market. 
The competition generated by the desire for control over these vast oil and natural 
gas resources countered the mindset that economic sanctions can be successful: 
"in September 1999, more than 50 foreign companies attended an oil and gas 
technology exhibition in Baghdad, the first such gathering in 10 years. Most of the 
firms were from Canada, France, Italy, and the United kingdom. "246 
The French oil giant Elf Aquitaine negotiated and was promised by Iraq the 
important Majnoon field (7 billion barrels of proven reserves), while French 
Total, another oil giant, negotiated a deal to be finalized for the Nahr' Umar field 
(6 billion barrels of proven reserves with 440,000 projected production capability 
barrels per day). While Gaz dc France conducted negotiations to build a$1.7 
billion pipeline from Iraq to Turkey. Turkish oil companies followed the same 
road. Botas, TPAO, and Tekfen signed a PSA with Iraq for the development of 
Mansuriyah, a$2.5 billion project with 10 billion eu. ms. of natural gas per year. 
246 EIA (2001) Loc. Cit. 
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In the meantime, Russian oil companies had went further in their dealings with 
Iraq. They negotiated and signed deals and joint ventures for drilling, production 
sharing agreements, construction of new oil pipeline and upgrading of facilities. 
Three huge Russian oil firms, Lukoil, Zarubezhneft and Machinoimport, 
concluded and signed a production sharing agreement ($ 4 billion) to develop the 
West Qurna field (7-8 billion barrels of proven reserves). China National 
Petrolum Corporation (CNPC) and Norinco signed a$1.2 billion deal for the Al- 
Ahdab field. In addition, CNPC, Norinco, and Sinochem have had discussions 
with Iraq over developing four other Iraqi fields. At the same time, British (BP, 
British Gas, Branch Energy, Pacific Resources, Ranger Oil), Canadian (Chauvco 
Resources, International Petrolum Corporation, Escondido, CanOxy, TransCanada 
Pipelines), German (Preussag and Deminex), Dutch (Shell and Lamaj), Japanese 
(Mitsubishi Corporation, Inpex, Idemitsu, Sumitomo, and Japex), and many others 
discussed, negotiated and expressed interest in developing and buying Iraqi oil. 247 
The fight for Iraq oil in spite of sanctions was made clear by this example: in 
November 1997, the Spanish government offered Iraq a "donation" and a loan of 
114 million euro ($123 million) in exchange for a Spanish oil company Repsol 
being granted the right to develop the vital Nasiriya oilfield south of Iraq 
according to the Madrid daily El Mundo who reported the news on 17 February 
2003.248 It is worth noting that more than 1000 companies from at least 80 
countries registered with the United Nations to lift Iraqi oil. 249 
Quite naturally, de-containment occurred because of the direct oil needs and 
economic relations between the world and Iraq. Thus, it can be argued that 
international political economy -economic ties and oil needs- worked and helped 
to de-contain Iraq. On the following pages, and to illustrate this point further, key 
countries are selected and each of these countries' trade with Iraq is discussed in 
some detail in an attempt to explain the prevailed mood, changed attitudes, their 
interests, and perceptions that had accelerated the de-containment of Iraq. 
247 "Oil, Business, and the Future of Iraqi Sanctions" Policy Watch No. 283, November 24,1997 
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 
248 MEFS, Vol. XLVI, No. 8,24 February 2003. 
249 AP, 25 June 2002. 
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Thus, the following section will examine and demonstrates how key actors in the 
international community effectively removed Iraq from the international sanctions 
siege into the market of the world trading community. Isolation of Iraq was 
virtually untenable under the oil-for-food scheme as the world openly traded and 
interacted with Iraq. 
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5.2 Iraq and key international actors 
Table 5.2 Iraq main trading partners, 1997 
Exports to: ($ m) 
Spain 389 
France 360 
US 288 
Italy 184 
India 152 
Austria 120 
South Africa 119 
Japan 107 
Canada 95 
Croatia 58 
Total incl others 2,309 
Imports from: ($ m 
Australia 242 
US 90 
China 65 
France 53 
Thailand 66 
Brazil 28 
Belgium-Luxembourg 27 
Germany 27 
Malaysia 23 
Egypt 22 
Total including others 766 
Source: EIU Iraq Country Profile, 1999-2000, p. 29. 
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Table 5.3 Iraq annual indicators 1998 
Main destinations of exports 1998 % of total 
US 30.1 
France 16.3 
Spain 11.0 
Italy 8.9 
Main origins of imports 1998 % of total 
France 20.8 
Australia 16.0 
US 8.7 
China 8.5 
Source: EIU Iraq Country Report, May 2000, p. 5. 
Table 5.4 EIU annual indicators of Iraq exports and imports 1999 
Main destinations of exports 1999 % of total 
US 56.4 
Netherlands 12.3 
Japan 9.4 
France 7.6 
Main origins of imports 1999 % of total 
France 19.2 
Australia 18.0 
China 12.5 
Germany 8.4 
Source: ETU Iraq Country Report, February 2001, p. 5. 
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Table 5.5 EIU annual indicators of Iraq exports and imports 1999 
Main destinations of exports 1999 % of total 
US 44.4 
France 8.3 
Italy 8.3 
Netherlands 7.4 
Main origins of imports 1999 % of total 
France 21.4 
Australia 11.9 
China 10.6 
Germany 5.6 
Source: EIU Iraq Country Report, June 2001, p. 5. 
Table 5.6 Iraq main trading partners, 1999 
Exports to: US$ M) 
US 3,879 
Netherlands 848 
Japan 644 
France 521 
Spain 402 
Total incl others 6,875 
Imports from: (US$ m 
France 193 
Australia 182 
China 126 
Russia 83 
US 22 
Total incl others 1,008 
Source: ElU Iraq Country Profile, 2000, p. 31. 
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Table 5.7 EIU annual indicators of Iraq exports and imports for the year 
2000, 
Main destinations of exports 2000 % of total 
US 46.2 
Italy 12.2 
France 9.6 
[Spain 8.6 
Main origins of imports 2000 % of total 
France 22.5 
Australia 22.0 
China 5.8 
Russia 5.8 
Source: EIU Iraq Country Report, September 2001 and the same are shown in EJU r 
Country Report, December 2001, p. 5. 
Table 5.8 EIU annual indicators of Iraq exports and imports for the year 
2001 
Main destinations of exports 2001 % of total 
US 60.6 
France 8.5 
Netherlands 7.4 
r1taly 5.8 
Main origins of imports 2001 % of total 
France 19.4 
Australia 14.4 
Italy 10.7 
FGermany 9.9 
Source: EIU Iraq Country Report, September 2002 and the same are shown in EU Ira 
Country Report, December 2002, p. 5. 
Table 5.9 Iraq's main trading partners (Year 
France Australia China Russia 
22.5% 22% 5.8% 5.8% 
Exports 2000 7771 
USA Italy France Spain 
46.2% 12.2% 9.6% 8.6%. 
Source: http: //www. tradepartners. gov. uk/files/irag education. doc 
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5.2.1 The old superpower: Russia 
Russia, probably Iraq's most vocal and influential advocate in the context of the 
UN Security Council, had made no secret of its renewed economic interest in Iraq. 
As of the middle of 2001, Russian bilateral trade with Iraq stood at $ 2.5 billion a 
year. 250 As for the summer of 2001, the contracts agreed amounted to 
approximately US$50 billion. 25' According to Iraq's Deputy Oil Minister, 
Hussein al-Hadithi, Iraq had signed over 900 agreements with more than 227 
Russian oil companies since the start of the UN "oil-for-food" deal. 252 
Russian companies were generally very enthusiastic about expanding their exports 
to Iraq with or without sanctions. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov affirmed 
this, saying, "Russia has its own large economic interests in Iraq. Iraq is one of 
our most important partners in the Middle East. "253 At a G8 summit in the 
summer of 2001, the Russian President Vladimir Putin added his voice to those of 
other international leaders calling for an end to the sanctions, commenting that: 
"The system of sanctions against Iraq is not productive... Sanctions have failed to 
convince Iraq to allow international observers in. , 254 
Russian companies had been extremely active with respect to circumventing 
sanctions and arranging reconstruction contracts and other business deals in Iraq. 
Moreover, the Russian government had been quite supportive of such activity. It 
is only what one would expect, therefore, that Russian oil companies had also 
been openly pushing for a suspension of sanctions, and working around sanctions 
whenever possible "Of course we are keen to expand our reserve base abroad and 
Iraq for us is a good option, not only in itself but also as a platform for the region 
as a whole, " said Dimtry Dolgov, spokesman for LUKOIL, Russia's largest oil 
company. 255 "What is wrong if Russian diplomacy benefits Russian business? " 
250 The Moscow Times, 16 July 2001, p. 07. 2si Al-Ilayat, 4 August 2001, p. 1 1. 252 AM, 17 January 2003. 
253 www. online. ie/ June 22,2001. 254"G8 FMs Call for New Iraq Strategy", International Relations & Security Network, 20 July 
2001. 
255 Reuters, 28 April 2001. 
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asked another high-ranking Russian oil executive commenting on the Russian 
government's support for company initiatives in Iraq. 256 As a result of such 
business/government initiatives, Iraq promised an exclusive priority to Russian 
firms in some of its oil fields, including the large Majnoon and Bin Umar fields. 
The Washington Post reported: "Convoy carrying Russian oil-drilling equipment 
arrived at the al Waheed border recently and passed from Syria into Iraq en route 
to the northern Iraqi city of Kirkuk. About 50 Russian specialists will arrive soon 
to begin setting up to drill 45 wells. " The newspaper added, "Russia has also 
emerged in the past year or two as Iraq's largest trading partner under the UN oil- 
for-food program. In the six-month period ending in May, Russia purchased 90 
million barrels of oil out of 226 million sold by Iraq, a deal worth roughly $1.8 
billion, according to oil executives here. As of July 31, UN figures show that 
Russia had sold Iraq $4.18 billion in food, medicine, and oil-industry equipment 
since the program began in late 1996, surpassing all other countries. " The 
newspaper gave an example of two vital Russian deals with Iraq: "Emercom, 
founded by the Ministry of Emergency Situation under close Putin ally Sergei 
Shoigu, Emercom has become a recent Iraqi favourite; last year Baghdad awarded 
it two contracts to trade 20 million and 15 million barrels of oil. On July 11, 
Emercom signed two contracts for a total of 12 million barrels, according to a 
confidential UN document obtained last month. " The newspaper pointed: 
"According to UN officials, Iraq was charging a premium of 20 cents per barrel at 
the time of the Emercom deal, Western diplomats consider a 5-cent premium 
legitimate and anything else an illegal surcharge for Hussein. By that reasoning, 
the recent Emercom contracts were worth $1.8 million in illegal surcharges. " The 
other example was of "Slavneft, another state-controlled firm, signed a contract 
last year to develop the Luhais field in southern Iraq with 490 million barrels of 
oil. In June, Sibur, a subsidiary of the natural gas monopoly Gazprom, agreed to 
develop a gas field in southern Iraq. "257 
6 Moscow Times, Loc. Cit. 
257 Peter 13 aker "Russian-Iraqi Oil Ties Worry US" Washington Post 1 September 2002, p. Al6. 
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Iraq gave Russian businesses priority in winning business in the oil sector as a 
political reward for Russian backing in the Security Council against economic 
sanctions. Ever since, many Russian firms also signed big deals under this new 
friendly Russian stance towards Iraq in its war against 'American' sanctions. 
Rosneftegazexport, an oil firm, was one such a firm which signed twenty oil 
equipment contracts with Iraq worth 100 million Euros ($ 88.65 million). 258 In 
addition to their gains in the Iraqi oil and gas sectors, Russian companies had also 
won tenders to restore power plants, petrochemical, transportation, 
telecommunication, industrial and agriculture sectors. 
In June 2002, Russia accused the United States and the United Kingdom of trying 
to target its vital national interests in Iraq, 259 To further buy Russian support 
against economic sanctions, Iraq's ambassador to Russia announced in July 2002 
that his country was ready to pay off its $8 billion debt to Russia, blaming 
sanctions and America for putting obstacles in front of fulfilling the long standing 
debt. 260 
Similar to that held in the Netherlands (see p. 190), a round table conference was 
held in Moscow to discuss business dealings and how best to protect Russian 
economic interests in Iraq. Businessmen, parliamentarians, and a number of Iraqi 
government officials attended the meeting. In that meeting Russian officials 
confirmed the importance of Iraq as a strategic and economic partner. "In 2001, 
Iraq secured its position as Russia's leading partner in the Arab world, with 
turnover of goods with that country accounting for 60 percent of that with all Arab 
countries, " Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Saltanov, told the 
participants. 261 It is worth noting that Russian companies were the largest lifters of 
Iraqi oil under the UN programme reaching to about 40 million barrels for 
2001.262 
258 Reuters, 14 November 2001. 
259 A1-Jazeera. net, 18 June 2002. 260 AD, 4 July 2002. 
262 AR, 26 November 2001. 
RMIM, 28 April 2001. 
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Russia went even further in challenging the United States in the UN, by 
threatening to use its veto power to defeat a US/UK plan to revamp the economic 
embargo on Iraq, seeking to ease restrictions on civilian goods while tightening 
enforcement of the 1990 sanctions especially in the arms field and plugging up 
Iraq smuggling routes. The US failed to bring Russia on board for such an action. 
Russia managed to delay voting on what was called "smart sanctions" and ever 
since UN Resolution 1284 of December 17,1999, Russia had haggled with the 
United States on the issue of a lengthy list of "dual use" supplies and goods that 
can be used for both military and civilian purposes. 
At the UN Russia managed to push the United States to make compromises and 
loosen UN sanctions regime regarding the list of sale or supply of commodities, 
services, or products to Iraq in order to protect Moscow's strong commercial 
interests in Iraq. "We see in the new scheme a major threat to Russian trade and 
economic interests in Iraq. We cannot allow it to pass, " said Russian Foreign 
Minister Igor Ivanov. 263 The Iraqi-Russian relationship created obstacles in 
Russian-American relations. Russia played the role of shielding Iraq from 
pressure in the United Nations. Russia protected its business and domestic 
interests and at the same time it maintained that Russia still retained a key factor 
in the geopolitical game in the Middle East and the world as large. 
This is how economics reflected on Russian foreign policy towards Saddam's 
Iraq, In December 2001, Sergey Ordzhonikidze, Russian Deputy Foreign 
Minister, commented that Russia was "categorically against conducting a military 
operation in regards to Baghdad in the framework of the next phase in the fight 
against international terrorism. "264 It is worth noting here that Russia had always 
showed anger and disenchantment at the perceived American-dominated world 
and political agenda. Paula J. Dobriansky showed how this relationship had taken 
a negative course over many contentious issues. She highlighted that the Russian- 
American relation had long term problems with the United States such as the 
Balkan crisis, the Middle East peace process, the notion of rogue states, ballistic 
missile defence deployment, Chechnya, etc. She claimed, "Russia's economic 
263 Washington Post, 28 November 2001. 
264 AM, 21 December 2001. 
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demise has bred feelings of resentment and suspicion that the United States has 
deliberately undermined the Russian economy. " She argued that the economic 
plight of Russia today had been behind its anti-Americanism "Overall, Russia's 
economic and political crises have been important factors pushing Moscow's 
"265 entire foreign policy agenda toward a much more anti-Western course. 
According to her, most Russians stood against any unipolar moves from the 
United States and called instead for closer alliances with countries like China, 
German, Iran, Iraq, and France. Moscow would like to see a world of 
multipolarity, Dobriansky illustrated this by using an example from the Primakov 
era: "Primakov become foreign minister in January 1996. The notion of universal 
human values was discarded in exchange for the promotion of Russia's national 
interest. Moscow's new worldview came very close to resembling a rather crude 
and mechanistic "balance of power" concept. Alleged US hegemony, combined 
with Russia's perilous domestic state, became Moscow's major international 
problem for the twenty-first century. " She pointed "Russia's preferred solution to 
US hegemony has been the promotion of multipolarity-the building of a grand 
coalition of several regional powers to confront and reduce US international 
preponderance. In Primakov's vision, the imperative of offsetting US hegemony 
was so paramount that such countries as Russia, France, China, and even India 
which otherwise share divergent regional interests, might become members of a 
"266 common anti-US front. 
Russia's policy toward rogue states was explained clearly by Dobriansky: 
"Another point, which Russian spokesmen tirelessly emphasize these days, is the 
need to resolve all international problems diplomatically rather than through the 
use of force. " However, she believes that it is much easier to see why Russian 
politicians prefer that approach: "Moscow's policy prescription for dealing with 
rogue states become much easier to understand once one grasps that Russia is 
fundamentally disinterested in the promotion of international stability in the 
context of a US-led global system. In fact, the more friction and instability, up to a 
265 Paula J. Dobriansky "Russian Foreign Policy: Promise or Peril? " The Washington Ouarterly 
Winter 2000, p. 136. 
266 Ibid., p. 140. 
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certain point, plague the international system, the better it is for Moscow. In a 
perverse way, post-Communist Russia appears to have embraced essentially the 
same zero-sum, anti-US approach to international relations as its Soviet 
predecessors. s267 Dobrinasky concluded: "It is probably inevitable that even a 
pro-US Russian government would be unable for years to come to ensure its 
country's full compliance with international economic sanctions. To do so, the 
Russian government would be able to control the bureaucracy and the private 
"268 sector through the rule of law. 
Tareq Y. Ismael and Andrej Kreutz traced back the rebirth of Russia-Iraq relations 
to 1994 when Russia started "supporting Baghdad politically against the US- 
imposed punitive sanctions. "269 Both acknowledged that prior to 1994, Russian- 
Iraqi relations was not promising due to more pro-American advisors surrounding 
president Yeltsin at the time. However this changed for a number of factors which 
they noted as being: "First, the Russian political elite was deeply disappointed by 
the lack of the expected generous economic help from the US and its allies, and 
their recognition of Russian interests in the former Soviet bloc area. Feeling 
rejected by the West- especially after the unsuccessful effort to block NATO 
expansion in East-Central Europe, Russian leaders started to look for alternatives 
to their previous pro-American foreign policy. " The second factor highlighted by 
them was that "Russia did not get any substantial financial help from the wealthy 
and pro-western Arab oil producing countries-particularly Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait, and the return to the "radical" states such as Iraq and Libya, and in the 
1990s also Iran, in fact became an economic necessity. " The third factor was that 
"Iraq's strategic location at the Persian Gulf and its proximity to the former Soviet 
borders made this country too important to be ignored by any government in 
Moscow. s27° 
267 Ibid., p. 141. 
268 Ibid., p. 143. 
269 Tareq Y Ismael & Andrej Kreutz "Russian-Iraqi Relations: A Historical and Political Analysis" 
Arab Studies Ouarterly Volume 23, Number 4, fall 2001, p. 88. 270 Ibid., p. 94. 
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As a political outcome of all that, Russia started its own "agenda" by challenging 
the United States in the United Nations "The official Russian position on 
sanctions against Iraq also began to change. In June and July 1994 its 
representative in the Security Council, S. Lavrov started to argue that the Security 
Council should respond adequately to the positive steps which had been 
undertaken by Iraq and to weaken if not completely abolish the sanctions. 927' 
That, in conjunction with subsequent Russian moves, did not please or help the 
United States in its war against Iraq. These Russian moves were detailed nicely by 
Tareq Y. Ismael and Andrej Kreutz: "In May 1995, the Russian Parliament-Duma 
adopted a Resolution calling for the removal of the oil embargo against Iraq... In 
April 1995 an intergovernmental agreement was concluded which provided for 
Russian drilling in the oilfields of West Qurna and North Rumaili for a total 
amount of 15 billion US dollars. " They added, "In March 1997 another major 
contract between the Iraqi company SKOP and a group of Russian companies was 
signed. It provided for the development of the second stage of the West Qurna 
oilfields, with extractive deposits of oil amounting to one billion tons. According 
to the estimations of the Iraqi experts, the profits of the Russian companies might 
"2n be as high as 70 billion US dollars. 
They saw the arrival of foreign minister Eugenii Primakov as an important event 
in Russian-Iraqi relations. They claimed rightly that: "For a number of 
geopolitical and economic reasons, Iraq had to become one of his priorities and in 
addition, he had long established personal links with that country. Between 1986 
and 1970 he worked as a Soviet press correspondent in Baghdad and since then 
have had friendly relations with Saddam Hussein. As he admitted himself, he even 
mediated between him and the Kurdish nationalists. Primakov's role as 
Gorbachev's envoy during the Second Gulf War was also well remembered in 
Iraq and when he assumed the post of Russian Foreign Minister, this was 
welcomed there with great satisfaction. "273 
271 Ibid., pp. 95-96. 
272 Ibid., p. 96. 
273 Ibid., pp. 97-98. 
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Ismael and Kreutz pointed "since then Russia, together with some other states, 
especially France and China, created a kind of 'pro-Iraqi lobby' in the UN 
Security Council in order to weaken the sanctions and to constrain US action 
against that country. " 274 More moves towards improvements in relations took 
place from 1997 onwards. A joint Russian-Iraqi statement on 19 November 1997 
confirmed that "On the basis of Iraq's fulfilment of the relevant UN Security 
Council Resolutions, Russia... . will energetically work for the earliest possible 
lifting of the sanctions against Iraq and, above all, for putting into effect point 22 
of Resolution No. 687.... To this end, active steps will be taken to increase the 
effectiveness of the Special Commission's work while showing respect for the 
sovereignty and security of Iraq. s275 Russia, like France and China and the great 
majority of the other UN members, all used the US/UK attack of Iraqi targets in 
December 1998 to make clear their displeasure and frustration with US policy on 
Iraq. Just a day after the US/UK bombing, the Russian Parliament-Duma asked 
president Yeltsin to "get Russia out of participation in the sanctions against Iraq" 
and to "take all necessary means in order to re-establish fully normal economic 
"276 and military-technological relations with Iraq. 
Russia's move towards self-assertiveness in its policy towards Iraq was clear with 
the economic success and profits they were making "Russian companies in fact 
got the most favourable treatment by the Iraqi authorities. Their share in exporting 
Iraqi oil during the first six stages of the "`oil-for-food" programme, amounted to 
about 40% of the total volume of Iraqi oil exports. Russian companies also won 
first place due to the high volume of civil goods delivered to Iraq (about $500 
million US) and in 2000 all Iraq's orders to Russia exceeded $20 billion US"277 
The crucial economic ties continued to flourish: "In the first six months of 1999, 
Russian companies exported 43.0 percent of Iraqi oil which was allowed to be 
sold according to the UN `oil-for-food"" program. And at least two of them, 
Lukoil and Slavneft, already have their offices in Baghdad. For Russia, whose 
won federal budget in 1999 amounted to only $24 billion US, Iraq's orders which 
274 Ibid., p. 98. 273 Ibid., p. 99. 276 Ibid., pp. 101-102. 
217 Ibid., p. 102. 
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now exceed $20 billion US are considered to be vital sources of income. , 278 
Russian-Iraqi relations continued to improve during the Putin period where Tareq 
Y. Ismael and Andrej Kreutz noted, "The Iraqi case probably represents one of the 
few issues on which present Russian leaders are willing to openly and persistently 
disagree with the US and its allies. "279 During this period, "members of the Duma 
began to form a Russian-Iraqi inter-parliamentary commission on bilateral 
cooperation. And there is a lively exchange of delegations between the two 
countries. "280 In addition, continued support of Iraq in the UN and attempts to 
protect Iraq against any American military attack or invasion were focal points in 
the Russian foreign policy during the Putin period. 
The success in relations between the two countries was clear when in mid August 
2002 Iraq and Russia announced the finalization of what they called "the deal of 
the century" This new deal came amid US plans to attack Baghdad and overthrow 
Saddam's regime. The plan was to fully implement this economic agreement in 
the coming five years. The total economic cooperation agreement was worth $40 
billion for projects in oil, electrical energy, chemical products, irrigation, railroad 
construction, and transportation. 281 Moreover, the tensions behind Russia and the 
US was highlighted even further during operation Iraqi Freedom of March 2003, 
when Bush telephoned the Russian president Vladimir Putin to protest Russian 
sales of high-tech military systems and weapons. The United States believed 
according to the White House as reported by Reuters that Russia had sold night- 
vision goggles, antitank missiles and global positioning system (CPS) jamming 
system to the Iraqi army. The White House even suggested that there were 
Russian technicians on the ground helping the Iraqi army operating these military 
systems. 282 
278 Ibid., p. 107. 
279 Ibid., p. 105. 
280 Ibid., p. 106. 
2$1 Peter Baker "Russia, Iraq plan deals to bolster ties" Washington Post Saturday 17,2002, p. AO1. 282 Reuters, 24 March 2003. 
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5.2.2 The sole superpower: the United States of America 
Table 5.10 United States of America trade with Iraq 1992-2003 
Year Total Exports Total Imports 
1992 0.50 0.00 
1993 4.00 0.00 
1994 0.80 0.00 
1995 0.20 0.00 
1996 2.80 0.00 
1997 82.00 311.90 
1998 106.40 1,183.20 
1999 9.50 4,226.40 
2000 10.40 6,065.90 
2001 46.20 5,820.30 
2002 31.60 3,548.20 
2003 (January-April) 15.50 2,435.50 
Source: U. S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Division. Data Dissemination Branch 
htt : //Iandview. census. ov/foreign-trade/balance/c5050. htmi 
The United States is the world's largest oil importer: "The Americans are the No. 1 
consumers, burning up about a third of the oil on the market every day. i283 
Basically, the American economic way of life is based on cheap fuel; big 
machines, big cars thus such an economy is depended on low oil prices and 
constantly stable and secure supply of oil. Many scholars concluded that the 
United States had always made special efforts in defending its vested interests in 
smoothly flowing oil supplies as well as the protection of crucial oil reserves even 
by using armed force. 
During the oil for food deal period, Iraq was the sixth largest oil exporter to the 
United States. American oil companies bought 690 thousands barrel per day from 
Iraq, that is nearly half of what Iraq sold under the oil-for-food deal. 284 Al-Hayat 
Arabic Daily put the estimates of the daily amount of Iraqi oil exports to the 
United States at 780 thousand barrels per day in the year 2001, which was 
283 Christopher Dickey "The Once & Future Petro King" Newsweek April 8/April 15 2002. 
284 Al-Jazeera. net, 28 February 2002. 
172 
equivalent to 4% of total imports, 285 while AFP puts United States oil imports 
from Iraq around 9% of total imports: "In 2001, the United States imported some 
10.6 million barrels of oil per day-mainly from Canada, Saudi Arabia and 
Venezuela, although around nine percent came from Iraq, according to official 
figures. , 286 Al-Hayat indicated that this dealing continued and the amount of Iraqi 
oil imported by the United States reached up to 950 thousand barrels per day in 
January 2002.287 Mark Tran wrote in the Guardian, a British newspaper: 
"President George Bush may demonize Iraq as part of an "axis of evil", but that 
does not prevent the US from importing one million barrels of Iraqi oil a day. " He 
confirmed that Iraq ranks "the sixth largest supplier" of crude oil to the United 
States, and added: "Not too many Americans may know about US dependence on 
Iraqi oil. "288 Iraqi oil continued to flow to the United States even in the months 
before the war. In January 2003 the United States doubled its imports of Iraqi oil 
to reach to two million barrels per day. 289 
Despite the widespread belief that American commercial contacts with Iraq had 
been non-existence, nine US major companies- Mobile, Conoco, Chevron, 
Occidental, Arco, Exxon, Texaco, Coastal, and Amoco established contact with 
Baghdad showing interest in investing in the development of Iraq's various oil 
fields. 290 While many US subsidiaries who were stationed in Europe and the 
Middle East worked with Baghdad under the oil-for food deal. Many of whom 
won large contracts. 
This had been, to a large extent, a hidden cutthroat competition between the EU, 
Asian, Arabs and US. The "oil-for-food" programme became the object of intense 
political and commercial competition. As stated previously the "oil-for-food" deal 
brought Saddam back to the international market and reestablished Iraq as major 
oil producer once again. With billions of dollars and crucial strategic influence at 
stake, the struggle for control over the vast, strategically important oil resources in 
285 l-1` a at, 14 April 2002, p. 11. 
286 A". 18 April 2002. 
287 Al-Hayat (14 April 2002) Loc. Cit. 
288 Tran (16April 2002) Loc. Cit. 
289 Al-flayat 6 February 2003, p. 11. 290 Policy Watch Number 283 (1997), Loc. cit. 
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Iraq became the main goal. This proved to be a blunt economic and political 
weapon in the hand of Saddam. 
The Iraqi leader-who was sitting atop the second largest oil reserves in the world 
after Saudi Arabia- had, in his wrangling with the UN and the United States, many 
times exploited his country's energy wealth by threatening to cut oil exports. On 
many occasions, he actually stopped the flow of Iraqi oil to world markets, 
leaving the world to wonder how to replace more than 2 million barrels per day 
and the United States questioning where it will find it supplies of 950 thousands 
barrels per day at short notice. This speculation, plus market fears coupled with 
the lingering Middle East Crisis between Israel and the Palestinians, pushed prices 
up despite the Saudi assurances that it would cover for Iraq oil in the market. For 
instance, Saddam Hussein suspended two million barrels per day (bpd) of Iraqi oil 
exports on April 8,2002 for one month in political protest aimed at Israel's 
invasion of Palestinian areas on the West Bank threatening that he might extend 
the oil embargo even further if Israel did not "unconditionally withdraw from the 
Palestinian territories. " 291 On that same day, oil rose to $27 per barrel. 292 
However at least until 25th April 2003, there was no extra oil coming from the 
Saudis, despite European and US demands for it, 293 and hopes of Saudi cover for 
the shortages in the market caused by Saddam's oil embargo were dashed. The 
EU and US oil majors, refineries, and economy started feeling the pinch of 
missing two millions barrels of oil per day from the world market and economy. 
In its special issue on the future of Energy, Newsweek magazine acknowledged 
that: 
Price increases still hurt us (the United States), and do serious harm to 
our trading partners, who are still far more dependent on foreign oil... 
Nations that spend far more of their GDP on oil, like China, South 
Korea or Thailand, pass those costs through to customers, so American 
pay more for everything from steel to TV sets. 
291 Reuters, 8 April 2002. 
292 Ibid. 
293 Reuters, 25 April 2002. 
174 
A surge in Crude prices could cause gasoline prices to jump in the 
biggest oil consuming nations-the United States, Asia, and Europe- 
which would evidently have an effect on the sense of inflation among 
motorists at the gas pump, and in the long term could fall negatively 
on the overall economy especially in areas concerning consumer 
confidence, purchasing power, investment and income. This could 
result in a recession if the prices were to stay high for a while or no 
substitute for Iraqi oil was found. 294 
The importance of Iraqi oil to the US economy was further highlighted in the 
summer of 2001. When Iraq threatened to suspend its oil exports as part of its 
ongoing brinksmanship vis a vis the UN, "crude oil prices pushed up towards $30 
per barrel... "295 When OPEC cut oil production the following month, President 
Bush commented, "The US economy is bumping along right now and a run-up of 
energy prices would hurt. " 296 A news report around that time claimed that 
American oil suppliers were already buying 90% of Iraq's oil exports, which 
made the US the foremost customer of one of its most despised enemies. 297 
Not only oil was significant, but also jobs and the loss in commercial 
opportunities that was a result of sanctions. According to Stauffer, who wrote in 
the Middle East Policy Journal about the United States' costs of conflict in the 
Middle East region: "US sanctions on trade with Iran, Iraq, Libya and Syria, have 
cost the US currently some 80,000-100,000 jobs each year, although the figure is 
probably higher, notes Dr. Stauffer, because it does not reflect the lost 
opportunities for US farmers to export into the growing markets of the sanctioned 
"298 countries. 
Despite the oil and commercial contracts, United States government did not have 
an embassy or a commercial attache, like many EU countries and the rest of the 
world, in Baghdad, it also did not allow directly export to Iraq as many members 
294 Emerson (2002) Loc. Cit. 
295 "Oil Nudges $30 as Iraq Threatens Exports" Telegra +, www. Teleeraph. co. uk, 12 June 2001. 296 
. 25 July 2001. 297 "Trading With the Enemy: US Refiners Reportedly Buying Most of Iraq's Oil" ABC News, 20 
July 2001. http: //abcnews go com/sections/world/DailyNews/irag010720 cooley. html 98 SEES, 3 March 2003, Vol. VLVI, No. 9. 
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of the EU and the rest of the world did. However, it did retain an interest section 
in the Polish embassy in Baghdad, which was later closed during the Bush 
administration. 
5.2.3 The Asian economies 
Asian countries also found great interest in restarting ties with Baghdad, despite 
their geographical distance. India for example, whose trade volume with Iraq 
reached $1 billion under the "oil-for-food" deal, had signed oil and gas deals with 
Iraq. An agreement was signed in July 2002 to boost bilateral economic ties 
especially in the oil and gas sector. India's Oil Natural Gas Corporation had 
offices in Baghdad and was working on the Tuba field. 299 In 1999, the British 
Guardian revealed "India today became the first country to openly flout the nine- 
year-old economic embargo against Iraq when it agreed to a $25m loan to help 
Baghdad to buy 1,000 Indian buses. " The Guardian noted that the Indian Minister 
of oil and gas who had signed the deal in Baghdad said publicly that he "was 
aware that the deal signed in Baghdad would violate UN sanctions, but declared 
his country would never allow a friend like Iraq to suffer. " declaring that India 
was ready to give Iraq "all the political, material and moral support" to win the 
battle over sanctions. 300 
Other key Asian states also looked for trade with Iraq, One such country was 
Indonesia. The Indonesian Mines and Energy Minster, Purnomo Yusgiatoro, 
signed an agreement with Iraq in Baghdad for oil exploration of Iraq's Western 
Desert "an exploration block of an area 10,000 square km (3,861 sq mile), which 
may yield two or three oilfields when explored. "301 
While during 1997-1998, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and 
China state-owned Norinco signed a deal with the Iraqi authorities for the 
development of the Al-Ahdab oil field that contains 180mt of oil and was 
producing 5mt annually. At the same time, CNPC also negotiated for developing 
299 AE, 8 July 2002. 
300 Mark Tran "India busts Iraq sanctions" The Guardian. 29 July 1999 
301 Reuters, 23 April 2002. 
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the Halfyah oil field that was estimated to produce 18mt. 302 Sino-Iraqi trade 
relations went beyond just oil, it also involved the export of food, 
electromechanical equipment, communications, etc. 
For example, according to Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the trade volume 
with Iraq was as follow: 
Table 5.11 China exportlimports with Iraq, (unit: thousand US dollars), 
1998-2000 
Year 1998 1999 2000 
Exports 104,670 148,000 32,700 
Imports 59,860 116,000 64,800 
Total 164,530 263,000 97,500 
Balance of 
trade 
+44,810 +32,000 32,100 
Source: China and Iraq: http: //www. fml2rc. iv. cn/en /g 4_ 367. html 
302 Xiaojie xu "China and the Middle East: Cross-investment in the Energy Sector" Middle FAS 
Policy Journal Vol. VII, No. 3, June 2000. www. menc. org/public asp/journal vnl7/0006 xu asp 
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5.2.4 Western European actors 
Despite the fact that Greece, Spain, Belgium, Austria, Italy, and Finland all traded 
with Iraq during the sanctions era, the scope of this section in particular and the 
thesis in general does not permit me to detail every EU country's trade with Iraq. 
This section will chose the Netherlands, France, Germany and the United 
Kingdom as a sample example of the EU. The reasons for selecting these 
countries are 1) they are all large trading partners two with veto powers in the 
Security Council and some with major political and economic powers within the 
European Union. 2) The Netherlands was selected due to the author of this thesis 
privileged access and information as an advisor to Dutch companies and the EVD 
as well as no study on sanctions took a vital trading country like the Netherlands 
in their research. 3) Moreover, Chose France and Germany for their diplomatic 
and economic defiance to the US-Iraq policy of containment and multilateral 
sanctions. 4) And The United Kingdom for its unique relationship with the United 
States being its strongest ally, at the same time, they played a moderating role 
inside the UN Security Council trying to bridge the policy rifts across the Atlantic 
(which will be illustrated in this chapter and chapter seven) as well as some of its 
companies traded with Baghdad. 
The sections will show how these key European nations traded and promoted 
trade with Iraq during the era of sanctions. However, before attempting to do that, 
the section will highlight an important background behind the difference in 
interests and perceptions between key EU states and the United States on the use 
of sanctions. This will help understanding of why key EU states actually traded 
with, diplomatically engaged, and negotiated with Baghdad during the era of 
economic sanctions. 
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5.2.4.1 Differences of perception and interests between Europe 
and the United States 
The policy rifts between the powers across the Atlantic intensified the clash of 
interests, and Iraq became the best ground for Europeans, Russia and the United 
States to express and highlight their differences and make their political and 
economic gains. 
There were many factors behind America's failure diplomatically to secure a 
measure of international and regional support for the containing Saddam 
effectively. These disagreements stemmed from strategic (the Middle East conflict 
and the fear of the risk for the moderate Arab governments) and political (the 
independent EU foreign policy stance and the question of the future of Iraq which 
caused huge anxiety for the Europeans and the Arabs alike) reasons, but the 
economic factor helps explain the public positions taken by these countries which 
had tied themselves to many lucrative oil and re-construction contracts with Iraq. 
In addition to a potential damage to these countries' national interests, there were 
also fears concerning rises in oil prices if the US should invade Iraq. Economic 
and commercial ties would thus appear to had played a major factor behind the 
international support against a regime change in Baghdad. 
The sense of divergence in interests and vision was highlighted clearly in an 
article in The Economist: "Anti-Ameri canism in Europe is not new. Nor, during 
the long cold war, were rows across the Atlantic unusual. But what Europeans are 
now seeing is what they regard as a new kind of `anti-Europeanism' in 
Washington. Articles by George Will and Charles Krauthammer, two influential 
American commentators, arguing that European hostility to Israel revealed the 
continent to be in the grip of rampant anti-Semitism, outraged policymakers in 
Europe. Scarcely less comforting are jibes from right-wing Republicans about 
`euro-weenies' or articles like one by Walter Russell Mead, of the Council on 
Foreign Relations in New York, arguing that `Americans just don't trust Europe's 
political judgment. Appeasement is its second nature. Europeans have never met a 
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leader-Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin, Qaddafi, Khomeini, Saddam Hussein-they 
didn't think could be softened up by concessions. "303 
"Anti-European sentiment in America is not new, " declares William Wallace and 
Jan Zielonka. They added: "The United States was built by immigrants who shook 
off the disappointments of the old world for the hope of the new. Businessmen 
and politicians in late-nineteenth-century America believed they represented the 
vigorous future, Europe the enfeebled past. In the two world wars Americans saw 
themselves as sailing across the Atlantic to sort out European quarrels that the 
European were incapable of resolving among themselves. " They pointed that 
"After 1945, the American prescription for Europe was to make it "more like us": 
to build a United States of Europe that would become America's loyal partner 
within a broader Western alliance. In the years since, American disappointment at 
Europe's unwillingness to accept US leadership unconditionally has fluctuated 
between despair over European political incoherence and fear that the European 
allies might agree on a framework for integration different from what Washington 
has prescribed. " They stressed that: "Just as European anti-Americanism damaged 
Western solidarity during the Cold War, so American Eurobashing threatens to 
unravel transatlantic cooperation in the post-Cold War era. " They warn that this 
"risks alienating America's most important allies. "304 
Richard Perle, a Pentagon adviser on Iraq, "launched an extraordinary tirade 
against Europe which he accused of losing its moral direction and providing 
succour to Saddam Hussein, " the Guardian reported. In an interview with the 
Guardian, Perle said, "I think Europe has lost its moral compass. " Taken the 
Germans as an example, Perle claimed, "Germany has subsided into moral 
numbing pacifism. For the German Chancellor to say he will have nothing to do 
with action against Saddam Hussein, even if approved by the United Nations, is 
unilateralism. "305 
303 "Europe and the United States" The Economist, 8 August 2002. 
304 William Wallace & Jan Zielonka "Misunderstanding Europe" Foreign Affairs 
November/December 1998, p. 65-66. 305 Edward Pilkington & Ewen MacAskill "Europe Lacks Moral Fibre, Says US Hawk" II 
Guardian, 13 November 2002. 
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In a sense, this had to be looked at from another angle. The United States is the 
sole superpower. It remains the most important country militarily and within the 
current international economic system. World security is a vital national interest 
for the United States. In contrast, the European Union is a recently formed 
economic block that still needs to form a united political goals and foreign policy 
outlook. Its concerns remained focused solely on the economic side. This did not 
match precisely with United States world vision and strategy especially after 9/11. 
At the base of all, the European countries adopt a strategy of engagement, of non- 
isolation and of dialogue rather than punitive economic sanctions and isolation. 
They had followed this with every "problematic country" such as Iran, North 
Korea, Iraq, China, Libya and Cuba, Richard Haass and Meghan O'Sullivan 
defined the strategy of engagement as "a foreign policy strategy that depends to a 
significant degree on positive incentives to achieve its objectives. " Both authors 
agreed that: "the distinguishing feature of engagement strategies is their reliance 
on the extension provision of incentives to shape the behaviour of countries. " 
They added: "The ongoing sanctions debate has exposed the drawbacks of relying 
on economic coercion, particularly when exerted unilaterally, as the primary 
instrument of foreign policy. Although there is still a range of opinion about the 
efficacy of sanctions and the frequency with which they should be used, some 
broad areas of consensus have emerged. Sanctions almost always result in some 
economic hardship, but this impact is often insufficient or unable to force the 
desired political change in the target country. Moreover, sanctions can be costly 
for innocent bystanders, particularly the poorest in the target country and 
American businesses and commercial interests. In addition, sanctions often evoke 
unintended consequences, such as the strengthening of obnoxious regimes. Given 
these findings, there is increasing recognition that reliance solely on punitive tools 
like sanctions rarely constitutes an effective foreign policy strategy. This growing 
awareness has been behind calls to explore more nuanced foreign policy strategies 
that, while possibly having a sanctions component, are not entirely dependent 
upon it for achieving US objectives. " 
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Richard Haass and Meghan O'Sullivan pointed out two other important factors 
that showed why punishment alone was not enough in dealing with problematic 
countries: "just as the efficacy of sanctions has been questioned, the limits of 
military force have been exposed. Although military action will remain an 
essential foreign policy tool, its application is expensive and by no means certain 
of achieving its goals. Even in the face of overwhelming American military and 
technological superiority, recalcitrant regimes such as Iraq's Saddam Hussein 
have displayed the capacity to withstand military attack for surprisingly long 
periods of time. " They stressed: "the changing nature of post-cold war world 
threats makes them increasingly ill suited to being managed by strategies based on 
punishment alone. Threats from proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
terrorism, and ethnic conflict increasingly occupy the attention of those concerned 
with national security and global stability. One may argue that the United States 
can address these issues by using sanctions to isolate and weaken regimes that 
sponsor and support offensive behaviour as it has done in the past. However, quite 
possibly, insecure regimes are more likely to pose these sorts of threats to 
America and the international system; if so, then policies that destabilize and 
ostracize countries can be expected to exacerbate problems, not mitigate them. " 
Most significantly, they pointed out: "within the last decade, many of America's 
closest allies in Europe have revealed a preference for using incentives, rather 
than punitive actions, to achieve foreign policy goals. 006 
Also on this matter Alexander L. George, noted: "Many students of international 
relations have noted that the failure of the western powers to thwart the early 
aggressive moves of Japan and Hitler's Germany in the 1930s had a profound 
impact on subsequent American foreign policy attitudes. The lesson of 
Chamberlain's abortive effort to appease Hitler at Munich in 1938 has been 
deeply etched in the consciousness of successive generations of policymakers and 
foreign policy specialists. There is ample evidence that on numerous occasions 
306 Richard N. Haass & Meghan L. O'Sullivan (eds. ) Honey and Vine ar ncentives an tý ions 
and Foreign Policy (Brookings Institution Press, 2000), pp. 2-3. 
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since the end of World War II American policymakers have been influenced by 
the simple proposition `If appeasement, then World War III. "'307 
George asserted: " `Appeasement' became such an invidious phenomenon that 
little effort was made by policymakers and scholars alike to differentiate between 
those special conditions under which appeasement was indeed a misguided and 
dangerous policy and other conditions when it could eliminate the sources of 
conflict and the possibility of war with another state. i308It is worth mentioning 
here, however, that it was entirely probable that with such a dictatorial- 
aggressive- expansionist mind set as that of Saddam, appeasement alone would 
not have worked. 
A congressional briefing in the United States by four leading think tanks on the 
EU perspectives on "difficult regimes" in the Middle East concluded that the 
Europeans: 
Distinguish between the goal of ending Iraq's WMD programs, which 
they support, and the goal of changing the Iraqi regime, which they see 
as quite different and perhaps not essential for the control of WMD. 
They do not advocate military operations to depose Saddam Hussein at 
present and warn the US threats to do so all but preclude the 
possibility of Iraqi cooperation with the sanctions/inspections policy 
approved by the United Nations. European also worry that an attack on 
Iraq could have a detrimental impact on stability in the 
region... Europe has significant economic interests in Iraq, though US 
policymakers tend to misjudge the magnitude of such interests. By 
way of example, The Wall Street Journal and the Heritage Foundation 
report that the single largest consumer of Iraqi products is in fact the 
United States, which receives 56.4% of Iraqi exports. Together, the 
two largest European consumers of Iraqi products (the Netherlands 
and France) receive only 19.9% of Iraqi exports... Europeans have 
307 Alexander L. George Bridging the Gap: Theory & Practice in Foreign Policy (United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 1998), pp. 61-62. 308 Ibid., p. 62. 
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generally followed a policy of engagement with the difficult regimes 
of the Gulf, ranging from an easing of economic restrictions on trade 
with Iraq. 309 
Roberson acknowledged that European countries and the United States had great 
differences in perception, interest and strategy when it came to the Middle East: 
Europe's interests in regional stability overlaps with that of the United 
States, and where differences exist, they are matters of priorities and 
tactics. The United States tends to deal with the region as a global 
power with global interests, while Europe, with its limited power 
capability, has a less expansive view of its interests and needs. While 
the United States divided the region into enemies and allies, Europe 
seeks relations with all states in the region. While the United States 
had, in the 1990s, moved away from an "even-handed" approach to the 
peace process, Europe believes a stable peace requires the formation of 
a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. (Whilst initially 
supporting sanctions on Iraq, Europe) increasingly became 
disillusioned with their effectiveness and chafed against them. 310 
Robert Kagan confirmed that fact more boldly: "It is time to stop pretending that 
Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they 
occupy the same world. On the all-important question of power-the efficacy of 
power, the morality of power, the desirability of power-American and European 
perspectives are diverging. Europe is turning away from power, or to put it a little 
differently, it is moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and 
rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation. 011 Kagan added "When it 
comes to setting national priorities, determining threats, defining challenges, and 
309 Policy Brief #4 From a June 22,2002 Congressional Staff Briefing on "US Challenges and 
Choices in the Gulf: European Perspectives, " jointly sponsored by, The Atlantic Council of the 
United States, The Middle East Institute, The Middle East Policy Council, and the Stanley 
Foundation 
310 B A. Roberson "The Impact of the International System on the Middle East" in Raymond 
Hinnebusch & Anoushiravan Ehteshami, (eds. ) The Foreign Policies of Middle East States (Lynne 
Rienner, 2002), p. 61. 
311 Robert Kagan Paradise & Power: America and Europe in the new world order (Atlantic Books, 
2003), p. 3. 
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fashioning and implementing foreign and defence policies, the United States and 
Europe have parted ways. "312 He asserted: "More and more over the past decade, 
the United States and its European allies have has rather substantial disagreements 
over what constitute intolerable threats to international security and the world 
order, as the case of Iraq has abundantly shown. , 313 The Iraq issue created major 
rift in EU-American relations because Europeans, according to Kagan, saw 
Saddam as an "American problem. " He stated: "The vast majority of Europeans 
always believed that the threat posed by Saddam Hussein was more tolerable than 
the risk of removing him. But Americans, being stronger, developed a lower 
threshold of tolerance for Saddam and his weapons of mass destruction, especially 
after September 11. s314 
A typical example that showed how policy differences concerning economic and 
political interests played to dismantle the United Nations Special Commission 
(UNSCOM) in charge of unearthing and destroying Iraq's weapons of mass 
destructions can be seen from how the Security Council and especially the Iraqi 
lobby in it tried to influence its work. 
Many had accused Iraqi obstruction to be the main if not the only factor that 
complicated the full implementation of UNSCOM's mandate. However, key EU 
states, the Russians, the Chinese, and the Arab countries all played a pivotal role 
in the eventual collapse of UNSCOM. The large economic and commercial 
interests of these states that were entangled with the Iraqi regime increased the 
lack of political support for US military action to punish Iraq for its intransigence 
against UNSCOM, which contributed eventually to the defeat of UNSCOM by 
Iraq. 
As Richard Butler, chairman of the United Nations Special Commission to disarm 
Iraq (UNSCOM), gave his insight and showed, that even in the heart of the 
Security Council itself, Iraq managed through trade and oil to gain powerful 
supporters, which helped Iraq to get away with consequential breaches of UN 
312 Ibid., p. 4. 
313 Ibid., p. 29. 
314 Ibid., p. 31. 
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Resolutions. Butler concluded that Iraqi policy of undermining the work and then 
the destruction of UNSCOM was given a boost by Security Council divisions and 
its adamant insistence to a diplomatic solution to Saddam's defiance. The Council 
failed to focus on Iraqi non-compliance with UN arms inspectors: instead, the 
supporters of Iraq at the UN pushed for more concessions on the sanctions regime. 
Taking the Russians as a case in point, Richard Butler clearly stated how 
permanent members of the Security Council defended Iraq's interests and their 
own narrow national interests by trying to impede and re-write the original aim 
and work of UNSCOM in order to speed the lifting of the economic sanctions on 
Iraq: "Primakov (Russia Foreign Minister) began, declaring that `Russia wants the 
Iraq problem solved. ' He saw UNSCOM as having a key role to play in achieving 
this objective-by finishing its disarmament work as soon as possible. For this 
purpose, it should consider new criteria for judging Iraq's compliance with the 
law. `You mustn't be rigid, ' he urged. `You must be more flexible, more 
understanding. ' The onus of proof, he made clear, was as great upon UNSCOM as 
upon Iraq- If not greater. "315 The Russians ignored Iraq's concealment activities 
and started instead applying enormous pressure on Butler and his arms inspection 
team. Butler recalled one of the meetings in the UN, where a Russian official 
attacked UNSCOM, arguing that: "Iraq was substantially disarmed and that many 
of the concerns raised in the briefing by the UNSCOM experts were illusory. He 
went on to present an interpretation of the data that involved ignoring some facts, 
distorting others, and dismissing still others as unimportant, all of it adding up to 
an argument in favour of giving Iraq a clean bill of health and winding up 
UNSCOM's disarmament work. "316 
Butler convincingly showed that vigorous support for Saddam existed and 
intensified against UNSCOM from countries like Russia, France and, to some 
extent, China. Instead of forcing Iraq to comply with UNSCOM, these states 
started to accommodate Iraqi belligerence and tried to appease the Iraqi dictator. 
Butler stated that: "Russia, France, and China-now joined by Malaysia as a newly 
elected non-permanent member- hardened their positions in support of Iraq. In 
315 Butler, Op. Cit. pp 117-11$. 316 Ibid., p. 120. 
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their belief, Iraq had been subjected to misbehaviour (including spying) by 
UNSCOM and to illegal aggression by the United States and the United 
Kingdom. 017 
As for the French position, Butler wrote from his first-hand experience with the 
French Foreign Ministry, and particularly with Jean de Gliniasty, the head of the 
division responsible for France's relations with the United Nations: "De Gliniasty 
advanced a single French position: Of the choices available, it would be better to 
continue some arms-control monitoring in Iraq without sanctions rather than to 
retain sanctions with no monitoring. This reflected a profound policy difference 
between France and the United States. Paris believed Washington's policy had 
two goals: the maintenance of sanctions and, ultimately, the removal of Saddam 
Hussein. On the former, France sought the removal of sanctions for economic 
reasons; on the latter, France doubted Saddam could be removed by other than 
natural means. Since these two elements of US policy were connected-sanctions 
would remain in place as long as Saddam Hussein remained in power- US policy 
looked dismal to France. France's view ignored the clarification the United States 
had given about implementation of sanctions' removal, if Iraq was properly 
disarmed. "318 He added: "France, I feared, would have been content with a 
monitoring system that was less than robust. In fact, the government of Jacques 
Chirac was edging toward a position where it assessed Iraq as having been 
substantially disarmed and certainly posing no threat to France. " Butler stressed: 
"France thus argued that a monitoring system that guaranteed some degree of 
continuing international vigilance over Iraq would be sufficient and that the 
benefits of removing sanctions and normalizing relations with Iraq would 
outweigh any deficiencies in the monitoring. "319 
The French pro-Iraqi policy- while stemming from commercial and arms deals 
interests with Saddam, which goes back to when Saddam was a Vice President in 
the early 70's then met in Baghdad with French Prime Minister Chirac and 
discussed arms and nuclear reactor deals- at the UN and in Europe came from 
37 Ibid., pp. 229-230. 
318 Ibid., pp. 214-215. 
319 Ibid. 
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many factors. It is widely known among students of international relations that 
ever since General de Gaulle, France had stood against a world dominated by the 
United States and, to some extent, the United Kingdom. In other words, against a 
world that represented solely a purely Anglo-Saxon model and culture. Thus 
France fought for a multi-polar world that would limit American supremacy after 
the collapse of communism. Iraq and the case of international economic sanctions, 
coupled with the issue of disarmament imposed by the Security Council after the 
Second Gulf War, allowed France to play a key role in advancing such multi-polar 
world model and encouraged it to defy the Anglo-Saxon model and norms in 
world politics. 
For instance, the French Foreign Minister, Hubert Vedrine's own assessment of 
the role of the United States in the post-cold war era and the interlinked issues of 
globalisation were very obvious in his book: "let's admit it: globalization does not 
automatically benefit France. Globalization develops according to principles that 
correspond neither to French tradition nor to French culture: the ultraliberal 
market economy, mistrust of the state, individualism removed from the republican 
tradition, the inevitable reinforcement of the universal and "indispensable" role of 
the United States, common law, the English language, Anglo-Saxon norms, and 
Protestant-more than Catholic--concepts. Historically, French identity has been 
defined by and built upon a strong central state, first monarchical, and then 
republican. It was painstakingly built by jurists and based on the idea that France 
had a specific political, legal, and cultural role to play in the world. "320 
Tim Trevan, a British expert on biological warfare and strategist and spokesman 
for UNSCOM, described how the world community backed down and was 
reluctant in dealing with Saddam forcefully in support of UNSCOM, thus 
rendering the whole UN inspection team ineffective: "it was the inaction of the 
Security Council in the autumn of 1997 and again in the spring and summer of 
1998, the failure of political will to enforce the very law it had itself enacted (the 
ceasefire Resolution), that undermined the effectiveness of UNSCOM. In early 
320 Hubert Vedrine & Dominique Moisi Prance in an Alf Globalization (Brookings Institution 
Press, 2001), p. 17-18. 
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1999, it is again failing. s321 Trevan drew a parallel between the inaction of the 
international community to Nazi Germany and the reluctance with Iraq. "The 
Inter-Allied Commission of Control, established by the Versailles Treaty to 
oversee Germany's disarmament after the First World War, operated for seven 
years and eight months before Hitler's regime kicked them out. There was the 
merest of whimpers from the world community then. UNSCOM lasted seven 
years and six months before Saddam's regime kicked out the intrusive 
inspections. The world's reaction was reluctantly to accept a British Resolution 
suspending reviews of sanctions against Iraq until it resumed 'cooperation'. Seven 
years and eight months into UNSCOM's operations, and Iraq announced the end 
of all `cooperation', even on monitoring. The parallels are staggering. The 
Council has not heeded Francis Drake's words-'the continuing unto it be 
"322 thoroughly finished yields true glory'. 
The international community's commercial and political interests overshadowed 
the work of the inspectors and discouraged full Iraqi compliance. Iraq reassessed 
its situation with UNSCOM, and decided to cease its cooperation with the UN 
inspection mission unless UNSCOM closed the chemical, nuclear and missile 
files, and unless the Security Council lifted what remained of the economic 
sanctions. Iraq was using the UNSCOM saga to further weaken the US, divide the 
Council, and erode what fully remained of the sanctions. That is what encouraged 
Iraq to reject a UN Resolution adopted in December 1999, calling for the 
suspension of UN sanctions if it allowed the inspectors to return. "Realpolitik was 
also coming into play. Russia and France were massive creditors of Iraq and were 
looking forward to the day when Iraqi oil flowed to provide funds to pay Iraq's 
debts. French and Russian oil companies had also pencilled in lucrative contracts 
to exploit major oil fields in Iraq once the sanctions were lifted. Russia's entire 
stance towards the West and the US would also change in mid-1994. It would no 
longer automatically fall into line with the US position, seeking rather to re- 
321 Tim Trevan Saddam's Secrets; The Hunt for Iraq's Hidden Weapons (liarperCollins, 1999), 
384. 
322 Ibid., p. 385. 
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establish its independent place at the top table. At times it seemed that Russia was 
opposing the US just for the sake of it. "323 
In December 1998, Iraq declared that UNSCOM in its then current configuration 
was dead, and that they would never be allowed to enter back into Iraq, accusing 
its members of spying and undermining Iraq's national integrity. Ever since that 
time, the UN and the US tried to reach a compromise that would be acceptable to 
Iraq and its supporters. After years of haggling in the UN, Security Council 
Resolution 1284 was passed. Iraq immediately rejected that Resolution, calling it 
a sham. A stalemate evolved on Iraq at the UN. 
Resolution 1284 was a compromise that offered Iraq the possibility of having 
what remained of UN sanctions suspended by fully cooperating with the new arms 
inspectors or the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission 
(UNMOVIC). Iraq defied this new UN compromise, despite the fact that the terms 
of inspection in that Resolution had been eased to please Iraq. Saddam's regime 
refused, and effectively demanded an immediate and unconditional suspension of 
the sanctions regime, arguing that it had disarmed as required by the Security 
Council. It was a telling blow to the future of the sanctions policy and even to the 
new world order proposed by Bush Senior after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
The international community supported the case of Iraq, and thus the stalemate 
continued at the UN. It was becoming clear that there was no longer a sufficient 
international consensus to maintain anything like a comprehensive economic 
blockade of Iraq. 
Even though Iraq was in clear breach of UN Resolutions, this did not prevent the 
world from trading and negotiating with Iraq. While the US and the UK tended to 
favour responding to non-compliance with punitive air strikes and bomb attacks 
against suspected weapons installations, the international community as a whole 
was critical of such aggression and preferred instead to negotiate with Saddam's 
regime. The chief consequence of this preference was that the "oil-for-food" 
programme was continuously renewed, amended, relaxed and further 
323 Ibid., p. 256. 
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compromised to the advantage of the Iraqi regime and the trading partners. In 
addition, Saddam continued to smuggle oil and forbidden goods behind the UN's 
back. 
Nevertheless, in 2000, UN Resolution 1330 eliminated the revenue ceiling on 
Iraqi oil sales. In addition, the Security Council doubled the spending for oil 
sector spare parts and equipment, allowing Iraq to spend up to 600 million dollars 
every six months on repairing its damaged oil facilities. This further concession 
only encouraged Saddam to continue his defiance of UN inspections mandate for 
four complete years. 
Having highlighted the conflicting perceptions between key European powers and 
the sole superpower in an important issue such as economic sanctions, the next 
section proceeds to detail the trade and political relations between Iraq and key 
EU states. 
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5.2.4.2 The Netherlands 
Table 5.12 The Netherlands trade with Iraq, 1996-1999 
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 Jan-Se 
Exports (DFI 
million) 0.3 24.5 47.6 55.4 
Imports (DFI 
million) 0.1 338.7 931.8 1,403.6 
Source: Special report Netherlands, MEED 26 May 2000, p. 30. 
1 DFI=0.495845USD 1USD=2.01676 DFI 
Table 5.13 Handelcijfers Nederland- Irak 1999-2002 (The Netherlands trade 
with Iraq 1999-2002) (x 1000.000 euro) 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Exports 39,9 35,2 36,8 31,5 
_Imports 
968,2 676,4 888,4 622,8 
Source: EVD-Information (The Netherlands Foreign Trade Agency), 
http: //www. evd. nl/zoeken/ShowBouwsteen. asp? bstnum=75272 
A brief examination of the way that the oil-for-food deal dynamics affected 
decision-making in the Netherlands serves nicely as a typical example of the kind 
of thing that had been going on in most of the major European countries over the 
period of the oil-for-food deal. Dutch companies were lining up, applying strong 
pressure on the government for negotiations and a reduction of sanctions, and it 
was readily apparent to the economic ministries that business in other countries 
like France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Spain, Austria, 
South Africa, China, Russia and Turkey were getting profitable commercial 
contracts under the oil-for-food programme. It made little sense to simply stand 
by and let others take advantage while Dutch companies suffered. Thus, even 
while the foreign ministry tended to pay lip service to the line of policy preferred 
by the Americans, the government also supported negotiations with Iraq and the 
progressive expansion of the oil-for-food deal. At one point (March 2001), five 
Dutch chambers of commerce held a joint meeting to debate the sanctions policy 
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and to inform their eager companies about how to do and best promote business 
with Iraq under the programme. 
More than 90 Dutch companies of all types registered in the programme, and in 
addition there were representatives from the Dutch ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
and two companies set up programmes to share information about their 
experiences in doing business with Iraq in order to encourage and assist the other 
companies waiting in line. In that meeting, the Iraqi Charge des affairs in the 
Netherlands gave a speech to the companies assuring them of Baghdad's 
eagerness and delight to work and trade with the Netherlands. This was so 
important that it drew the attention of the Kuwaiti Embassy in the Netherlands, 
who sent an official to watch and hear how Iraq was effectively penetrating inside 
major Dutch and multinational companies. 324 
This kind of conference was repeated in March 2002 and summer 2002- ignoring 
the risk of American threats of an attack to overthrow Saddam's regime- and was 
espoused by the EVD (Netherlands Foreign Trade Agency) and number of 
chambers of commerce, who had gathered in the harbor city of Rotterdam. 
Moreover, in April 2002, the Dutch ministry of Foreign Affairs officially 
dispatched a Dutch official to be in charge of Dutch affairs (mainly business and 
trade) and to be stationed in Baghdad. Instructions was given for him to promote 
Dutch business and trade in co-ordination with the EVD, Foreign Affairs, the 
Dutch Embassy in Amman, and the various chambers of commerce. The decision 
came after more than a year of reports coming in from the Dutch Embassy in 
Amman to the EVD and Foreign Affairs in The Hague that Dutch companies were 
underrepresented in the Iraqi market compared to other European and other 
countries. The Dutch business community had been pushing and lobbying their 
government to open the Dutch embassy in Baghdad to protect Dutch economic 
and commercial interests and support Dutch businesses in Iraq. 325 
324 Key organizer from the EVD of the Dutch businesses meeting for Iraq, private interview with 
author, The Netherlands, March 2001. 
325 EVD Middle East-desk Information Manager, private interview with author, The Netherlands, 
April 2002. 
193 
The Netherlands also participated in the International Baghdad trade fair of 
November 2002, which lasted from 1St November till the 10th, and unlike 
previously the Dutch companies hired a wing at the fair grounds and displayed 
their products. 326 
It is only natural that The Netherlands, which prides itself on being a pro-business 
nation, derived from its glorious past as a great merchant, traders and foreign 
investors nation, and where big Dutch multinationals and banks are today such as 
Philips, Aegon, Ahold, Shell, KPN, Corus, Draka, DSM, Axzo Nobil, Unilever, 
ABN-AMRO, Rabobank and ING, was unable to easily turn a blind eye on a huge 
market such as Iraq. Thus, nobody in the business community seemed to have any 
particular scruples about doing business with "the butcher of Baghdad". A Dutch 
businessman, who wished to remain anonymous, once said to the author, "I really 
don't care if Hitler or Saddam rules Iraq. I have a clear task: to maximize my 
company's business, preferably in new markets. I am only answerable to my CEO 
and the shareholders, not to the foreign ministry in Washington. The sanctions 
walls are breaking and we should use this opportunity to get the handcuffs off of 
ourselves and embrace it. Politicians is a job; let them do there job, business is my 
job and I should have the freedom to function my enterprise in the most efficient 
way. We have to push for the breakthrough first. Later on, the political will come 
to support it. s327 
A Dutch chamber of commerce distributed a letter to Dutch companies in August 
2001, encouraging them to participate that November in a two week Baghdad 
International Trade Fair. The letter informed companies that they had a chance to 
grasp important opportunities similar to those already secured by companies from 
other European states. The letter referred openly to Belgium, Germany, France, 
Russia and Italy as countries that had already benefited from re-engaging in 
relations with Iraq. 328 A Dutch exports manager told the chamber of commerce 
once "If you were to send us to Iraq, send us like the French and the Turkish do. 
326 Dutch businessmen, private interview with author, The Netherlands, December 2002. 327 Dutch Executive Manager of a major multinational company, private interview with author, 
The Netherlands, May 2001. 
328 Letter of invitation (in Dutch) sent to me and others to stimulate businesses to participate in the 
annual Baghdad trade fair. Send by the Rotterdam Kamer van Koophandel (Rotterdam Chamber of 
Commerce), August 2001. 
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They go with airplanes, send us also with airplanes. There is no point for the air 
ban if you accept to do business with that country. , 329 
Obviously, all of this potential business had been contingent on making deals with 
the Iraqi government and then getting the sanctions lifted in order to take 
advantage of the opportunities. With respect to arranging deals Saddam profited 
by completely subordinating business policy to his political imperatives. 
Companies from `friendly' countries were given priority with respect to major 
contracts, while companies from less helpful countries saw the lion's share of 
opportunities in Iraq going to their competitors. As successful companies stayed 
successful by making sure that they were not left out when there was a great deal 
of profit to be made, it is hardly surprising that the Iraqi policy had born much 
fruit. The Dutch saw that the world was making business with Iraq. An EVD 
official told the author: "Really everyone is doing it. It's all legal, as it is under the 
"oil-for-food" deal. I care about our business and companies, especially those who 
are just starting their businesses. Our small enterprises, young people who are 
fighting to win emerging markets and make descent living. The food, agriculture, 
industrial sectors, I want to see them gain and succeed, not lose. Iraq is re- 
emerging, it went through years of underdevelopment, and by nature we are a 
trading nation that ventures internationally. Iraq has the projects, and we have the 
chance to make money. Our business community, especially those who are just 
starting; should have the support and protection from the Dutch government to 
make their success a reality. ""330 
Radio Netherlands website featured an article on the Netherlands dealings with 
Iraq. The article pointed "Each year, some 300 Dutch companies receive 
authorization to conduct trade with Iraq. The number has been stable for years and 
remains virtually unaffected by the current threat or war, according to figures 
provided by Dutch customs. " The article then mentioned a Dutch company (Hyva 
hydraulics) that was trading with Iraq for many years "For many years the 
company has been engaged in trade with Iraq and director Jaap Vanndrager is not 
329 Dutch Export Manager of a leading Dutch company, private interview with author, the 
Netherlands, May 2001. 
330 EVD Middle East-desk Information Manager, private interview with author, The Netherlands, 
March 2002. 
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prepared to give it all up because of the threat of war. He says Hyva has never 
struck any deals with Saddam Hussein; it deals directly with the Iraq people on a 
business-to-business level. In Mr Vaandrager's view, Iraq offers huge 
opportunities for Dutch exporting companies who could clinch contracts totaling 
many hundreds of billions of euros. " The article added that despite war was 
looming over Iraq "Dutch companies keen to trade with Iraq do not seem to care 
much about the imminent war. Indeed, a Dutch trade delegation is scheduled to go 
to Iraq in May. Headed by Jaap Vaandrager, the mission aims to win more 
"3 business contracts. 31 
The Netherlands is trading nation, and the world around it was trading with Iraq 
freely, with competitors companies making profits. Therefore, it was only natural 
for the Netherlands not to sit and watch an important market fall away from its 
hands as its companies being disadvantaged economically. Thus the drive to 
participate in the international momentum to trade with Iraq occurred. 
331 Matthijs Nieuwenhuis "Dutch trade with Iraq remains stable" Radio Netherlands 
Wereldmroea. 7 March 2003. llttn: //www. rnw. nl/hotspots/html/dut03O3O7htmI 
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5.2.4.3 France 
Table 5.14 France trade with Iraq, 1996.1111999 
Imports (C million 
1996 1997 1998 1H 1999 
0 469 663 290 
Exports (C million) 71 
1996 1997 1998 1H 1999 
3 210 250 111 
Source: Special report France, MEER 22 October 1999, p. 8. 
1 Euro=1.09270USD 1USD=0.915166 Euro 
The Netherlands was not the only UN member to take advantage of the oil-for- 
food programme and sign contracts with Iraq. As of summer 2002, French 
332 
companies had signed more than $3 billion worth of deals since 1996. 
According to another source, France's total trade with Iraq from 1996 until the 
end of phase 11 of the oil-for-food deal reached $3 billion and $800 million. By 
that trade value, France became the first European country among the EU 
countries to reach to such a level in trade with Iraq since the start of the economic 
sanctions in 1991.333 French exports to Iraq during 2000-2001 went up by 66.4% 
from 396 to 659 million Euros, while Iraq continued to supply France with Iraqi 
oil. Hence, that in the year 2000 France imports of Iraq's oil reached 1,435 billion 
Euros. 334 At the same time, visits between the two countries' businessmen and 
officials never stopped. The last was the visit by Iraq's trade minister to Paris 
where he met with 80 businessmen of many leading French companies. 335 French 
companies also participated in all the annual Baghdad trade fair: for instance, 90 
332 International Herald Tribune, 4 July 2001. 
333 A l-Jazeera. net, 23 March 2002. 
334 CA1-Jazeera. net, 2 July 2002. 
335 Ibid. 
197 
companies participated in the November 2001 fair, and 81 companies took part in 
336 the November 2002 trade fair. 
Perhaps the fiercest of diplomatic and economic clashes happened between 
America and France. These differences in interests and vision can be attributed to 
General Charles de Gaulle, who established France's independent foreign policy 
and national interests, which clashed with that of the United States. Dominique 
Moisi wrote in Foreign Affairs: 
To Americans, France is a beautiful country, home to that most elegant 
of cities, Paris the seductive tones of the French language, and some of 
the world's finest wines, which makes it all the more difficult for them 
to understand how such a charming nation could be so irritating an 
ally. The French always seem to be opposing the United States on 
some issue or other, whether it is in the realm of international 
diplomacy, where between the lines of France's carefully worded 
diplomatic statements once can discern a distinct distaste for 
America's oft-proclaimed sole-superpower status, or on matters of 
culture, where France is always the first to denounce American 
"cultural imperialism. " Lately, Franco-American friction has 
manifested itself most visibly in the Persian Gulf, where France's 
interests-in Iraq and Iran-seem to clash with America's security 
"337 needs. 
336 Al-Jazeera. net, 1 November 2002. 
337 Dominique Moisi "The Trouble with France" Foreign Affairs May/June 1998, p. 94. 
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Eric Rouleau, a former French Ambassador to Turkey and Tunisia, illustrated how 
these differences runs deep: 
The French are undoubtedly not alone among European in their 
difficulty grasping American policy in the Middle East. Although clear 
in its objectives-at least those publicly defined-it invariably raises 
questions and sometimes suspicions. Part of the problem comes from 
cultural differences. The French, without necessarily being cynical, 
tend to be sceptical of the moralism that America traditionally attaches 
to its policies. General Charles de Gaulle raised no eyebrows in France 
when he declared, as a self-evident truth, that the Primary purpose of 
the state, which he characterized as a "cold monster, " was to defend 
the nation's interests. Nor did anyone take offence when he set down 
the rule-still observed-that France recognizes only states, and that 
the regime governing a state is not its concern. (One might note in 
passing that observance of this principle has spared France not only 
the diplomatic complications accompanying changes in regimes but, 
paradoxically, accusations of hypocrisy and double standards. ) The 
notion that there are rogue states, then, has no equivalent in the French 
political vocabulary and continues to be a source of puzzlement. In 
European eyes, Washington's criteria for categorizing good and bad 
states would, if applied rigorously, significantly lengthen the list of the 
latter. 338 
The French were against the multilateral comprehensive economic sanctions 
against Baghdad. The French foreign minister, Hubert Vedrine, described the 
sanctions on Iraq as "useless, cruel, and inadequate", while admitting that the 
Security Council ought to purse its objectives "by means other than the current 
embargo. " 339 He forcefully asserted: "On Iraq, we think that the legitimate 
security aspirations of Iraq's neighbours can be ensured without continuing to rely 
338Eric Rouleau "America's Unyielding Policy Toward Iraq" Foreign Affairs January/February 
1995, pp. 59-60. 339 Hubert Vedrine & Dominique Moisi France in an A eý of Globalization (Brookings Institution 
Press, 2001), p. 94. 
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on the embargo that penalizes-very cruelly-the population, even as it is 
manipulated by the leaders. " 
Moreover, France stood vigorously against Operation Iraqi Freedom. French 
Foreign Minister, Hubert Vedrine, declared that: "Military action against Iraq 
cannot be justified within the United States' war against terrorism .... 
No European 
country believes it is in the logic of the anti-terrorist drive to undertake something 
against Iraq. Even those in the United States arguing openly for American action 
against Iraq are not saying anymore there is a link to the (September 11`h) 
attacks. 9040 
In sum, France a key UN Security Council member with veto powers, as well as a 
significant political and economic weight inside the EU, played a pivotal role in 
eroding sanctions through its economic dealing with Baghdad and diplomatic 
defiance to the US-Iraq policy as was shown in this section and will be illustrated 
further in chapter seven. 
340 Reuters, 21 December 2001. 
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5.2.4.4 Germany 
Table 5.15 Germany trade with Iraq 1999-2000 
Imports (DM million) 
_Im 
ports 1999 162.4 
_Im 
ports Jan-Jun 1999 67.2 
Im ports Jan-Jun 2000 43.6 
I Ex orts (DM million) 
Exp orts 1999 142.9 
Exp orts Jan-Jun 1999 56.8 
Exp orts Jan-Jun 2000 50.5 
Source: Special report Germany, MEED 17 November 2000, p. 26. 
1 DM= 0.558688USD 1 USD= 1.78991DM 
Meanwhile Germany, Europe's major economic power, was accorded by Saddam 
Hussein priority-trading status for the Iraqi market in June 2002. Trade between 
Iraq and Germany had reached nearly $ 661 million dollars since 1996.341 Various 
German TV stations spoke of it reaching the $1 billion mark. 
Moreover, Germany defied the United States diplomatically. Transatlantic 
tensions were also very clear with the hard-line German position against an 
American/British led war to oust Saddam Hussein regime. Germany's 
government-a vital member of the EU and NATO- opposed any military action 
against Iraq, saying it preferred diplomacy to war. German Chancellor Gerhard 
Schroeder's blunt rejection of the use of force led to the sharpest differences 
within the allies on Iraq. Europe, with exception of the United Kingdom, seemed 
to reject what they viewed as American belligerence and unilateralism after the 
September 11th terrorist attacks on America. 
341 AF , 16 June 2002. 
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The Economist summed the German foreign policy stance and its clash with that 
of the American national vital interests: 
Until recently, Germany was one of the United States best friends. The 
Americans could rely on its enthusiastic moral, if not military, support 
in most global matters. Within hours of the terrorist attacks on the 
United States a year ago, Gerhard Schroder, Germany's chancellor, 
was among the first to pledge his "unlimited solidarity", describing the 
event as "a declaration of war against the entire civilised world". But 
now he has categorically rejected any German support for an 
American-led attack on Iraq, even if backed by a United Nations 
mandate. The relationship that has been the cornerstone of German 
foreign policy since the Second World War is under strain. Though 
several European governments feel much the same toward Mr Bush's 
policy, Germany's has gone furthest out on a limb. 342 
It is not only Germany's leadership that was against the war, but also the general 
public and civil society groups. According to a German expert Dieter Lutz, 
Director of the Peace Research Institute of the Hamburg University "The threat 
potential of Baghdad is small. The danger of a military strike planned by 
Washington is bigger than what Iraq can do. "343 According to the BBC, the 
regional Schwaebis Ches Tagblatt newspaper quoted Ms. Daeubler-Gmelin, 
German's Justice Minister, as saying "Bush wants to divert attention from his 
domestic problems. It's a classic tactic. It's one that Hitler used. "344 
German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, expressed the same sentiment even 
more strongly, saying: "All European nations would view a broadening (of the 
conflict) to include Iraq highly sceptically-and that is putting it 
diplomatically. "aas While German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder was very clear 
342 "Germany's Foreign Policy: Why Gerhard Schroder Has Gone Out On a Limb" The Fconomis 
12 September 2002. 
343 Xinhua News Agency, 28 September 2002. 
344 BBC-, 19 September 2002. 
345 Reuters, 28 November 2001. 
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in his opposition to US planned attack when he said, that a military attack on Iraq 
is "wrong" and that "under my leadership Germany will not take part in that. "346 
Interestingly, after he was elected for the second time, German Chancellor 
Gerhard Schroder reiterated the same political decision he and his party members 
have held during the elections "I want to make it as clear as glass that we are 
opposed to military intervention in Iraq. , 347 
346 Chicago Tribune, 27 August 2002. 
347 Hugh Williamson & Peter Spiegel "Germany Rejects Role in War Against Iraq" Financial 
es 27 November 2002. 
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5.2.4.5 United Kingdom 
Table 5.16 A breakdown of the United Kingdom exports to Iraq between 
Jan-Sep 2000.1 GBP=1.58000 USD 1 USD= 0.632910 GBP 
Description Value U. K. £) 
Animal and vegetable oils, fats and 
waxes 
6,000 
Manufactured goods classified chiefly 
by material 
10,000 
Miscellaneous edible products and 
preparations 
29,000 
Crude fertilisers and crude minerals 16,000 
Petroleum, petroleum products and 
related material 
93,000 
Organic chemicals 4,000 
Inorganic chemicals 6,000 
Medicinal and pharmaceutical products 1,857,000 
Essential oils and resinoids and perfume 
materials toiletries 
4,000 
Plastics in primary forms 23,000 
Plastics in non-primary forms 9,000 
Chemical materials and roducts 321,000 
Rubber manufacturers 114,000 
Paper, paperboard, and articles of paper 
or of paperboard 
1,000 
Textile yarn, fabrics, made-up articles, 
and related products 
3,000 
Non metallic mineral manufacturers 3,000 
Iron and steel 181,000 
Manufacturers or metal 112,000 
Power generating machinery and 
equipment 
19,490,000 
Machinery specialised for particular 
industries 
770,000 
Metalworking machinery 205,000 
General industrial machinery and 
equipment, and machine parts 
11,252,000 
Electrical machinery, apparatus and 
appliances and electrical parts 
1,347,000 
Road vehicles 1,813,000 
Articles of apparel and clothing 
accessories 
17,000 
Professional, scientific and controlling 
instruments and a aratus 
549,000 
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 549,000 
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 632,000 
Grand Total 38,867,000 
source: tnttp: Hwww. traaepartners. 2ov. uK/textiirag/nroril e/03 ec(MoMi /eco ig shtm) 
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Unlike France, Germany and the Netherlands and other EU members, the United 
Kingdom's government was engaged with the United States in occasional 
bombing on Iraq, and was a public advocate of overthrowing Saddam's regime. 
At the same time, it fought in the UN alongside the United States against the pro- 
Iraq lobby formed by Russia, France, and Germany. This was especially clear 
during 2002 and 2003. The United Kingdom also shared a special and historic 
relationship with the United States. However, at times, the United Kingdom was 
close to France and Germany compassion for the Iraqi people as the Blair 
government formulated his Labour government notion of ethical foreign policy. 
The United Kingdom together with the Netherlands initiated a plan at the Security 
Council to lift sanctions on a trial basis of 120 days in return for the full and 
renewed cooperation of Iraq with UN weapons inspectors. The Guardian stated 
"Britain is offering Iraq a carrot by proposing that sanctions could be suspended if 
Baghdad resumed cooperation with United Nations efforts to monitor banned 
weapons of mass destruction. " Britain had more leverage with the United States 
than that of France and Germany due to the historic relationship and huge trade 
between the two countries. The Guardian reported "Britain hopes to persuade the 
United States to go along with this latest attempt to overcome bitter differences in 
the UN security council and give Baghdad a fresh incentive to close the weapons 
file, Washington is said to be unhappy with some of the proposals, but the foreign 
secretary, Robin Cook, is keen to emphasize British humanitarian concern. " The 
British/Dutch proposal called for "lifting all limits on the amount of oil Iraq can 
sell" and proposed "that the council should consider allowing foreign investment- 
vital to revive the Iraqi oil industry- four months after weapons inspectors 
return. "aas 
Moreover, companies from the United Kingdom, the chief US ally, had been 
negotiating business with Iraq since the inception of the oil-for-food programme. 
They also participated in Iraq's trade fairs and the number of companies venturing 
in the Iraqi market had increased as indicated by the BBC news online. 
348 Ian Black "Britian holds out carrot to Iraq on santions" The Guardian. 17 June 1999. 
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The BBC spoke of at least a dozen British businesses registered for the annual 
Baghdad International Trade Fair starting is` November 2002. According to the 
BBC they were exploring opportunities in oil, medical, water treatment, and 
engineering sectors. 349 Products for the use of agriculture were sold to Iraq under 
the oil for food deal, and some British businessmen related to the agriculture 
companies visited Iraq frequently some as often as twice a year. During these 
relatively long visits they negotiated for contracts and closed deals with the Iraqi 
authority under the oil-for-food deal. UK subsidiaries in Latin America, Europe 
and the Middle East were also involved in similar negotiations and deals. 350 
BBC, 17 September 2002. 
350 Iraqi Businessmen representing UK companies in their dealings with Iraq, private interview 
with author, The Netherlands, 2002. 
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5.3 Iraq's attempts to capitalize on economic temptation 
Iraq attached great political importance to its trade with the international 
community. It used annual trade fairs to lure European, Russian, Turkish and 
Asian companies back to the Iraqi market, whilst continued to smuggle oil and 
asked international companies for kickbacks to add to its increased revenues that 
were not controlled by the UN. Here is a brief look at the other ways the world 
business community interacted with Iraq in the era of sanctions. 
5.3.1 The Baghdad Trade Fair 
The Netherlands, France, Germany and the UK were not the only European 
countries competing to sell their goods to and trade with Baghdad. Dozens of 
firms including from Washington's European partners in NATO were also 
strongly present in the Iraqi market, including Sweden, Belgium, Turkey, Finland, 
Denmark, Italy, Spain, Cyprus, Switzerland, Romania, Yugoslavia, Russia and 
Austria. They all competed for a share of the market and profited from the 
periodic expansions to the oil-for-food programme. Even the United Kingdom 
was one of these. These countries representatives at trade fairs managed to 
negotiate and sign trade agreements and contracts. EU and other countries' 
companies found trade fairs as a good way of networking and a step towards 
gaining a greater share in the market. 
For example when Iraq organized an international trade fair in Baghdad in 
November 2001, the biggest since these trade fairs were resumed in 1995, the 
European Union business community was heavily represented. France 
participated with 104 firms, while 100 German companies exhibited their 
products at the Baghdad trade fair. Like the French and Germans, 40 companies 
represented Italy and the Spanish sent 30 companies. Also participated were 200 
Russian companies and 120 Turkish frms. 351 In addition 15 Arab countries also 
participated in the fair. 
351 
, 28 October 2001. 
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Iraq organized another trade fair at the beginning of November 2002 for ten days, 
where 1,200 companies joined the fair from 49 countries. This level was not far 
away from that seen before the economic sanctions and the 1991 Gulf War, where 
52 to 55 countries participated. Over 20,000 officials and business people who 
attended the trade fair listened to the opening sermon, where patriotic Iraqi songs 
and praises of Saddam Hussein including condemnation of America were heard. 
Countries like France, Germany, The Netherlands, Italy, Austria, Denmark, 
Turkey, Greece, Russia and China participated in the fair. In the fair contracts 
were signed between Iraq and many companies totaling $ 0.5 billion. Some 20 
contracts were signed with French, Saudi, UAE, German, and Iranian 
companies. 352 
Iraq used these trade fairs for its own political ends. This kind of trade fair 
allowed companies to get an introduction to the Iraqi market, promoted their 
products, and provided an ideal platform for the region's and the international 
businessmen, investors and government representatives alike to meet and develop 
strong, positive business relationships. Iraq managed to lure international 
companies back to the Iraqi market, indicated to the world (especially the United 
States) that sanctions were a thing from the past. Politically and economically Iraq 
wanted to show the United States that the world was returning to normal trade 
activities with Iraq whether the US liked it or not. In the words of the director of 
the Baghdad fair, Fawzi al-Dhahir, this event "marks the return of normal trade 
activities between Iraq and the world as they were before the unjust embargo. "333 
It is not at all surprising that an Iraqi official should think this way and or say 
these words, since nearly 50 countries with more than 1,650 companies, 20,000 
officials and business people participated in the two-week trade fair, higher than a 
year previously, when 45 countries and 1,554 companies attended the annual 
fair. 354 
352 Al-Jazeera. net, 10 November 2002. 
353 Reuters, 7 November 2001. 
ssa AI!, 1 November 2001. 
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5.3.2 The kickbacks 
Iraq's programme of sanctions-busting included asking for kickbacks from 
companies operating under the oil-for-food deal. This apparently started in mid. 
2001, when Iraq asked international companies to pay the Iraqi government 
money outside the UN escrow account. 
The Chairman of the UN sanctions committee conceded to the CNN "Iraq has 
been trying to obtain illegal kickbacks from companies that sell humanitarian 
goods under the United Nations oil-for-food program. "355 Raad Alkadiri, of the 
Petroleum Finance Co. in Washington, confirmed: "Paying a surcharge is hard to 
prove, particularly when Iraq is dealing with sort of smaller, lesser known traders 
who come from countries that don't see eye-to-eye with the United States on 
sanctions. "356 
At the same time, the Financial Times obtained a confidential list of companies 
that it claimed were paying the illegal surcharge to Baghdad, and ironically they 
were mostly from the UK: "The UK is home to more companies doing oil 
business with Iraq than any other country, according to a confidential United 
Nations list of buyers, many of which are said to be paying illegal kickbacks to 
the Iraqi regime. The list, obtained by the Financial Times, was discussed on 
Wednesday in a closed-door meeting by members of the UN Security Council. It 
shows that 98 of 735 companies registered to buy oil directly from Iraq are from 
the UK. "357 
ass CNN, 7 March 2001. 
356 CNN, 24 January 2001. 
357Carola Hoyos "UK leads way for Iraq dealings" Financial times. 12 April 2001. 
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5.3.3 Oil smuggling and illicit military supplies 
Sanctions-busting ships loaded with smuggled Iraqi oil had also become another 
routine method employed by the Iraqi regime through Iraqi, Arab, and Asian 
agents to violate UN sanctions against Iraq. Needless to say, these ships loaded oil 
without the authorization of the UN and the earnings went to the Iraqi government 
outside of the UN programme in Iraq. The United States had long accused 
Baghdad of illegally gaining between $1 billion to $2 billion in oil revenues 
annually. Despite the usual news of sinking ships in the Persian Gulf spilling 
smuggled Iraqi oil, the UN for the first time presented evidence of such illegal 
acts: "Iraq was caught smuggling $10 million worth of oil through an Athens- 
based shipping company in violation of UN sanctions, the United Nations said 
today. " 358 Smuggling through Turkey had been a daily routine since Turkey 
expressed its unhappiness of the economic sanctions as early as 1992: "Despite 
the UN sanctions, Iraqi oil has been unlawfully transported to South Eastern 
Turkey through the Habur border gate. It was recently reported that there are `200 
embargo busts for every legitimate load' at the Turkish-Iraqi border. "359 Oil was 
also smuggled through Syria and Jordan. 
A report published by the Coalition for International Justice, a human rights' 
group based in Washington, confirmed the increasing amount of oil smuggling the 
Iraqi leader was managing to do. Susan Blaustein spoke of $2.5 billion of illegal 
oil sales made for the Iraqi leader in the year 2002 alone. "That money is meant to 
be distributed to the Iraqi people in humanitarian goods, but Saddam is in charge 
of the distribution and he has a veto over the UN workers there, " she said. She 
asserted that: "The UN Security Council, which has 15 members including five 
permanent members with veto power-the United States, Russia, China, France 
and Britain-has not been addressing the problem adequately. " She added: "Each 
country has had its own reasons for refusing to crack down on Hussein's illegal 
revenue-generating activities. Russia and France have been loathe to lose their 
lucrative oil-for-food contracts and future oil rights by taking any tough stance on 
ass "Iraq Caught Smuggling Oil, UN Official Says" The Washington 1'o5t 26 October 2001, p. A28. 35 Sever (2001), p. 54. 
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Iraq in the UN Security Council . "M Reuters, who took the news from oil industry 
and shipping sources, reported that Iraq was smuggling large shipments of oil 
from its Gulf port via Jordan, calling it Baghdad's most successful smuggling 
yet. 
361 
In further evidence of how much money Saddam made outside the UN/US eyes 
could be found in the news that emerged after the guns went silent in Baghdad 
end of April 2003, The American troops in Iraq found $780 million in one of 
Saddam palaces, $112 of them were labeled "Bank of Jordan" 362 Azzaman 
Newspaper, Iraqi newspaper based in London and now in Baghdad as well. also 
reported on another finding this time of $100 million and 90 million Euro that was 
hidden by Saddam. 363 While the New York Times claimed Saddam took $1 
billion before the war started from Iraq's Central Bank. 364 
Moreover, research published by the US-based Wisconsin Project on Nuclear 
Arms Control stated "that previously unpublished reports by UN arms inspectors 
(UNSCOM) show that Baghdad sought to buy-and in some cases succeeded in 
buying-banned military items in the early and mid-1990s from companies in 
Romania, Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia. " According to Radio Free Europe the 
research showed that Iraq "vigorously courted companies in Romania, Ukraine, 
Belarus, and Russia to break the sanctions in exchange for money from smuggled 
oil, "365 
While regionally, the smuggling was public and continues. The New York Times 
wrote "In a brazen violation of United Nations sanctions, scores of Syrian trucks 
laden with Iraqi oil now shuttle past this desert oasis every day, reflecting the ties 
that have turned the former foes into friends. " The newspaper added "The 
unauthorized deliveries have angered the United States and British Governments, 
360 Reuters, 18 September 2002. 
361 Reuters, 21 February 2003. 
362 Washington Post, 25 April 2003, p. 15. 
363 Azzaman Newspaper, 1 May 2003. 
364 The New York Times, 6 May 2003. 
365 Radio Free Europe, 21 June 2001. 
http: //www. rferl. ore/ ca/features/2-001/06121062001123116. asn 
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which have asked the Syrian authorities to stop them, said diplomats based in 
Damascus, the Syrian capital. But the Syrians appear in no mood to do so, and 
some diplomats say they believe that the Syrian Government may play a role in 
distributing the oil once it reaches Damascus. " The newspaper report significantly 
stressed "The smuggling is so open that drivers regularly pull off the road at the 
Roman ruins of Palmyra here, in full view of the Syrian police. "366 
At many times Iraq deceived the UN and there was many corrupt and greedy 
businessmen in Eastern Europe and Western Europe as well as Asia and the Arab 
world to supply Iraq's demands of illegal military supplies while the neighboring 
states acted as trafficking channels of smuggled goods. Ultimate destination was 
Jordan, Lebanon or Syria using Palestinians, Lebanese, and Jordanian 
businessmen as a cover purchasers and from there these businessmen help 
smuggles the illegal goods through the land border to the hand of the Iraqi regime. 
Besides the oil smuggling which was thriving and generating assured additional 
sources of revenue for Iraq, in several cases, many individuals had been caught 
smuggling military and dual-use products to Iraq. Leading German news weekly, 
Der Spiegel, reported that: "investigators suspect Iraq attempted to buy machines 
that could be used to make large-calibre guns from German firms. "367 
News of similar cases was aired, concerning possible arms deals between 
Ukrainian and Swiss companies with Iraq. A report by the Wisconsin Project on 
Nuclear Arms Control confirmed: "The Iraqi Government has had little difficulty 
in securing the material it needs to rebuild weapons sites despite United Nations 
sanctions. " The Report stated: "the Iraqi Government has developed a highly 
sophisticated smuggling network which has made a nonsense of the whole idea of 
sanctions. " The authors of the Report declared: "the Iraqis often use businessmen 
in Jordan to buy weapons components from Eastern European defence 
manufacturers. The components are paid for the proceeds of smuggled Iraqi oil, 
366 The New York Times, 26 April 1999. 
367 ýý 8 December 2001 
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and appear to be destined for Jordan, but when they arrive they are driven across 
the Iraqi border in trucks. "368 
Most significantly, US Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, conceded that 
sanctions had failed in preventing Iraq from acquiring dual-use products and 
military technology, even though it was under embargo: "Quite apart from what is 
permitted and not permitted, there is a great deal that is moving across their 
border, and it is common knowledge in the world that Iraq has an enormous 
"3 appetite for weapons of mass destruction and military capabilities. 64 
Moreover, the Guardian spoke of a Western report that accused Eastern European 
countries-such as Serbia, Bulgaria, Ukraine, and Belarus-of illicit arms trade with 
Iraq. "Yugoslavia is the hub for east European arms smugglers and military 
experts who have been supplying Saddam Hussein with crucial equipment and 
know-how... Bulgaria admitted last week the Terem plant in Turgovishte had been 
sending armoured vehicles and spare parts to Iraq via Syria, while Belarus, under 
the anti-western authoritarian President Alexander Lukashenko, has been 
supplying Baghdad with missile expertise and machinery which can be adapted 
for military use. 070 
Thus it was no surprise that despite years of sanctions and weapons inspections, 
the Iraqi President confirmed that his country's success in circumventing 
sanctions: "Conditions in Iraq have this year become better than previous years, 
economically and in our capacity to face up the challenges and confront the 
Americans. Our military capabilities are now bigger. Battle is continuing on the 
economic, political and military fields. We are convinced we will be 
victorious. "371 In fact, Iraq was proud to announce that it had launched successful 
tests on three new missiles despite sanctions, called Ababil and Al Samoud 1 and 
Al Samoud 2. Later, Hans Blix and his new inspection team, UNMOVIC, found 
in 2003 that Iraq's Al Samoud 2 missiles had a capacity of more than 150KM 
368 BBC 18 June 2001. 
369 AT; P, 10 May 2002. 
370 Ian Traynor & Nicholas Wood "Eastern Europe Arms Saddam" The guardian, 25 November, 
2002. 
371 AIT, 22 August 2001. 
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which was prohibited by the UN Security Council Resolutions. This discovery 
clearly indicated that Iraq despite the years of sanctions was able to acquire the 
prohibited materials and know-how to develop missiles that could possibly 
threatens the Middle East region and the American troops in the Arabian Gulf. 
5.4 Summary 
In summary, it is easy to understand why the comprehensive economic sanctions 
collapsed and lost their logic and effectiveness internationally. In this chapter 
also, particular attention was given to key European countries, Russia, and to the 
issue of policy differences and national interests between Europe and the United 
States: 
The past two chapters have shown how Iraq triumphed in its battle to break out of 
the isolation brought on it through UN sanctions imposed in 1990. It established 
how key actors and Iraq managed to restore diplomatic, economic, and strategic 
ties with its neighbours and the international community as whole. These were 
solid and significant gains. Instead of behaving like the man who lost the Gulf 
War, the re-integration of Saddam into the world oil market and the subsequent 
commercial and diplomatic relations, in addition to the Palestinian uprising, the 
policy rifts across the Atlantic coupled with the smuggling networks, all allowed 
the Iraqi regime to emerge strengthened regionally and globally in the battle to 
undermine the multilateral comprehensive economic sanctions. 
All these commercial interests and the oil power of Iraq, in addition to the 
region's strategic developments, have created a climate in the region and 
worldwide that questioned increasingly the logic of maintaining these constantly 
undermined sanctions. What have been identified in the past two chapters were 
pivotal moments in the history of sanctions that have helped Iraq out of its 
economic siege and diplomatic isolation; the main pillars of an effective 
multilateral comprehensive economic sanction. 
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In their book, Cortright and Lopez illustrated the American predicament in the 
UN on Iraq, which led to the collapse of the multilateral comprehensive economic 
sanctions: 
After more than eleven years of continuing sanctions, the United 
Nations has been unable to achieve its objectives in Iraq. The 
sanctions have constrained Iraq's military capabilities, but they have 
not succeeded in convincing Saddam Hussein's government to 
comply fully with the UN mandate on disarming weapons of mass 
destruction. On the contrary, Iraqi defiance of UN policy has 
deepened and become more strident frontline states, Iraq has 
aggressively pursued policies to undermine the sanctions, and 
international compliance has steadily eroded. Unauthorized trade has 
increased, and commercial and transportation links with Baghdad 
have multiplied. 372 
The authors showed how Iraq's friends at the UN, notably Russia, France, and 
China, stood as an obstacle in front any further pressure on Saddam regime: 
Moscow called for a partial lifting of sanctions as a means of 
acknowledging the progress achieved and encouraging further 
cooperation from Baghdad. Such a step would have been in keeping 
with cooperation theory, which emphasizes the importance of 
reciprocating concessions. When the target of coercive pressure 
complies with the sender's demands, however grudgingly, a reciprocal 
gesture to ease coercive pressure can help to encourage further 
cooperation. The United States rejected proposals for easing sanctions 
pressure, however, showing little interest in applying this principle in 
Iraq. Nor did Iraq provide any indication that it was interested in 
cooperation on inspections. The policy options on Iraq were reduced 
to Iraqi obstinacy and US bombing. 373 
372 Cortright & Lopez (2002), p. 21. 
373 Ibid., pp. 25-26. 
215 
At the same time, the authors acknowledged that: "By early 2000, it was no longer 
accurate to describe UN policy as an oil embargo. Iraqi oil exports were not 
prohibited" adding, "by the fall of 2000, daily oil production was between 2.6 and 
2.8 million barrels, levels approaching the rates before the Gulf War. Oil exports 
revenues during the second half of 2000 were nearly $10 billion-hardly what one 
would call an oil embargo. 074 
The authors conceded that: "By summer 2000, UN sanctions in Iraq were 
unravelling, " accurately concluding that this "was partly the result of the 
inevitable erosion that occurs with sanctions that have been maintained for such 
an inordinately long period. It was also due to factors specifically associated with 
this case: continuing divisions among the permanent members of the Security 
Council, widespread public concern for humanitarian suffering in Iraq, and the 
Baghdad regime's elaborate and multi-pronged efforts to subvert sanctions 
compliance. "375 
They highlighted a vital point when they pointed that even the monitoring of 
sanctions collapsed: "Further evidence of the erosion of sanctions came in 
October 2000, when the government of Jordan ordered a halt to the inspection of 
Iraqi-bound cargo arriving at the port of Aqaba. The inspections at Aqaba dated 
from 1994, when the UN hired Lloyd's Register to monitor goods destined for 
Iraq. These dockside inspections were a substitute for maritime inspection, which 
had caused delays and increased costs for shippers. Jordan gave no explanation 
for its decision to halt the inspections by Lloyd's Register, although it indicated at 
the time that new arrangements would be provided. A year later, the monitoring of 
Iraqi-bound cargo had not resumed. The end of cargo monitoring at Aqaba, 
combined with the departure of UNSCOM inspectors from Iraq, left the United 
Nations with no means of determining whether Iraq was importing military 
equipment and rebuilding its weapons capability. "376 
374 Ibid., p. 28. 
375 Ibid., p. 32. 376 Ibid., p. 34. 
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These Iraqi political gains caused both by the greed of the business community 
and economic considerations had led to many bargaining, conciliatory gestures, 
diplomatic overtures, and negotiations with Baghdad, which subsequently eased 
the pressure of sanctions on Saddam and ultimately led to their collapse. Baghdad 
did not comply fully with UN Resolutions as sanctions rules demanded, and relied 
solely instead on strategies of entangling the world business community in 
lucrative deals, smuggling networks, and obstruction and confrontation methods 
with UNSCOM, taking advantage of the Middle East crisis, and exploiting 
Security Council divisions and ideological differences. The result was a 
weakening of international and regional political support for sanctions on Iraq. 
Saddam Hussein confirmed that his country was winning the battle of sanctions: 
"Westerners are saying that the economic situation of Iraqis, despite the sanctions, 
is better than that of the Egyptians, and that Iraq has benefited from 
sanctions... and improved itself in the propaganda war against US policy. "377 
What follows is essentially a moral and traumatic dilemma arising from the 
humanitarian catastrophe that had resulted from comprehensive economic 
sanctions. Thus the following chapter will examine another aspect of the dc- 
containment of Iraq: the humanitarian moral challenge of the comprehensive 
economic sanctions. 
377 AP-, 25 May 2002. 
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6. INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION AND 
SANCTIONS 
"Starvation of civilian as a method of warfare is prohibited"378 
"The US should stop pretending that the sanctions have nothing to do with the 
dire public health crisis confronting millions of Iraqis. "379 
This chapter will argue that the humanitarian moral predicament resulting from 
the sanctions haunted the United States and the pro-sanctions lobby, and helped to 
break the walls of the economic and political siege on Iraq. To illustrate this point, 
this chapter will explore at and focus on how public opinion, the church, peace 
groups, the UN officials and others influenced and helped bring about the de- 
containment of Iraq. 
Enormous suffering and many deaths were the direct results of sanctions. They 
impoverished the people and reduced them to mere survivors of the daily hardship 
of sanctions adding to the misery and tyranny of Saddam's rule. There were those 
in the United States who had hoped that by pushing the people too far, the chances 
of a military coup aided by a popular discontent against the government to topple 
it would be more likely. This backfired. Thus, after some time, the ethical 
question over their impact on the civilian population was very hard to ignore. De- 
containment of Saddam regime was the result. 
378 Geneva Protocol I, Article 54. 
37 Hannah Megally, Executive Director, Middle East and North Africa Division, Human Rights 
Watch. UN Security Council Must Ease Iraq Crisis: A letter sent to the Security Council by 
Human Rights Watch and five other organizations, March 23,2000. 
www, hrw. orp-/Vrcss/2000/03/--iraQO323. htm 
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Table 6.1 UNICEF basic indicators on Iraq 
Under-5 mortality rate 
per 1000 births 1960 171 
2001 133 
Infant mortality rated 
(under 1) per 1000 births 1960 117 
2001 107 
Total-population 
(thousands) 
2001 23584 
Annual no. of births 
(thousands) 
2001 823 
Annual no. of under-5 
deaths (thousands) 
2001 109 
GNI per capita (US $) 2001 2170 
Life expectancy at birth 
(years) 
2001 63 
Total adult literacy rate 2000 58 
Net primary school 
enrolment/attendance (°Io) 
1995-2001 93 
Source: http: //www. unicef. orgLinfobycotintry/ir,, ig statistics. html 
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Table 6.2 UNICEF estimates on child and infant mortality rates for Iraq 
Year Child mortality rates 
for under 5 (U5MR) 
Infant mortality rates 
(IMR) 
1960 171 117 
1970 127 90 
1980 83 63 
1990 50 40 
1995 117 98 
1998 125 103 
Source: http: //www. unicef. orp/reseval/cmrirq. html 
Table 6.3 Reported mortality in children less than 5 years old from selected 
causes in Iraq (1990-1994) 
Year No. Per 100 000 
1990 8903 257 
1991 27473 884 
1992 46933 1460 
1993 49762 1495 
1994 52905 1536 
Source: Ministry of Health, Government of Iraq (Northern Governorates 
excluded). http: //www. who. int/disasters/repo/5249. htmi 
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Table 6.4 Percentage of low birth weight (LBW) births to total births In Iraq 
(1990-1994) 
Year % Low birth weight (LBW) 
1990 4.5 
1991 10.8 
1992 17.6 
1993 19.7 
1994 21.1 
Source: Ministry of Health, Government of Iraq (Northern Governorates 
excluded). http: //www. who. int/disasters/repo/5249. html 
Table 6.5 Shortage of food in Iraq, 1995/1996 (000 tons) 
Commodity Estimated 
production 
Total 
requirements 
Shortage/import 
requirements 
% shortage 
of total 
requirements 
Cereals 2192 5633 3441 61.1 
Pulses 50 120 70 57.7 
Vegetable oil 100 298 198 66.4 
Red/Poultry 
meat 
114 454 340 74.9 
Fish 5 62 57 91.9 
Eggs 
(million) 
150 1966 1816 92.4 
Milk N. A. 372 223 59.9 
Tea NIL 62 62 100.0 
Sugar 80 814 734 90.0 
Baby Milk Negligible 43 43 100.0 
Source: Evaluation of food and nutrition situation in Iraq- FAO 1995. 
http: //www. who. int/disasters/repo/5249. htm) 
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Table 6.6 Selected indicators in Iraq before sanctions, 1988-1989 
Health indicators 
-Birth rate 43 per 1000 population 
-Crude death rate 8.0 per 1000 population 
-Infant mortality rate 52 per 1000 live births 
-Under 5 mortality rate 94 per 1000 live births 
-Maternal mortality rate 160 per 100,000 live births 
-Low birth weight 5% (below 2.5 kg) 
I -Life expectancy 66 years I 
Socioeconomic indicators 
-GNP per capita (US$) US$ 2,800 
-% female literacy 85% 
-% population with health care 93% 
I -% population with safe water 90% 1 
-% pregnant women with maternity care 78% 
-% pregnant women with trained birth attendant during delivery 86% 
Source: The health conditions of the population in Iraq since the Gulf crisis, 
World Health Organization (WHO). March 1996. 
http: //www. who. int/disasters/repo/. 249. html 
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6.1 The humanitarian minefield 
Saddam's campaign to beat sanctions took advantage of the ordeal of sanctions- 
related suffering of the innocent Iraqi people. The failure of world governments 
to put the vulnerable and innocent at the forefront of their policy contributed 
greatly to the Iraqi propaganda campaign. The distress about the humanitarian 
consequences in Iraq had become high. Sanctions were blamed as the direct factor 
causing the humanitarian, health and sanitation tragedy in Iraq. The Iraqi leader 
managed to use this factor to fuel his propaganda machine and win more 
concessions from the world to ease the economic sanctions, 
All the American administrations and British governments repeatedly insisted that 
their quarrel was not with the Iraqi people but rather with the political leaders in 
Baghdad. The magnitude and human costs of sanctions had resulted in much 
suffering and many deaths among the civilian population of Iraq while leaving its 
political leaders entrenched, prosperous, and powerful. Ordinary Iraqis could not 
help but see this as an effort to destroy them and keep them backward. This also 
pushed the world grass roots' community to oppose and demand the change of the 
sanctions policy, which resulted in further compromises through lifting more 
restrictions to the benefit of Saddam's regime only. 
For example, Iraqi media told the people that what UNSCOM got from the 
revenues of the oil-for-food deal was much more than an ordinary Iraqi benefits 
from its revenues. Saddam's propaganda machine told ordinary Iraqis that each 
inspector, for example, earned more than $100 thousand per year extracted from 
the revenues of the oil for food deal. The care costs of their sniffer dogs, as well 
as their travel expenses, were also extracted from the oil for food deal Iraqis were 
told. Ordinary Iraqis were made to believe that this money was being robbed from 
their own oil revenues and future wealth . 
380 Thus, resentment increased against 
UNSCOM, UN, and the sanctions system rather than Saddam, especially when 
they witnessed their daily suffering and silent deaths because of the lack of food, 
money, employment, education, or health facilities due to years of UN sanctions 
380 Various programmes from the Iraqi Satellite Channel, 2002. ' 
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and wars. This shift in resentment did not help to bring a popular revolt with army 
coup backing against Saddam as economic sanctions' advocates had hoped. 
Sanctions advocates did not realize that the longer this situation continued, the 
more ammunition Saddam gained for his propaganda machine, and the more 
counterproductive sanctions became. 
This chapter will concludes that the humanitarian situation in Iraq was employed 
by the Iraqis to further divide the Security Council, win more public opinion, and 
erode the comprehensive strict sanctions regime of 1991. While it is very true that 
Saddam hypocritically used Iraqis' agony and humiliation for his own political 
agenda while his ruthless rule was also a major cause of Iraqi deaths and 
humiliation, the fact remained, however, that UN sanctions was the main reason 
behind the daily suffering, humiliation, agony, displacement and death of millions 
of Iraqis. Sanctions came to add much more agony to an already bad situation 
under the tyranny of Saddam and his reckless adventures. 
Prior to UN sanctions, Iraq was a prosperous country in terms of infrastructure 
and modernization when compared to other Muslim countries in the region. Iraqi 
citizens had greater access to modem health facilities, high standards of living, 
free education system, modern infrastructure in terms of electricity; clean water; 
save roads; international hotels; three international airports, law tax with a reliable 
banking and insurance system, low inflation, foreign investment, and the Iraqi 
Dinar was strong against the American dollar. There were over three dollars to the 
Dinar. Under sanctions, however, $1 equalled 2000 and sometimes 2500 Dinars, a 
sign of hyperinflation. In addition, Iraqi women enjoyed gender equality in the 
work, social and education fields. After the Gulf War of 1991, this previously 
confident country was reduced to a poor, depressed country, where sanctions 
caused acute consequences, Many human rights NGOs reported on Iraqis' daily 
agony; they spoke of a generation of Iraqis suffering in all spheres and deprived of 
their basic needs. All their reports highlighted that under sanctions a generation of 
Iraqis had no jobs, have never worked, left without education, low wages, no 
modern health system, no clean water, and with no, human developments or future 
perspective. They pointed to other detrimental 'impacts of the international 
economic sanctions such'as the increased corruption in all walks of life, hyper- 
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inflation, school-dropouts, child labour, child illnesses, child deaths, organized 
crime, child prostitution, decline in the standards of nutrition, and increased levels 
of stress and anxiety among teen-age and women. Sanctions deprived ordinary 
Iraqis from their economic and health rights. In addition, it humiliated the dignity 
of Iraqis when at the same time Saddam was depriving them of their political and 
human rights. Innocent people were sandwiched between these two problems. 
However some casualties remained invisible. Sanctions had caused the exodus of 
nearly 5 million Iraqis out of a population of 22 million. They were Iraq's most 
valued trained professionals: the doctors, engineers, scientists, businessmen, 
lawyers, teachers, artists, pilots, poets, archaeologists, and writers. This was the 
most significant part of the population that could actually have been critical of 
Saddam and might have played an important role in the establishment of civil 
society. Sanctions had also hit the Christian community hard, as well as the 
Muslims of Iraq. Throughout its history, Iraq had never known such a massive 
exodus of its population. In their search for livelihood, they filled the cities around 
the world. Today they can be seen from America to Australia. No one in Iraq had 
ever believed that Iraqis would reach places such as New Zealand. 
Another ironic episode from the sanctions' era was the sanctions on literature and 
scientific periodicals. It is said in the Middle East that Cairo writes, Beirut prints, 
and Baghdad reads. The ordinary Iraqi is considered to be an avid reader and 
information seeker in the Arab World. During the sanctions' era, Iraqis were 
denied the right to read the latest literature and periodicals. The ironic part was 
that these same books and periodicals, which the ordinary people were denied due 
to sanctions, were smuggled to Saddam and his regime through regional states by 
smugglers and businessmen. 
Many accounts spoke of the collapse of the middle class in Iraq. The post-Gulf 
War conditions and the daily burdens of sanctions all undermined the middle class 
and reduced it to poverty, debt and deprivation. Family income declined due to 
loss of business, closures of factories, low wages in the public sector, and 
hyperinflation. People were forced to sell valuable books, cars and sentimental 
gifts in open markets. Professors became taxi drivers. On the other hand, the 
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suffering of the poor became even worse and particularly acute especially in the 
southern cities of Basra, Najaf and Nassryia. 
Most scholars and humanitarian reports agreed that sanctions forced the Iraqi 
population to depend on the centrally controlled rationing system. People also 
competed for government favours, co-opted through a governmental system of 
carrot and stick or punishments and privileges. In addition, sanctions have had a 
negative impact of the advancement of democracy. After the Iran-Iraq war, 
Saddam was talking of opening up in political sphere, but the Gulf War of 1991 
and sanctions killed that pipe dream. After the Gulf War, the government used the 
sanctions as a pretext to delay indefinitely any political changes and managed to 
employ the sanctions as a mobilizing tool to rally suffering Iraqis behind the flag 
through shifting the blame of the collective suffering from the dictatorial regime 
in Baghdad and placing it on the United States. Tariq Aziz, Iraq's deputy Prime 
minister, said on many occasions that it was impossible to open up freedom and 
democracy under such a bleak economic situation. The Iraqi government saw 
democracy coupled with sanctions as the beginning of the end of their tyrannical 
rule. 
Interestingly, sanctions and continued allied bombing, whilst not really putting an 
end to Saddam's rule once and for all, had pushed a large number of the Iraqi 
population towards stronger religious assertion: "There is a widely acknowledged 
trend toward greater Islamic religiosity. External expression is found in women's 
dress. In those parts of society where women used to appear publicly in Western 
dress (predominantly in middle-class circles), it has become more common for 
women at least to wear scarves covering their heads. Where women had 
preciously worn scarves (mainly in communities that had recently moved to the 
towns from the countryside), it has become more common for them to wear the 
"3s1 full black abaya. 
381 Tim Niblock: (2001) pp. 180-181. 
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6.2 United Nations and NGOs' reports speed up dc- 
containment 
After a decade of sanctions, the human costs were horrendous on the vulnerable 
civilian population. This devastating situation, even if unintended, raised ethical, 
moral and legal questions around the world. 
Pressure was immense on the sanctions regime and took different forms and ways: 
1. International advocacy network 
2. Using information and the Internet as a political weapon 
3. Mobilizing morality and opposition on national and international bases relying 
on figures, facts and religion 
4. Grassroots campaigns to transform popular attitudes 
5. Raising awareness of the impact sanctions had on all aspects of Iraqi life 
6. Highlighting details on the disastrous effect on children, women, and the 
elderly 
7. Publicly challenging and attacking the general concept of sanctions as a 
contrary concept to international law, the Convention of Human Rights, and the 
United Nations Charter 
8. Through the United Nations Secretary-General and UN staff members' political 
influence and public statements 
9. Donation for the children of Iraq 
10. Sanctions-busting delegations to Iraq 
11. Writing letters to MP's and Congressmen, leaflets, and arranging speakers 
meetings 
12. And finally, by establishing groups that is solely dedicated to launching 
campaigns against sanctions in major Western countries including the United 
States and United Kingdom. 
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These general points can be clearly seen below through the various ways the anti- 
sanctions lobby exerted pressure on the comprehensive sanctions on Iraq: 
1) The immense criticism from international figures, which created a fierce anti- 
sanctions lobby in the West and the Arab world. These figures included Ramsey 
Clark, Mararita Papandreou, Ahmed Ben Bella, Miguel D'Escoto, Hans Von 
Sponeck, Denis L Halliday, Boutros Boutros Ghali, Kofi Annan, Felicity 
Arbuthnot, Kathy Kelly, John Pilger's, Noam Chomsky, George Galloway, 
Archbishop Giuseppe Lazzarotto, Auxiliary Bishop Thomas Gumbleton and 
Father Jean-Marie Benjamin. In addition to the Vatican, the Catholic peace group, 
Pax Christi USA, the Catholic Church, Canadian Church groups including Inter- 
Church Action, the Church of England, the World Council of Churches, United 
Methodist Church, Orthodox church, The National Council of Churches, British 
charity groups, charities, parliamentarians and associations. Most of these other 
anti-sanctions groups derived from North America and the United Kingdom, 
including groups like Iraq Action Coalition, International Action Center, Voice in 
the Wilderness, Fellowship of Reconciliation, Citizens Concerned for the People 
of Iraq, the Campaign Against Sanctions in Iraq (which was launched at the 
University of Cambridge in 1997, Britain Against Sanctions on Iraq, Leeds 
Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq (based at Leeds University), Manchester 
Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq (based at Manchester University), Canadian 
Network to End Sanctions on Iraq, and University of Western Ontario Movement 
to End the War Against Iraq. 
These world figures and organizations saw that the years of sanctions did not 
constrain Saddam or change his behaviour, but, rather had a grave impact on the 
weakest, innocent members of the population. They viewed the disturbing civilian 
sanctions-related-suffering in Iraq as a grave violation of the UN basic principles 
of human rights, the Declaration of Human Rights, The Convention on the Rights 
of Child in particular and international law in general. 
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Pope John Paul II too added his voice and prayer against Iraq sanctions: "The sons 
and daughters of the (Catholic) church in Iraq, and all the Iraqi people who are 
being so severely tried by the continuing international embargo, never cease to be 
present in my thoughts... .1 assure all those who arc suffering, especially the 
women, children and elderly, of my prayerful support. "382 While nearly a year 
later the Pontiff told prelates of the Chaldean Catholic Church visiting from Iraq 
and other Middle Eastern countries: "I implore the Lord to enlighten the 
understanding and hearts of those nations responsible (for the embargo), so that 
they may open in favour of re-establishing a just and lasting peace in this region, ". 
In addition, the Pope called for the lifting of sanctions and named Friday a day of 
fasting for Catholics around the world against the suffering of Iraqis from the 
sanctions. 383 
Moreover, the Catholic aid agency Cafod also rejected sanctions "Whereas the 
Iraqi elite have survived the Gulf war and the sanctions, the poor people of Iraq 
have continued to suffer and die, "384 
The long years of sanctions proved to be a cruel instrument resulting in 
considerable hardship and harm violating every principle of the Iraqi people's 
basic human dignity and human rights causing a worldwide outrage and adding 
energy for the calls against the comprehensive sanctions, demanding the lifting of 
most restrictions on trade and investment to address the country's continuing 
humanitarian crisis. This was clearly reflected in a letter sent to the Security 
Council from Human Rights Watch, a human rights group based in the United 
States, which urged the United Nations Security Council to address the 
humanitarian situation in Iraq in a transparent and open way. In this way, asking 
the Security Council to lift most sanctions on non-military trade and investment: 
"We are writing to you to express our deep concern about the commitment in the 
Security Council to improving the humanitarian crisis in Iraq. We urge the 
Council, in its March 24 debate on the most recent report of the Secrctary-General 
382 DM, 19 March 2000. 
393 AP, 11 December 2001. 
384 Ian Black & David Sharrock "Aid workers lambast sanctions" The, Ouar jj i, 23 December 
1998. 
231 
on Iraq (S12000/208), to address this emergency in a thorough and transparent 
manner, to show determination to implement the humanitarian provisions of 
UNSCR 986,1153 and 1284 (1999), and to accord the necessary priority to 
fundamental humanitarian and human rights principles in the design and operation 
of the Iraq sanctions' regime. Our views are based on our long experience with 
Iraqi issues, and months of dialogue with UN agencies, diplomatic missions and 
other non-governmental organisations. We believe strongly that humanitarian and 
human rights principles have been consistently subordinated to political 
considerations in the Council's approach to Iraq. " The letter asked the UN 
Security Council to ease the comprehensive sanctions on Iraq: "the Security 
Council must do all in its power to protect the fundamental rights of the civilian 
population. We are therefore compelled to call for a radical redesign of the 
sanctions regime to make the sanctions more targeted, effective and credible. The 
current sanctions regime hurts the most vulnerable and fails to touch Iraq's 
political leaders. " It is vital to note that, in addition to Human Rights Watch, five 
other organizations also signed this letter, including Save the Children/UK. 385 
Over time, concern increased that the people were enduring the brunt and not the 
regime. International solidarity and support for sanctions-weakened. Iraq could 
persuade the international community that the innocent victims and suffering were 
directly linked to comprehensive economic sanctions, which created an 
international situation appropriate for easing the strict sanctions' regime of 1991. 
The human tragedy of sanctions placed the United Nations and the United States 
under huge public questioning. There is no doubt that the suffering of the Iraqi 
people encouraged a strong campaign for the lifting of sanctions. The message of 
all the groups illustrated above was simply that under sanctions, the people were 
dying. In the face of all these concerns and opposition to sanctions, the UN had 
little choice but to promote a bargaining process in which the US and Iraq tried to 
find a solution to the sanctions stalemate. Thus the UN established the oil-for- 
food deal and others which permitted Iraq to export and import more easily. 
Pressure on humanitarian grounds persuaded the Security Council to expand the 
385 U. N Security Council Must Ease Iraq Crisis, Press Rel ji , "Truman Rights Watch www, hrw. ore/press/2000/03/`ir, g0323, htm, 23 March 2000, 
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oil-for-food deal. This significantly weakened the sanctions regime to the benefit 
of oil-wealthy Saddam, who claimed: "On previous occasions we have said the 
blockade will not be lifted by a unanimous UN Security Council 
Resolution.... Rather, it will erode the more Iraqis remain firm in their stance. "386 
Moreover, this victory for the Iraqis was culminated by the numerous visits in the 
past decade of many, among others, French, German, Dutch, British, Spanish, 
Russian, Canadian, American, and Arab lawmakers, religious leaders, and 
parliamentarians to assess or challenge the economic embargo on Iraq. 
Another problem for the Western world came from the large numbers of Iraqis 
immigrating from the daily economic hardship of sanctions and the brutality of 
Saddam's regime. This presented the West with a moral challenge and economic 
strain. Statistics from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees put Iraqis at the 
top of people asking for asylum in the West. "Statistics on asylum applications in 
29 industrialized countries for the first nine months of this year (2002) show that 
the top country of origin of asylum seekers from January to September this year 
was Iraq. "387 This showed how the oil-for-food deal was not sufficient to relieve 
completely the sanctions-suffering Iraqis however helping only Saddam and his 
inner circle to stay entrenched in power giving them power and legitimacy. The 
lack of UN enforcement of its Resolutions on human rights' inside Iraq against 
Saddam regime also pushed Iraqis to immigrate. 
2) The most significant challenge to the pro-sanctions lobbyist and the UN came 
from organizations affiliated with the UN such as UNICEF, FAO and WHO. For 
example, UNICEF (a member of the UN family) described sanctions as the main 
problem behind the suffering of people "Many problems of nutrition and health 
can arise not just from military but also from economic warfare-as the outside 
world tries to put pressure on errant regimes. While the United Nations finds itself 
caring for war-torn communities, the Security Council is imposing economic 
386 j Q. July 1998, 
3s' Office e of the Spokesman for the Secretary-General, United Nations, 222a n. rg, 6 Uccembcr 
2002. 
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sanctions that create many of the same problems for the poor and vulnerable-- 
leaving the real targets virtually untouched. "388 
UNICEF Reports on infant and child mortality in Iraq provided the world with 
shocking realities of the humanitarian costs of sanctions. UNICEF's findings in 
1999 on child and maternal mortality in Iraq, the first such study since 1991, 
indicated that: "in heavily-populated southern and central parts of the country, 
children under five are dying at more than twice the rate they were ten years ago. 
UNICEF Executive Director Carol Bellamy said the findings reveal an ongoing 
humanitarian emergency. " This considerable hardship among Iraq's poor and 
vulnerable was clearly revealed by that UNICEF survey, which showed that "in 
the south and centre of Iraq-home to 85 per cent of the country's population- 
under-5 mortality more than doubled from 56 deaths per 1000 live births (1984- 
1989) to 131 deaths per 1000 live births (1994.1999). likewise infant mortality--- 
defined as the death of children in their first year-increased from 47 per 1000 
live births to 108 per 1000 live births within the same time frame. The surveys 
indicate a maternal mortality ratio in the south and centre of 294 deaths per 
100,000 live births over the ten-year period 1989 to 1999. i3$9 
The World Health Organization (WHO) also produced reports and press releases 
to affect the sanctions regime. One such press release warned of the immanent 
collapse of the Iraqi health system. Dr. Hiroshi Nakajima, Director-General of the 
WHO, who visited Iraq for four-days to examine the oil-for-food programme 
came out criticizing sanctions and its effects on the health System and well being 
of Iraq. After visiting Najaf, Kerbela, Babil and Baghdad provinces he witnessed 
that these four provinces health facilities "suffer from a series of problems caused 
by lack of medicines and essential supplies as well as breakdowns in equipment 
and other logistical and managerial problems. Erratic electrical current is a major 
cause of breakdowns in the cold chain. " The visitors observed, "Government drug 
warehouses and pharmacies have few stocks of medicines and medical supplies. 
In a large suburb of Baghdad, the Director-General saw queues of patients waiting 
388 UNICEF Report on the state of the world's children 1996, www. unice f orc/, 1996, 389 Iraq surveys show 'humanitarian emergency'. 12 August 1999 
www. unicef. or newsli ee/99pr29. htm 
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to receive medicine. Stocks of medicine received for the month of February 
represented 30% of the normal needs of patients attending this facility. " Adding, 
"Basic medical materials, such as auto-destruct syringes, bandages or dressings 
are not available. " According to WHO Director-General, "The consequences of 
this situation are causing a near breakdown of the health care system, which is 
reeling under the pressure of being deprived of medicine, other basic supplies and 
"39o spare parts. 
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations followed a similar 
line in trying to exert pressure on the Security Council through its special reports 
and press releases to expand the oil-for-food deal. In a mission to Iraq the 
organization produced a report which highlighted the malnutrition spread in the 
country especially among the vulnerable groups and called the oil-far-food 
programme not completely adequate to elevate the suffering of the people and 
requested for investment in the water and agriculture sectors. 
The FAO report pointed, "Perhaps the most-far reaching recommendation for both 
agriculture and nutrition concerns the need for economic rehabilitation and 
development throughout the whole country. Unless increased purchasing power is 
generated and greater investment is made in agriculture, additional and necessary 
high-quality proteins and bio-available mico-nutrients will be beyond the means 
of many, and nutritional problems will persist, despite the improved ration under 
SCR 986. " Adding, "Of major importance is the severe deterioration of the water 
and sanitation system in Iraq. Water availability in its widest sense involving 
drinking water, irrigation, water-logging, salinity and sewage disposal is 
absolutely fundamental to the future of agricultural productivity and health of the 
population. It is recommended that high priority be given to sustainable 
rehabilitation of the water and sanitation system, otherwise waterborne diseases, 
including nutritional marasmus, will remain a major problem despite improved 
food availability. s391 
390 World Health Organization Press Release, W110/16, httn'/lwww, who inti, 27 February 1997. 391 The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (PAO) Special Report on Iraq, 
bttV: //www. fao. orgLp, iews/onp-lish/-, ilertcslsrirg997. htm, 3 October 1997. 
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Then the pressure came from within the Security Council. The Iraqi predicament 
was clearly summed up by a report of the Security Council Panel on Humanitarian 
Issues. The Security Council established the Panel on 30 January 1999, to inform 
the Council, as some of its members (notably Russia, France and China) were 
increasingly concerned over the humanitarian situation in Iraq. The Panel stated: 
"According to the information presented to the panel, at the end of the last decade, 
Iraq's social and economic indicators were generally above the regional and 
developing country averages. GDP in 1989 stood at 75.5 billion for a population 
of 18.3 million. GDP. Growth had averaged 10.4% from 1974 to 1980. By 1988 
GDP per capita totalled 3.510 US dollars. The concerted push for economic 
growth from the mid-seventies onward had benefited the country's infrastructure. " 
The Panel added: "As highlighted by FAO, at that time Iraq had one of the highest 
per capita foods' availability indicators in the region. Dietary energy supply 
averaged 3.120 kilocalories per capita/per day. Due to the relative prosperity Iraq 
had the capacity to import large quantities of food. " 
The Panel findings showed clearly that Iraq's health system was large and 
efficient prior to sanctions: "According to WHO, prior to 1991 health care reached 
approximately 97% of the urban population and 78% of rural residents. The health 
care system was based on an extensive expanding network of health facilities 
linked up by reliable communications and a large fleet of service vehicles and 
ambulances... A major reduction of young child mortality took place from 1960 
to 1990, with the infant mortality rate at 65 per 1.000 live births in 1989. " The 
report added: "UNICEF indicates that a national welfare system was in place to 
assist orphans or children with disabilities and support the poorest families. " 
Moreover, the Panel report indicated that the educational system and policy of 
Iraq was well developed: "As described by UNICEF, the Government of Iraq 
made sizable investments in the education sector from the mid-1970s until 1990. 
According to UNESCO, the educational policy included provision for 
scholarships, research facilities and medical support for students. By 1989, the 
combined Primary and secondary enrolment ratio stood at 75% (slightly above the 
average for all developing countries at 70%, according to the Human 
Development Report for 1991). Illiteracy had been reduced to 20% by 1987. " 
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In addition, the report showed that: "Before 1991, the South and Centre of Iraq 
had a well-developed water and sanitation system comprising over two hundred 
water treatment plants ("wtp's") for urban areas and 1200 compact wtp's to serve 
rural areas, as well as an extensive distribution network. WHO estimates that 90% 
of the population had access to an abundant quantity of safe drinking water. There 
were modem mechanical means of collection and sanitary disposal. " 
The report concluded that the Gulf War and the effect of economic sanctions have 
devastated the Iraqi economy and the social fabric. "After the Gulf War and under 
the effect of sanctions, it is estimated that Iraq's GDP may have fallen by nearly 
two-thirds in 1991, owing to an 85% decline in oil production and the devastation 
of the industrial and services sectors of the economy... Agricultural growth has 
since been erratic and manufacturing output has all but vanished. According to 
figures provided by UNFPA, per capita income fell from 3.416 US dollar in 1984 
to 1,500 in 1991 and has decreased to less than 1.036 in 1998. Other sources 
estimate a decrease in per capita GDP to as low as 450 US dollars in 1995". As 
for the mortality rates the Panel reported: "As mentioned by UNFPA, the maternal 
mortality rate increased from 50/100.000 live births in 1989 to 117/100.000 in 
1997. The under-five child mortality rate increased from 30.2/1000 live births to 
97.2/1000 during the same period. Although figures for infant deaths are based on 
estimates that may involve a margin of error, the trend is one of sharp increases. 
The Population Division of DESA calculates that the infant mortality rate rose 
from 64/1.000 births in 1990 to 129/1.000 in 1995... Low birth weight babies 
(less than 2.5Kg) rose from 4% in 1990 to around a quarter of registered births in 
1997, due mainly to maternal malnutrition. UNFPA and other sources such as the 
International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, believe that 
as many as 70% of Iraqi women are suffering from anaemia. " 
The report then highlighted the problem that faced Iraqis concerning their daily 
dietary energy supplies, showing clearly that a lack in that supply had occurred. 
Under sanctions, many Iraqis lacked vitamins, minerals, and protein for health and 
growth especially children "The dietary energy supply had fallen from 3.120 to 
1.093 kilo calories per capita/per day by 1994-95. The prevalence of malnutrition 
in Iraqi children under five almost doubled from 1991 to 1996 (from 12% to 
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23%). Acute malnutrition in the Center/South rose from 3% to 11% for the same 
age bracket. Results of a nutritional status survey conducted on 15.000 children 
under 5 years of age in April 1997 indicated that almost the whole young child 
population was affected by a shift in their nutritional status towards malnutrition. " 
The report added: "Since 1991, hospitals and health centers have remained 
without repair and maintenance. The functional capacity of the health care system 
has degraded further by shortages of water and power supply, lack of 
transportation and the collapse of the telecommunications system. Communicable 
diseases, such as water-borne diseases and malaria, which had been under control, 
came back as an epidemic in 1993 and have now become part of the endemic 
pattern of the precarious health situation, according to WHO. " 
After acknowledging the dire humanitarian situation in Iraq, the Panel addressed 
the accelerating decline in the educational sector: "School enrolment for all ages 
(6-23) has declined to 53%. According to a field survey conducted in 1993, as 
quoted by UNESCO, in Central and Southern Governorates, 83% of school 
buildings needed rehabilitation, with 8.613 out of 10.334 schools having suffered 
serious damages. ... The rising number of street children and children who work 
can be explained, in part, as a result of increasing rates of school drop-outs and 
repetition, as more families are forced to rely on children to secure household 
incomes. " 
In a world of communication, technologies, Internet, free trade and globalisation, 
imagine a day without electricity, heating, or water. A day where no hospital 
equipment can function, where the lack of oxygen, needle, and clean medical 
equipment can result in many preventable deaths, a day where no water pumps 
can operate, no lights at night, no lights in the streets, when hardly any ambulance 
available for emergencies- and so continues the litany of daily agony deprivation. 
This was Iraq for the past 13 years. This was the daily live in Iraq in the twenty 
first century. The Panel was very clear about this "The accelerating decline of the 
power sector has had acute consequences for the humanitarian situation. The total 
remaining installed capacity today is about 7.500 mw, but inadequate maintenance 
and poor operating conditions have reduced the power actually generated to about 
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half that figure at 3.500 mw. . . Power shortages have consequently worsened to up 
to 6 hours a day since July 1998. " 
The UN Panel findings stated that there had been an "increase in juvenile 
delinquency, begging and prostitution, anxiety about the future and lack of 
motivation, a rising sense of isolation bred by absence of contact with the outside 
world, the development of a parallel economy replete with profiteering and 
criminality, cultural and scientific impoverishment, disruption of family life. " 
One important point highlighted by the Panel was the control by Saddam's regime 
of the humanitarian supplies to the Iraqi people: "The dependence of the Iraqi 
population on humanitarian supplies had increased Government control over 
individual lives to the detriment of personal initiative and self-reliance. "392 
To add salt to injury another UN-commissioned report written by the Belgian law 
Professor, Marc Bossuyt, for the UN Sub-commission on Human Rights which 
concluded: "The theory behind economic sanctions is that economic pressure on 
civilians will translate into pressure on the government for change. This theory is 
bankrupt both legally and practically. " The report asserted that the situation in 
Iraq was "a humanitarian disaster comparable to the worst catastrophes of the past 
093 decades. 
3) The call for more humane and moral sanctions came from many others and in 
many different forms, It was important resignations in protest of the humanitarian 
situation in Iraq and the lack of the oil-for-food scheme to bring the salvation to 
the Iraqi people in their ordeal that had the wide publicity and significance in the 
UN war with itself on the issue of the Iraq sanctions. Denis Halliday, the former 
UN Assistant Secretary General and Chief UN Relief Coordinator for Iraq from 
1997- until he resigned in protest at sanctions in 1998 - was one such powerful 
voice against the continuation of sanctions on Iraq. In a speech at Harvard 
392 Report by a group of experts of the humanitarian Panel established by the Security Council 
concerning the humanitarian situation in Iraq. April 1999, wwvw. un. nrg/ cpt / in/, Office of the Iraq Programme, United Nation-oil for food. 
3'3 AP 16 August 2000. 
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University in the United States, he outlined vigorously his point that sanctions 
were not producing the intended results: "on the contrary, they were producing 
counterproductive consequences for Iraq, the region and the world as whole. I see 
the present sanctions' regime representing a certain bankruptcy of ideas, 
simplistic, unsuccessful, without the desired results. And I see United Nations 
sanctions representing unacceptable consequences for the innocent children and 
people of the country; individuals that certainly had nothing to do with the 
invasion of Kuwait. There can be no justification in my view for the death and 
malnutrition for which sanctions are responsible. " Halliday added: "We may not 
like the government in power, but that dislike cannot be allowed to empower the 
members of the Security Council to sustain a sanctions' regime that kills, 
destroys, and brings to ruin the lives of some of the twenty-three and a half 
million people. " Halliday stressed: "the civilian population, particularly infants 
and children, are being targeted, are being hit by United Nations sanctions with 
appalling consequences. The data on infant mortality is known. 094 
Another Senior UN official, Hans von Sponeck, previously the UN humanitarian 
co-ordinator for Iraq from 1998-2000, resigned and attacked sanctions: "As a UN 
official, I should not be expected to be silent to that which I recognise as a true 
human tragedy that needs to be ended ... How long the civilian population, which 
is totally innocent on all this, should be exposed to such punishment for 
something that they have never done? "395 There is no doubt that economic 
sanctions and their prolongation represented a moral dilemma to many, and thus 
came the wide international consensus and outrage against sanctions. It became a 
moral crisis where it became harder and harder for any nation to justify the 
continued suffering of a people by the need to contain and overthrow Saddam. 
Both Halliday and Von Sponeck made their anti-Iraq-sanctions' sentiments clear 
in a joint-article in the Guardian of London: "The current policy of economic 
sanctions has destroyed society in Iraq and caused the death of thousands, young 
and old. " They asked: "How much longer can democratically elected governments 
394 "Why I Resigned My UN Post in Protest of Sanctions". Denis Halliday- Public Speech at Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts, transcript recorded by Chris Nicholson of the Campaign for the Iraqi People, November S. 1998. 
395 
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hope to get away with justifying policies that punish the Iraqi people for 
something they did not do, through economic sanctions that target them in the 
hope that those who survive will overthrow the regime? Is international law only 
applicable to the losers? Does the UN security council only serve the powerful? " 
They added: "The uncomfortable truth is that the west is holding the Iraqi people 
hostage, in order to secure Saddam Hussein's compliance to ever-shifting 
demands. "396 
4) Moreover, the movement to end the sanctions against Saddam on moral 
grounds had grown even among the United States' legislatures and people. Here 
we are talking about the United States of America, Saddam's most implacable 
opponent and the driving force behind the long-term continuation of the sanctions. 
"A group of United States congressmen -both Democrats and Republicans- are 
putting pressure on the Clinton administration over its support of the United 
Nations economic sanctions against Iraq. " reported the BBC. David Bonior, a 
Democrat for Michigan, had called the embargo on Iraq "infanticide 
masquerading as policy" He added "our message is simple, we're saying: millions 
of children are suffering and we refuse to close our eyes to the slaughter of 
innocents. This embargo has not hurt Saddam Hussein or the pampered elite 
which supports him, but has been devastating for millions of Iraqi people, " 
Congressman Bonior was one of 70 United States legislators who signed a protest 
397 letter against sanctions calling for its end. 
At the same time, "Congressman Dennis J. Kucinich (D-0}1) and 25 members of 
Congress have sent a letter to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright asking to 
meet with her to discuss issues related to United States sanctions policy in Iraq, 
This effort is also supported by the American Public Health Association, the 
oldest and largest organization of public health professionals in the world, 
representing more than 50,000 members from over 50 occupations of public 
health. " The letter stated, "We feel that the gravity of the public health crisis 
396Denis Halliday & Hans Von Sponeck `7he Hostage Nation" The Ouardiln 29 November 2001. 
397 (,, 17 February 2000. 
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makes it urgent for us to rethink the sanctions policy at all levels, especially in 
regard to water purification materials, "398 
Ohio State University witnessed a loud disruption from American protesters 
against the economic sanctions and war on Iraq. This was the loud protest that 
was broadcasted on television when three of the highest ranking officials in the 
Clinton administration, US Secretary of Defence William Cohen, Secretary of 
State Madeleine Albright, and National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, struggled 
to explain the administration policy on Iraq when they started hearing the loud 
protests of "`1-2-3-4, We don't want no racist war' and `Liar! ' by about dozen 
activists. These protestors repeatedly interrupted Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright, Secretary of Defence William Cohen and National Security Advisor 
Sandy Berger. They had to plead from the stage for equal time as they hammered 
the point that Saddam Hussein is a dangerous dictator with a history of using 
weapons of mass destruction. i399 Albright faced similar protests at University of 
Arizona. 
Another example of these protests was that of a group of American people from 
the American Friends Service Committee, who went to Baghdad in June 2002 on 
a fact-finding mission. The delegation leader, Peter Lems, told the Associated 
Press: "We are here because our government is unwilling to acknowledge the 
devastating consequence of its policy toward Iraq. " 40° At-Jazeera Television 
broadcasted a report from Baghdad showing how Christmas was being celebrated 
under sanctions. In it, they showed an American Church delegation spending 
Christmas in Baghdad speaking publicly against sanctions and war. 
5) While in the United Kingdom the movement to lift sanctions also gained 
momentum, It was through Labour MPs such as Tony Benn, George Galloway, 
and Tam Dalyell, who were all strong critics of sanctions on Iraq. Galloway made 
several sanctions-busting trips to Iraq and opened an organization for that cause 
called the Mariam Appeal. He was also famous for his trip on a London style 
398 Office of Rep. Kucinich, Press Release, Global Policy Forum, 
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double-decker bus overland to Baghdad to campaign against sanctions. Tony 
Benn called sanctions a "war crime", adding: "we have destroyed the whole of 
Iraqi society. We have killed hundreds of thousands of people with 
sanctions... We are still bombing and Saddam is still there. "40' Dave Nellist, a 
former Labour MP and now leader of the Socialist Alliance group on Coventry 
City Council, also criticized sanctions against Iraq. So did Ian Page, a Socialist 
Alliance Councillor in Lewisham in London, who said: "Sanctions have done 
nothing to eliminate Saddam Hussein... They are not working and should go, " 402 
6) Most important was the role of UN Secretary-Generals in initiating and pushing 
for more compromises on the oil-for-food deal. Boutros Boutros-Ghali was one of 
leading advocates to open channels of communication and initiate trade with 
Baghdad. In his book he recalled "I was also trying to ease the burden of sanctions 
on the people of Iraq. While fighting raged in the Iraq-Kuwait war, the United 
Nations in February 1991 sent a team to evaluate the humanitarian needs of the 
Iraqi people. This mission, led by Sadruddin Aga Khan, proposed the sale of Iraqi 
oil to finance the purchase of 'foodstuffs, medicine, and materials for essential 
civilian needs. ' On the basis of Sadruddin Aga Kahn's report, the Security 
Council adopted Resolution 706 on August 15,1991, authorizing states to import 
Iraqi oil at the rate of $1.6 billion each six months, " Ile added, "From this point 
on, "Oil for Food" became the story of my own quixotic attempt to obtain Iraq's 
approval of this programme. The Iraqi people, not Saddam Hussein's regime, 
were the ones who were suffering under the sanctions. Their jobs had been lost, 
their children's health affected, and their general well-being reduced by the severe 
restrictions imposed on the flow of goods and services into and out of the 
country. "403 
Not only Ghali but also the current Secretary-General of the United Nations Koft 
Annan advocated a similar and sometimes harder line expressing serious concerns 
about the health and general humanitarian situation in Iraq "UN Secretary-general 
Kofi Annan is to recommend an easing of restrictions on imports into Iraq 
4011313 
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because of their impact on the already tottering health care system. "404 A month 
later Annan expressed his dismay at the negative results from the Iraqi experience 
with sanctions "Tragically, it is usually the people who suffer, not the political 
elite whose behaviour triggered the sanctions in the first place. Indeed, those in 
power not only transfer the cost to the less privileged, but perversely often benefit 
from such sanctions, "aos 
Under Annan the oil-for-food programme saw major expansion. His pressure on 
the Security Council to prolong and expand the Programme was instrumental. 
Quite diplomacy and sometimes-public pressure was his methods. For example, 
the UN Secretary-General addressed a dinner of the International Rescue 
Committee in New York and presented his views on sanctions "Increasingly, 
however, the use of sanctions has given rise to concerns. These concerns relate, of 
course, to Iraq, but also to the many other States that are subject of sanctions 
today. What is clear is that we need to improve the effectiveness of sanctions 
regimes if we want this instrument to remain available in the future. " The UN 
chief added "in too many instances, we are witnessing a tragic and unintended 
cycle of events, in which sanctions inadvertently strengthen the hold on power of 
governments or groups whose illegal behaviour triggered them in the first place. 
In turn, the international community reacts by prolonging sanctions, and thereby 
may even be postponing the moment when the changes sought will actually come 
about. It is this "sanctions cycle" that must be broken. " Annan stressed `Too 
often, innocent civilians have become victims not only of the abuses of their own 
government, but also of the measures taken against it by the international 
community. They are, thus, doubly victimized. "40' 
Perhaps the strongest criticism of sanctions from Kofi Annan came when the 
United Nations Secretary-General put it bluntly as he addressed the Security 
Council on March 24`h, 2000: "The Humanitarian situation in Iraq poses a serious 
moral dilemma for this (organization). The United Nations has always been on the 
side of the vulnerable and the weak, and has always sought to relieve suffering, ' 
404 
, 13 March 2000. aos DM, 18 April 2000. 
406 United Nations Press Release, SG/SM/7625, httn; //www. un, nr I, 15 November 2000. 
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yet here we are accused of causing suffering to an entire population. We are in 
danger of losing the argument, or the propaganda war if we haven't already lost 
it-about who is responsible for this situation in Iraq-President Saddam Hussein 
or the United Nations. I am particularly concerned about the situation of Iraqi 
children, whose suffering and, in all too many cases, untimely death, has been 
documented in the report prepared by UNICEF and the Iraqi health ministry last 
year .... We cannot in all conscience 
ignore such reports, or assume that they are 
wrong. "407 
Summarizing the above discussion, the humanitarian dilemma in Iraq presented 
US policy-makers with moral and political realities that they could not escape. It 
also presented the United Nations with a moral challenge that pushed for the de- 
containment of Iraq. Also there were NGO's, churches, and other people's actions 
acting world wide to publicise the emergency situation inside Iraq and thus affect 
world opinion. The moral crisis also helped create and expand the UN "oil-for- 
food" deal, which paved a route of diplomatic and economic engagement with 
Iraq. In sum, the pressure on external actors was immense from NGO's, the 
various UN organs, some pro-Iraqi Security Council members, UN officials, 
Congress and MP's, and religious leaders that left the pro-sanctions supporters 
between a rock and a hard place pushing them to make serious compromises that 
paved the road for more trade and interactions with Iraq and caused its de- 
containment. 
Mention must also be made of the fact that sanctions claimed hundreds of 
thousands of innocent lives, many of them children, while leaving Saddam 
Hussein's regime untouched with his domestic political powers intact and more 
powerful. The ruling powerful elite accumulated more wealth and lived lavishly in 
their big style palaces, while the rest of the country lived in grinding poverty and 
agony. The oil-for-food deal positive effects in the daily lives of the Iraqis were 
hardly noticed, it could not make better Iraq's humanitarian, nutrition, sanitation, 
educational, and health crisis. Even with the oil for food deal sanctions continued 
to cause agony and death in Iraq, targeting its entire population with malnutrition 
407 United Nations Press Release, SC/6834, www. tin. org/. 24 March 2000. 
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and diseases causing immense harm to the social, economic, health and 
educational system. 
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Chapter seven 
247 
7. . UNITED 
STATES AND 
CONTAINMENT 
IRAQ BATTLE 
7.1 Running out of steam on Iraq: the shift to Smart 
Sanctions 
The United States in the past always maintained a firm position against any 
changes or pressures to the sanctions regime. However policy makers in the 
United States realized that global appetite for continuing the economic sanctions 
was not there anymore. 
In a statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, US Secretary of 
State Colin Powell explained the new Bush administration's change of policy: 
"When we took over on the 20th of January, I discovered that we had an Iraq 
policy that was in disarray; it was falling apart. We were losing support for the 
sanctions regime ... (it) was collapsing. More and more nations were saying let's 
just get rid of the sanctions, let's not worry about inspectors; let's just forget it. 
There was all kinds of leakage from the frontline states, or down through the 
Persian Gulf with smuggling of oil. "408 
The United States could not rebuild international consensus on Iraq, could not 
overthrow Saddam, and could not change his political goals or behaviour for 
nearly 13 years. International erosion, and the fading hope of rccnergizing 
sanctions through a new vision of "Smart Sanctions", added to the survival of 
Saddam's regime through the years of sanctions, had given the international 
community the chance to rehabilitate Iraq back to the trading and world 
community. America's foreign policy on Iraq, prior to September 11, proved 
toothless. Only on a few occasions, there was sonic muscle behind their politics. 
The United States did not press for a serious regime change in -Baghdad prior to 
408 Powell explains changes in Iraq sanctions policy, at Budget Bearing before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, 8 March 2001, US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman. 
248 
Bush Junior's accession to the Presidency, despite the rhetoric, and instead opted 
for containment in the hope that this would do the job and might lead one day to a 
silver bullet palace coup in Baghdad. 
The United States, in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, managed to develop 
comprehensive economic sanctions with the support of regional and international 
states. Washington's political influence on international and regional countries 
was very high at that period, as it had won the war militarily against Saddam. 
Moreover, Washington's other success was when it managed, after the Gulf War, 
to engage the region's key actors, including Israel, to sit in Madrid and discuss 
peace and cooperation rather than war. 
It can be stated that sanctions were relatively strong and tight on Saddam in their 
first three to four years. Saddam was weak after the war, and the West was, to a 
large extent, united against him. Russia, for example, managed to win state 
recognition from Iraq that Kuwait was entitled to exist and live near Iraq as an 
independent Arab state. However, the economic sanctions' system and the 
containment policy changed markedly with the appearance of political divisions 
over vital national interests inside the Security Council on Iraq amongst the allies 
and the Gulf War coalition. Economic interests played a big part in encouraging 
UN divisions further. That, of course, helped and resulted in its collapse and 
erosion of the sanctions' regime. New debates, problems, rules, relationships, and 
arrangements have evolved since the 1996 oil-for-food deal that have shaken the 
sanctions' structure and effectiveness to the point of eroding its logic. 
As a result, Iraq's neighbours and European allies questioned the price of 
continuing sanctions. By 1998, a school of thought developed among Arab and 
European diplomats and policy makers that declared that American tough rhetoric 
on Iraq was mainly for domestic and, public consumption-especially that of the 
American public support to the exiled Iraqi opposition-and they viewed the 
longevity of sanctions as economically draining to their companies and that the 
idea of overthrowing Saddam regime was illusionary. 409 
409 Dutch diplomat, private interview with author, Jordan, 2001. 
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It is vital to note here that the Europeans and the Arabs strongly believed that 
improving relations with Saddam and allowing him to engage with the West in 
dialogue and commerce would modify his behaviour. They had a similar view of 
Castro. An idea developed, particularly in France, Russia and the Arab world, that 
it was vital to provide Saddam with an opportunity. The Europeans waved the 
carrot to Saddam. A carrot policy was necessary from the European countries' 
point of view as it could make it easier for Saddam to comply with UN 
Resolutions, whilst at the same time winning commercially lucrative contracts 
from that rich country. 
The international community wanted an alternative to the lingering 
confrontation. They pushed Washington to allow a partial casing of the 
sanctions' regime. The Europeans and the Arabs saw clearly that 
confrontation between Baghdad and Washington did not deter 
Saddam. From their point of view, the American strategy of military 
attacks did not yield anything as Saddam survived all of them. 
Lawrence F. Kaplan highlighted the story of the failure of containing Iraq policy 
in the New Republic: 
America's policy of containment against Iraq-a policy that is leaking 
like a sieve. There is, to begin with, the crumbling UN sanctions 
regime. Iraq currently exports more oil than any other country save 
Saudi Arabia, earns more from oil sales than it did prior to the 
embargo, and has been using those earnings to replenish its military 
arsenal. No one knows how fast that arsenal is growing because of the 
absence of UN weapons inspections. '. -Meanwhile, Saddam Hussein is 
fast being rehabilitated on the international scene.. . The Clinton team 
in early 1999 commenced an internal review of Iraq policy. Saddam 
seemed to win everywhere there was a confrontation, 410 
410Lawrence F Kaplan "America's Iraq Policy Collapses Rollback" The New Republic October 
2000. 
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In a similar vain, both Cortright and Lopez contended: "The major powers had 
difficulty agreeing on a common programme, however, US officials opposed any 
easing of sanctions pressure. Meanwhile, many countries, including members of 
the Security Council, grew weary of the seemingly endless confrontation with Iraq 
and, motivated by a desire to relieve human suffering and resume trade relations, 
called for a lifting of sanctions altogether. "all 
As a result, open disregard for enforcement of the UN sanctions was widespread 
among the big powers and other nations. Consequently, a sanctions' fatigue 
developed and deepened among the international community, which undermined 
Unites States authority and plans for Iraq. The period after 1998 in the Security 
Council saw unprecedented international non-cooperation in sanctions monitoring 
and enforcement "The result was a steady weakening of the political commitment 
to continued sanctions within the Security Council, especially among China, 
Russia, and France, with even Great Britain at times distancing itself from the US 
position. The Council became deadlocked, unable to agree on a plan for resolving 
the current impasse and equally unable to ease sanctions pressures or end the 
sanctions-related suffering of the Iraqi people. "412 
Daniel L. Byman and Matthew C. Waxman confirmed that the containment policy 
led by the United States ran counter to the European and Arab allies' approach 
towards Iraq. There was no common perception on economic sanctions: "Allied 
and international support proved far less consistent than US domestic support and 
posed a major challenge for US policy. Although US allies in Europe and other 
major powers initially strongly supported attempts to coerce Iraq, over time 
France, Russia, and China became increasingly critical of US policy in the region 
and sought to end or curtail sanctions and inspections. Regional allies often did 
not support US strikes on Iraq or sought to limit their extent to avoid criticism at 
home. Lack of consistent regional or allied support undermined the credibility of 
411 Cortright&Lopez (2000) p. 54. 41 r Ibid., p. 57. 
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US threats, encouraged Saddam to defy US ultimatums, and restricted US military 
options, "413 
Domestically and at a special hearing, held nine years after the start of sanctions, 
in the Committee of Foreign Relations in Washington, many Senators criticised 
the Clinton administration's lack of a coherent, comprehensive and long-term 
policy towards Saddam Hussein. Senator Sam Brownback from Kansas declared: 
"Our problem is Saddam. " Later he asked: "My simple question to you is what is 
the Clinton administration's comprehensive plan for Iraq? What are we going to 
do? We are now in 1999. We have been at this for 9 years. There have been 
different strategies followed along the way. I was very hopeful earlier that we 
were moving toward a comprehensive plan and yet now it does not seem like we 
are on that track. " Senator John Ashcroft of Missouri remarked: 
I am distressed by the resignation on the part of too many individuals 
that there is nothing that can be done to address this security threat 
and that we just have to take whatever happens to us. That is the 
absence of policy, not the presence of a coherent strategy to advance 
US national security interests. The continuing exchanges of fire 
between United States warplanes and Iraqi air defence forces have 
made it clear that the threat posed by Saddam Hussein is not going to 
diminish unless aggressive action is taken to undermine his 
government. In that respect I agree with you wholeheartedly that he is 
the problem. Since December Iraq has violated the no-fly zones at 
least a hundred times. Its ground forces have fired 20 missiles at US 
war planes... It is precisely the lack of a consistent strategy to 
encourage a change of government in Baghdad that has cost the 
United States so dearly in the Persian Gulf. Maintaining a US force in 
the region to contain Saddam has cost us over $6 billion in real dollars 
since 1993, with no end in sight. And because policies have not been 
followed to address the real threat, there is little prospect that the 
20,000 troops we keep in the Persian Gulf will return home any time 
413 Daniel L. Byman & Matthew C. Waxman Confronting Tran- J4 Policy and the use of force 
since the Gulf War (National Defense Research Institute RAND, 2000), p. xvi. 
252 
soon. Keeping our forces on the front lines in the Persian Gulf without 
focused and committed political leadership in Washington is a 
disservice to the soldiers and it undermines American credibility 
abroad... Over the last 6 years we have taken the path of least 
resistance in our policy toward Iraq. We supported the opposition 
until Saddam attacked them in 1996. We supported firm containment 
until advocates of appeasement at the United Nations opposed us in 
the Security Council. We condemned Saddam's brutal repression and 
used the strongest rhetoric against his weapons of mass destruction, 
but were more than happy to undermine our own diplomacy to accept 
new promises of compliance by Saddam last fall... It is astounding to 
me that, after more than a year of constant provocation from Saddam 
and in the midst of almost daily live fire exchanges between Iraqi 
forces and US warplanes, the administration agreed in January to 
review sanctions on Iraq and also proposed lifting the caps on the "oil- 
for-food" program. If it were a real review of sanctions it might even 
be different, but `reviewing sanctions' for me is a code word for 
lifting or down grading sanctions... These tactical retreats at critical 
junctures, coupled with a lack of a long-term policy to encourage a 
new government in Baghdad, are the reason that Saddam, I think, is 
stronger today than he was at the end of the Gulf war. 414 
Of equal significance were the thoughts of Judith S Yaphc, a senior research 
professor for the Middle East at the institute for National Strategic Studies, 
National Defense University, Washington, D. C. She contended: "international 
support for a containment strategy on Iraq is proving increasingly difficult to 
maintain. The differences are especially sharp among the five permanent members 
of the UN Security Council-the United States, UK, France, Russia, China-and 
414 United States Policy Toward Iraq. IIearing before the Subcommittee On Near Eastern And 
South Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations. United States Senate, 106th congress, first session, March 9,1999. 
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within the Arab world. " She adds: "Russia, France, and China, however, argue 
against sanctions without end and without incentive. "415 
The diplomatic war actually shifted from all the allies against Saddam to allies 
against allies arguing about how to deal with Saddam, sanctions, and oil deals. 
Yaphe highlighted these differences and the disarray in the UN Security Council 
on Iraq: "US policymakers believe Iraq's objective and behaviour are unlikely to 
change while he is in power. They link Saddam's fate to that of the sanctions, 
saying that only his removal will offer some prospect for change. In contrast, 
Paris, Bonn, and Moscow have concluded that regime change is unlikely and, if it 
were to occur, would produce no shift in policy. These governments argue instead 
that policy change could occur under Saddam, and they are willing to deal with 
him.,, ai6 
Thus, impatience with American policy on Iraq grew among the allies. When the 
Europeans and the Arabs realized that America had gone beyond UN-stated goals 
for sanctions, with Saddam's survival and defiance, his business and oil incentives 
to the world, the world opted to ignore the Americans and started a process of 
opening up to Saddam. Thus, the American containment policy suffered the 
weakening of alliances to keep the sanctions comprehensive, tough and 
worldwide. Tensions amongst the allies reached a point where there was public 
criticism of American foreign policy on Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. US Secretary 
of State Colin Powell saw him self on the defensive, calling on the European 
allies to respect US leadership. Counter criticism from the EU came swift and 
hard. The German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, warned Washington not to 
treat the EU as satellite states: "I do not support anti-Americanism at all, but even 
with all the differences in size and weight, alliances between free democracies 
should not be reduced to following. Alliance partners are not satellites, " while the 
French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine called United States foreign policy 
"simplistic. "417 
415Yaphe (2001), p. 128. 
416 Ibid., p. 129. 417 Reuters, 12 February 2002. 
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There is no doubt that the regime in Baghdad came under immense pressure due 
to the sanctions and the American policy, but the dictator in Baghdad managed to 
stay strong. The sanctions did not lead to any significant domestic political 
changes inside Iraq. The dictator, his associates and family members remained 
politically and economically strong. Sanctions could not weaken any of them. 
Saddam's other power structure, such as the security and intelligence services, 
remained strong too and were able to destroy any opposition and dissent. 
Tim Niblock highlighted another vital point: "sanctions have reinforced among 
the population an image that the government has itself long projected: that of 
external powers scheming to pursue their own interests to the detriment of the 
Iraqi people. A strong perception exists among Iraqis that sanctions are part of a 
long-standing campaign to weaken and divide the Iraqi population and to prevent 
Iraq from playing its rightful role in the region. This is reinforced by reference to 
the imbalance in Western-enforced implementation of different Security Council 
Resolutions. Those Resolutions critical of Israel are not followed up, save to the 
extent that the Israeli government wishes to comply with the, whereas those that 
concern Iraq are implemented in detail. Such perceptions are further reinforced by 
the manner in which sanctions affect all Iraqi citizens, whether or not they are 
linked to the present regime. "418 
According to Mackey, in the end it was the United States who was isolated at the 
UN, the world, and the Middle East region not Saddam: "In truth, the sanctions 
had come to isolate the United States far more than Saddam Hussein. Refusing to 
bend to the suspect West, the master of Iraq increased his standing throughout the 
region. Although the Arabs did not ignore who, and what he was, Hussein's 
esteem was due to his refusal to bow to the mighty United States whom Arabs 
perceived as tending the Israeli oppression of the Palestinians. Beyond the Middle 
East, all who resented the world's sole superpower held their own grudging 
admiration for Hussein's tenacity, The Iraqi president understood this. " 19 
418 Niblock (2001), pp. 186-187. 
419 Sandra Mackey The Reckoning: Iraq and the Legacy of Sadýý ein (WW, W, Norton & 
Company, 2002), p. 372. 
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Giving the trade, oil, moral and strategic factors demonstrated in the previous 
chapters which led to Saddam de-containment, it is then no wonder that the US 
started looking for a new sanctioning strategy in the hope to place Saddam tightly 
back "in his box". The United States and the United Kingdom found themselves 
isolated in the Security Council and the world as whole in their policies against 
Saddam. The comprehensive economic sanctions collapsed. Thus the two powers 
looked for smarter sanctions. However that too failed to materialize. 
David Cortright and George Lopez clearly spoke of the politics in the UN towards 
the Iraq issue: 
One aspect of the recent assertion of power politics has been the shift 
away from what seemed to be a generalized commitment to sanctions 
cooperation among the Permanent Five members of the Security 
Council to a greater tendency by individual nations to use sanctions to 
serve more narrow national interests... Recent years have witnessed 
more pronounced differences among the Permanent Five, especially 
the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia, and attempts to 
dominate particular sanctions episodes 420 
Even though it did not happen, and Iraq, Russia and the Arab countries rejected it, 
it was still vital to understand and sum up the factors behind the initiative United 
States' Iraq policy towards more narrow targeted sanctions. The growing 
unhappiness with the poor results of the comprehensive economic sanctions on 
Iraq was largely the reason behind the introduction of "smart" sanctions as a 
possible idea to salvage what was left of the comprehensive economic sanctions. 
420 David Cortright & George Lopez Sanctions and the-Search for Security L Chad enges to Ih 
AqLton (Lynne Rienner, 2002), p. 6. 
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Seven factors explain why the US policy shifted from a comprehensive sanctions' 
regime to an initiative of more targeted sanctions: 
1. The United States strategy toward Iraq had failed to contain completely or 
overthrow Saddam. The Washington Post quoted the US Defence 
Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld as saying that the international economic 
sanctions and the no fly zones had all failed to contain Saddam. The 
Defence Secretary also admitted that international traders eroded 
sanctions. Containment did not do the job according to Rumsfeld: "There 
is no way any reasonable person could look at that record and say that it's 
(containment) worked, it hasn't worked. o9421 
2. Economic sanctions have had a devastating impact on a largely blameless 
powerless civilian population. Innocent Iraqi women, children and elderly 
were suffering and dying as result. The sanctions became the source of 
hardship for ordinary Iraqis. Sanctions became an instrument for disaster, 
while the Iraqi regime was left untouched. Internationally this resulted in 
the erosion of support for the embargo against Iraq. A strong international 
activist network emerged in the West and the Arab world, campaigning 
against sanctions. Therefore, the United Nations and the United States 
came under constant moral pressure to change its policies towards Iraq. 
3. Iraq succeeded in destroying UNSCOM. The UN inspectors were lied to, 
misled, and obstructed. Saddam even humiliated the United States by 
expelling American members of UNSCOM only and exposed evidence to 
the world that the UN team were spying to the advantage of the American 
and the Israelis. This shook UNSCOM, USA and UN credibility in the 
Arab world in particular and the international community in general. By 
losing UNSCOM as the eyes and cars of the West in Iraq, the United 
States lost its ability to monitor and verify Saddam's weapons 
programmes. It was clear that sanctions could not push Iraq to comply 
with UNSCOM or the subsequent UN/US demands to readmit them back, 
421Bradley Graham "Containment Has Not Eased Iraqi Threat, Rumsfeld Says" Wshington Post. 
Saturday, August 10,2002; p. A05. 
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including the new replacement to UNSCOM, the so called UNMOVIC 
(United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission) 
which was established by the Security Council Resolution 1284, and 
adopted in December 1999. Iraq thus succeeded in resisting for four years 
any pressure to accept and allow the new UN commission for monitoring 
and disarming Iraq's WMDs. There was no doubt this very situation 
created an additional dilemma for the Security Council, who remained 
divided for many years on how to reach a Resolution to the crisis. Many 
started calling for bargaining with Saddam, and others called for lifting of 
sanctions altogether. This only added more political pressure on the United 
States and the United Kingdom in the UN. 
4. Economic Sanctions were becoming unsustainable. With Arab and 
Western countries and companies flouting the sanctions, not only on a 
moral basis but also on the basis of their commercial interests, the 
sanctions' regime was falling apart. The basis for flouting the sanctions 
was strengthened by the need for Iraqi oil in world markets. Commercial 
interests pushed the Europeans and Arabs to pursue a different strategy 
from that of the Americans towards Iraq. In a nutshell, the Europeans and 
Arabs maintained a profitable relationship with Iraq with a substantial 
diplomatic presence. The EU and many other countries started calling for 
an engagement policy in which political and economic incentives, 
including the total removal of sanctions, were the core principles. 
Washington was not able to persuade most other nations including its 
traditional European friends that Saddam must be removed or even be 
placed under sharper economic penalties. This all added to Saddam's 
internal strength, as he appeared in front of his people to be winning the 
war of sanctions despite all the odds. 
5. Saddam remained defiant and entrenched-in power, and succeeded to 
counter possible strong internal threats to his regime. This was further 
evidence that he' portrayed sanctions as an external threat that only 
weakened his people. This presented the world with the grim picture that 
Saddam was there to stay-and the world had no choice but to deal with 
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him. Sanctions also failed to enhance democracy or human rights in Iraq 
or even generate a strong internal opposition to Saddam's rule. 
6. After more than twelve years and dozens of confrontations with the United 
States, in addition to the regional developments of the Middle East, 
particularly with respect to the Palestinian Intifada, Saddam succeeded in 
portraying a perception among the Iraqis and the Arabs that the outside 
world especially the United States and Israel, was trying to subvert Iraq 
and harm Arab and Islamic interests. Saddam used the Palestinian issue in 
that regard. He claimed that they were subjected to America's military 
retaliation and economic sanctions because his regime subscribed to a pure 
and genuine national and pan-Arab project for Iraq, Palestine, and the 
Arab world. Thus with every confrontation, the United States was seen as 
powerful country trying to avenge and strike an Arab nationalist regime. In 
addition to the large trade and illicit smuggling, all which helped in 
rehabilitating Iraq back to the Arab fold. 
7. The Iraqi regime had not moved toward accepting any of United States' 
major demands. Instead, Saddam always stayed defiant and looked for 
confrontation all the time. Thus, the sanctions' regime had clearly not had 
its desired effect of changing Saddam behaviour, even when was coupled 
with military threats and actions like Desert Fox attack on Iraq in 
December 1998. 
The United States found itself caught between collapsing sanctions and 
international moral and business pressure to lift sanctions altogether, The United 
States wanted to reenergize once again a large international participation and 
agreement on Iraq's policy, So they came up with a new alternative to the 
comprehensive economic sanctions: "Smart" sanctions -a more targeted form of 
sanctions that focused strongly on arms and weaponry and allowed more legal 
trade in civilian goods. The new approach also called for the frontline states, i. e. 
Turkey, Syria, Iran and Jordan, to monitor. their borders more strongly against 
smuggling goods and oil from and to Iraq. Thisýwas. to be done through allowing 
more UN troops to be stationed along each sovereign state's borders to implement 
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the smart sanctions. In other words, without the frontline states' full and true 
cooperation, smart sanctions would fail. The United States wanted, through the 
new sanctions initiative to tighten the land and sea borders, destroy Saddam's new 
smuggling networks, and improve its tarnished public diplomacy. 
However, Ankara, Damascus and Amman strongly rejected the smart sanctions' 
plan, while Russia, who had taken the lead in opposing the proposal at the UN, 
threatened to use its veto power against smart sanctions in the Security Council. 
They saw little benefit in having the UN to monitor strictly again their new trade 
and commercial gains with Baghdad. They saw this as American meddling in 
their national and economic interests, especially when Baghdad numerously 
threatened any neighbouring country that complied with an immediate cut in their 
special trading status and also in oil supplies. They also saw this as replacing their 
demands to put an end once and for all to sanctions, and they viewed the smart 
sanctions plan as a way to keep sanctions on Iraq permanently, thus harming their 
current and future trade, oil deals, and commercial relations. 
Despite many discussions and negotiations with such countries as France, Russia 
and Turkey, not to mention much of the Arab world, all efforts to convince them 
to tighten their border controls and drastically reduce their trade with Saddam had 
failed. Therefore, the US and UK decided to compromise on their original smart 
sanctions plan, having failed to achieve their objectives and particularly that of 
border controls. Thus the original context had to change. Only after that they 
reached a compromise with Russia, a staunch ally of Iraq and one of the five 
permanent members of the UN Security Council, who was continually calling for 
suspensions of sanctions altogether. This new plan did not have the border 
controls' issue mentioned in it at all. This was very significant as the borders 
remained porous and illegal trade and oil smuggling remained thriving. Moreover, 
the political and strategic ties between the neighbouring countries and Iraq were 
not curtailed by that move either, 
Ironically however there was concessions to Saddam and the trade lobby in that 
agreement, the new sanctions' system approved and advocated for the first time 
the speeding up of approval of civilian goods contracts in the UN so that they 
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could reach Iraq more quickly, while evaluating separately dual use goods - goods 
that can be used for civilian and military use at the same time. The new proposal, 
which was accepted and passed by all the Security Council members, lifted 
restraints on Iraq's imports of civilian goods but hoped to tighten controls on the 
inflow of materials that could be used for military purposes through the dual use 
goods list, to do that, they enshrined a new list of 300 pages (dubbed GRL or 
Goods Review List) listing all the goods that had dual uses. UNIMOVIC and the 
IAEA experts would evaluate these goods. Goods, which were not on the list, 
would only need a 10-day review by UN officials before being able to go to Iraq. 
This all was passed unanimously on 14 May 2002 in a new UN Resolution 
422 1409. 
Colin Rowat, from the University of Birmingham, UK, wrote in the Middle East 
Economic Survey, describing the Security Council Resolution 1409: "The 
principle innovation of the Resolution is to move some control over the approval 
of Iraqi imports from the 661 Iraq Sanctions Committee-the Security Council 
members-to UN weapons experts. Prior to the GRL, 661 Committee members 
scrutinized all contracts (except those containing only 'green list' items) to 
determine whether they contained `dual use' items. Now, UNMOVIC and the 
IAEA-the weapons' experts-rule on this, with the 661 Committee only reviewing 
applications if the experts find that they contain items on the GRL. '423 Yet US 
and UK diplomatic pressure failed to secure Security Council acceptance for the 
smart sanctions proposal. The Economist wrote: "For once, Saddam Hussein can 
justly declare victory. His mortal foes, America and Britain, had been plotting to 
tighten the 11-year siege of his regime by making United Nations sanctions 
"smarter". But the threat of a Russian veto at the Security Council scuppered 
months of inter-continental haggling. This week, the old "dumb" sanctions were 
extended unchanged. The smart ones may now be sunk for good. " The Economist 
added: "More happily for Iraq's rulers, the prolonging of the current system 
preserves the breaches they have systematically poked through the sanctions wall. 
The growing gaps sustain a thriving underground trade which, together with 
422 United Nations Resolution 1409, 
www. tradcprism. com/library/pups/docslsanctions/Traa/iQ040'= 
413 Colin Rowat "Iraq Sanctions' Saga Continues" Middle East Economic Survey 11 June 2002. 
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kickbacks and surcharges in some legal contracts, is by now thought to be worth 
about $3 billion a year. This is still far less than the $18 billion that earned last 
year from its legal oil sales. "424 
The problem remained: Iraq's borders and illicit trade were not hindered by this 
new system. It is very vital to note here that the United States was unable to get 
frontline states' cooperation on border control and curtailing illicit trade, 
smuggling routes, or even downgrading their trade volumes with Baghdad, which 
instead continued to increase and grow in billions of dollars. All in all, the search 
by the United States for a new form of sanctions, and specifically the talking of 
making sanctions smarter, proved that the old sanctions' regime was dead and 
ineffective. 
Thus, Cortright and Lopez conceded that the American and the British had no 
other choice but to make further concessions to rescue what was left whilst hoping 
that they could rebuild tight sanctions and consensus on Iraq again by introducing 
the concept of smart sanctions: `By the fall of 2000, US and British policymakers 
recognized that the sanctions policy in Iraq had reached a crisis point and that 
major change would be necessary. " 425 However, the opportunity for the 
strengthening of sanctions' policies vanished by Russian rejections and threats of 
veto, and France's defiance of an outright Anglo-American dominated world. A 
long term stalemate was the result in the Security Council on Iraq. 
The region refused smart sanctions. Why should they not? According to Cortright, 
Millar and Lopez: "the general deterioration of compliance with the existing UN 
sanctions among some member states and frontline countries makes any plan for 
the adoption and implementation of restructured sanctions an uphill struggle. 
Because the rewards of providing illegal goods and technologies to the 
government of Iraq are high, no system of military and dual-use isolation will be 
fully adequate. "426 
424 "Sanctions On Iraq: Smart Exit" The Economist 7 July 2001, 
42$ Cortright & Lopez (2002), p. 34. 
426 David Cortright, David Millar & George Lopez (eds. ) Smart Sanctions- Targeting Economic 
Statecraft LRowman and Littlefield, 2002), p. 221. 
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However, an event never crossed the mind of the best strategists and policy 
makers occurred on the I Ith of September 2001. The terrorist attacks in the United 
States of America were an awful human tragedy; at the same time, they changed 
the game of international relations and affected the Iraq case heavily. Since then 
the US viewed Saddam as a great danger to their national and security interests 
because of mounting challenges to its Iraq policy and the erosion of economic 
sanctions. This had been increased by the failure of the containment policy and 
the comprehensive economic sanctions, and the lack of weapons' inspectors on 
the ground. From a US view, Saddam had to go and his weapons had to be 
monitored and disarmed. The coming two sections will explore how Iraq's friends 
at the UN and the Arab region fought hard to not grant the US legitimacy for an 
attack to change the regime in Baghdad in order to keep the status quo where they 
were benefiting from trade and oil concessions from Baghdad. 
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7.2 September 11 and the sanctions dilemma 
The 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States pushed the American administration 
to formulate a new world strategy towards difficult states. "We have reached a 
point in history when the margin for error we once enjoyed is gone.. . the cost of 
underestimating the threat is unthinkable, " US Minister of Defence, Donald 
Rumsfeld told a EU Security Conference. 427 Understandably, America could not 
afford to sit on the sidelines any longer. They saw the sanctions on Iraq 
collapsing, nations trading and engaging with Iraq reaching in many ways the 
levels of that of before 1991 Gulf War; at the same time, the weapons' inspectors 
were absent from the ground for four years. This all required a new world and a 
new deal. Saddam was no longer the weak man whose job was only to keep Iraq 
united until a palace coup could take place. He had to be removed in the eyes of 
the Americans. Washington started to re-examine its traditional approach to 
difficult states including that of Iraq. They found out that sanctions had collapsed, 
and that Saddam was trading more freely and smuggling out side UN eyes. They 
realized that Saddam had managed to build strong obstacles for the American 
agenda in the UN through the Iraq's friends, which even threatened to use the 
veto. This lobby also had different economic and strategic interests to America, 
and they also noticed that the sanctions had created world-wide sympathy for Iraq, 
which had been inspection-free for more than four years. 9/11 was thus a big 
turning point in the relations between Iraq, America and the United Nations. 
The 9/11 attacks disturbed the balance of power in the UN between the pro-Iraqi 
lobby and the United States, and made the US seek a bolder solution to the Iraq 
issue. Under this new American policy, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea were placed 
under what the American called the "axis of evil". From the second day after 9/11, 
the Bush administration and the American media started considering Iraq a target 
of any American response to change the status quo and regain the balance of 
power. For more than a year and half, discussions and debates ensued in the US, 
UN, and other quarters in the world. During this time, the United States was 
urging for a more coercive strategy towards Saddam's regime, in what was later 
427 BCC, 8 February 2003. 
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known as the Bush pre-emptive doctrine. Almost all the UN members expressed 
dismay and doubts about the wisdom of this new doctrine. The American 
administration faced constant challenges to and refusals of this doctrine, 
especially against the unilateral action and regime change elements of it. 
The American administration also faced wide negative public opinion in the forms 
of large demonstrations in the United States itself, the United Kingdom, Italy, 
Turkey etc... The pro-Iraqi lobby inside the United Nations pushed the United 
States-who were thinking of an immediate pre-emptive unilateral action against 
the possible threat of Saddam's WMDs-to listen to the international demands of 
dealing with the sensitive subject of Iraq in a more diplomatic and peaceful ways. 
The United States therefore agreed to walk the extra mile and work through the 
United Nations Security Council to formulate a strategy towards Iraq's weapons 
of mass destruction. 
Nevertheless, the United States accused the United Nations of incompetence 
towards the Iraq issue, by acknowledging that, for the first time, the UN had failed 
to isolate and weaken the Iraqi regime. President Bush spoke to the UN General 
Assembly, stating: 
Delegates of the General Assembly, we have been more than patient. 
We've tried sanctions. We've tried the carrot of "oil-for-food", and 
the stick of coalition military strikes. But Saddam Hussein has defied 
all these efforts and continues to develop weapons of mass 
destruction.. Iraq has answered a decade of UN demands with a 
decade of defiance. All the world now faces a test, and the United 
Nations a difficult and defining moment. Are Security Council 
Resolutions to be honoured and enforced, or case aside without 
consequence? Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its 
founding, or will it be irrelevant?. :, The purposes of the United States 
should not be doubted. The Security Council Resolutions will be 
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enforced. The demands of peace and security will be met-or action 
will be unavoidable. 428 
The call from the American President to the United Nations to act on its 
responsibilities and enforce its own Resolutions demanding Iraq's disarmament 
came twelve years too late. 
Application of pressure and trade offs started pouring from the United States on 
the UN members to gain their compliance. This can be seen reflected in Bush 
statements to Russia's NTV television "We fully realise that Russia has economic 
interests in Iraq, as do other countries, of course, and these interests will be taken 
into account. "429 However, this did not work, as will be clear from the preceding 
sections. In sum, the de-containment that resulted in the collapse of the 
multilateral comprehensive economic sanctions on Iraq before September 11 was 
problematic and a blow to the US efforts to keep effectively Saddam "in his box"; 
The US found itself increasingly more isolated on Iraq. However, after the 
terrorist attacks in Washington and New York, America and the world were 
entering the new millennium with new enemy and a new threat. Thus, the post- 
September 11 environment witnessed a more assertive America foreign policy. 
After eliminating the direct threat of the terrorist's bases in Afghanistan, America 
moved immediately to the collapsing sanctions on Iraq. It first tried to place 
immense pressure to make other nations cooperate to reenergize sanctions and 
push Saddam to fully cooperate however, the US realized that these efforts were 
not successful to bring again as in 1991 a multilateral cooperation to contain or 
remove Saddam from power. 
The sanctions had collapsed, Saddam was not contained, his regime was not 
changing his behaviour or even collapsing, and the world resented America's Iraq 
policy. It was difficult to fashion a multilateral consensus similar to that found by 
428 President's Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly. Pros "l as , Office of the Press Secretary, The White House. www, whtchousö, cov/ncwoIrelciscS/20021, September 12, 
2002. 
429 Reuters, 21 November 2002. 
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the US in 1991. Thus the only best way for the United States of America to best 
advances its objectives of eliminating a regionally and internationally 
rehabilitated Saddam was through his ouster from power through a large scale 
military invasion. 
7.3 Resolution 1441: Security Council showdown 
After long debates and many compromises, France, Russia, the Arab world and 
the United States reached a deal. All these nations, and after more than eight 
weeks of heated debates, agreed on a compromise in the form of a new UN 
Resolution: Resolution 1441. The pro-Iraq lobby at the UN knew that they could 
not practically stop America from unilaterally attacking Iraq, but they tried to put 
the breaks on that American drive. They had hoped that Saddam would help their 
argument by complying fully with UN demands. The only hope for them was 
through placing more constraints on the Americans inside the UN. 
Even though initially the American decision to work with the international 
community on Iraq drew a positive reaction from the permanent members of the 
Security Council, France proposed-and was later supported by Russia, Germany 
and China- a two-step plan for resuming inspections, backed by the threat of 
heavy consequences if negative compliance came from Baghdad. The Bush team 
initially rejected that idea, but had to agree on the two-step plan later as France 
and Russia remained adamant. They opposed the immediate use of military force 
if Iraq violated or obstructed the UN weapons inspection force. Thus, a 
compromise was reached through Resolution 1441, which obliged the United 
States to go back to the Security Council and, discuss any violation from Iraq 
before deciding on using the military option. Iraq's friends inside the Security 
Council maintained that only the Security Council and not the United States could 
decide what punishment should be inflicted on Iraq should it fail to comply. 
Also it remained vague as to what would constitute non-compliance. "Any actions 
bypassing the UN Security Council should be regarded as a violation of 
international law, " said Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Yury Fedoto, warning 
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the United States not to use 1441 as a Resolution for war. 430 China and France 
too wanted to see the Iraq issue settled within the framework of the United 
Nations. When the United States wanted to include Iraq's shooting at 
American/British warplanes in the no fly zones as a violation of Resolution 1441, 
France, China, Russia and even Britain, and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan all 
objected and considered it a non-violation to Resolution 1441. 
Another example of the power of the pro-Iraqi lobby at the UN was shown in the 
thorny issue of the declaration that Iraq must submit to the UN on its inventory of 
weapons of mass destruction. President Bush said, "Should he again deny that 
this arsenal exists, he will have entered his final stage with a lie, and deception 
this time will not be tolerated. Delay and defiance will invite the severest 
consequences. " However, UN diplomats from the Security Council members 
believed this should not be enough by itself to trigger a war, 431 Saudi Arabia's 
Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal said "The Arab states have done all they can to 
diminish the threat of war and Iraq has agreed to the coming of inspectors, " He 
added that: "The matter logically suggests that the spectre of war has been 
distanced. " His Lebanese counterpart, Mahmoud Hammoud, said: "Who can 
prevent the United States from striking Iraq? Not me and not you, " He added "But 
the Resolution created a framework for dealing with the issues of Iraq, and it 
remains the basis. "432 
The French President, Chirac, said on 22"d November 2002 that it was not for 
President Bush to decide or define what would be a violation by Yraq. 433 The 
Russian President Putin, who demanded President Bush to stay within the 
parameters of the 1441 Resolution and not to act alone, echoed the same 
sentiment. 34 Thus, one can conclude that UN Resolution 1441 opened the door 
for a political solution, when it insisted that only the UN could decide whether 
Iraq had made a breach of the UN Resolution or not and what consequences to 
take right after. This Resolution was widely seen as a declaration for peace with 
430 AE , 15 November 
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the hope from the Iraqi lobby of putting war further away. However, this 
remained in the hands of Saddam to cooperate fully with the Resolution. What 
constituted a breach and who decided that and how to react to it were questions 
that were lingering, even after the Security Council had accepted the Resolution. 
Also, the wording of the Resolution's original draft was amended three times in 
the eight weeks of discussion. The policy differences and divergence in interests 
and tactics between the United States of America on the one hand, and that of the 
European Union, Russia and, to a lesser extent, the Arab world and China, had 
reflected itself clearly again in that Resolution. Once again, Iraq became the battle 
ground between the big five and other UN members for shaping the strategy for 
the new world order after 9/11. 
In a surprise move, Saddam accepted the Resolution, placing the United States in 
political trouble by delaying its plans even further to overthrow him, giving him 
more time to manoeuvre but also giving the pro-Iraqi lobby inside the UN a 
significant political boost to continue putting on the brakes to any American 
military plans. 
Almost immediately the rewards came for Saddam from two big nuclear powers 
on the international scene, which were trading with Iraq extensively: Russia and 
India. They warned against unilateral US use of force against Iraq at a unique 
meeting between Russian President Putin and Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee, 
who declared "Both sides strongly oppose unilateral use or threat of use of force 
in violation of the UN charter as well as interference in the internal affairs of other 
states. " 435 
International civil society groups also played a key role in mobilizing the street 
against war as they did against sanctions. Huge demonstrations on the 28 
September 2002 took place, when some 200,000 marched in London to protest a 
potential attack on Iraq while similar demonstrations were held in Italy, Germany, 
Australia and even the United States. 
435 Reuters, 4 December 2002. 
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The Pew Research Centre, based in Washington, found that the majority of the 
French, Germans and Russians totally objected to a new Gulf War, while they 
found out that the United Kingdom were divided on that issue, At the same time, 
they found that 83% of Turks were opposed to any possible Turkish government 
approval of the use of its bases by American troops for any Iraq attack. This report 
of course only reflected even further the transatlantic differences. 436 Saddam saw 
this anti-war movement building up around the globe and it gave him another 
reason to accept 1441 to further fuel this movement against the war. fie said on 
December 22nd 2002: "The world should tell America now there is no need for 
more aggression and sanctions on Iraq in order to let it cooperate freely (with the 
UN).,, 437 
After more than 24 days on the ground and more than 130 suspected sites visited 
with nothing found, Saddam went further with his surprises with a motive to 
embarrass the Americans even more and give more ammunition to his friends in 
the UN Security Council notably France, Russia, China, by openly inviting CIA 
agents to come inside Iraq and freely guide the UN weapons' inspectors to the 
suspected sites if they wished. 438 The United States refused the offer and said that 
Saddam should respect instead all UN Resolutions. 
436 Julian Borger "Bush Fails to Win Over Sceptical Europeans" The Guardian 5 December 2002. 
437 Reuters, 22 December 2002. 
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7.4 Four months later: no choice but war 
This thesis explained how and why containment in the form of comprehensive 
sanctions was no longer effective. Thus, the United States, after 12 years of 
failures, was left with few good policy options regarding Iraq. The option of a pre- 
emptive strike to topple Saddam, with the hope that they could rebuild Iraq back 
and provide prosperity and peace for its people and the entire region was the only 
option. Bush realized that the previous American administrations had failed to 
contain or overthrow Saddam's regime or even to make him comply with all his 
obligations under the UN sanctions' Resolutions. They had also been unable to 
break the formidable pro-Iraqi lobby inside the UN, and they realised that 
containment, as a policy, had failed. Thus after 9/11, the US needed to take a 
different approach: the military option to overthrow and disarm Iraq once and for 
all. This section account for how the last few months before the war saw greater 
divisions between the allies on Iraq. The failure to maintain a united and effective 
containment on Iraq during the sanctions years had reflected itself in the power 
struggles in the UN on Iraq. 
Simply, while the world enjoyed good relations with Baghdad, the United States 
could not live with an "Un-sanctioned Saddam" who had successfully traded with 
the world and had made further diplomatic gains. They could not live with 
Saddam enjoying all these economic and political advances with the UN weapons 
inspectors' absence from the ground in Iraq for four years. They had no other 
choice: they had to take action or live with the status quo mentioned throughout 
this thesis. 
The game of placing obstacles in front of the US drive to remove Saddam from 
power continued. The Iraq-trade partners as well as the NGO's and civil societies 
through organizing demonstrations around the world played a big role to buy 
Saddam some time with the hope of avoiding war. France, Russia, Germany, 
China, India, Belgium, Austria, Sweden, Greece, Finland and the countries 
making up the Arab world, with the very exception of Kuwait, have all lobbied 
against war and regime change in Baghdad. The French Foreign Minister 
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Dominique de Villepin made this clear: "Some American analysts have this idea 
of a virtuous circle-we'll intervene military in Iraq and, by magic, the region's 
problems will calm down.. . That's not the idea we have. " The Greek Foreign 
Minister, George Papandreou, remained adamant against the American quest to 
change the regime in Baghdad: "I am sceptical of those that say that imposing 
democracy and changing the regime in Baghdad can solve the issue not only there 
but in the wider Arab world. "439 The Belgian Prime Minister, Guy Verhofstadt, 
asserted that his country was not in support of any war that was for the sake of 
changing a regime: "Nobody is really convinced that it should be fought., . order in 
this world should be based on unilateral action but on rules agreed on within the 
international community" 440 Reflecting the general European scepticism, the 
European Parliament also had its say through a Resolution "calling on the United 
States not to take unilateral military action against Iraq and instead called for the 
United Nations to find a peaceful solution to the crisis. "441 However, the anti- 
sanctions and war camp did not provide the United States with an alternative that 
could genuinely re-energize the containment policy and the multilateral 
cooperation on Iraq. They simply were happy with the status quo believing that 
rehabilitating Saddam slowly through trade and incentives will ultimately work. 
At the UN, pressure was put on the US to grant more time to the weapons 
inspectors and allow diplomacy a chance for a peaceful Resolution. "The majority 
in the Council is in favour of giving more time to the inspectors, as long as the 
prospect.. . of the disarmament of Iraq through peaceful means exists, we have to 
continue, " said French Ambassador Jean-Marc de la Sablicre. °42 
Saddam was winning the diplomatic battle of stripping the US of its allies to fight 
a war and in delaying that war. Most of the European public and governments 
believed that Iraq's weapons were not a justification for war and that the arms' 
inspection regime under UN Resolution 1441 would be enough to disarm Saddam 
and bring peace without the need for using force. Anti-war sentiment in the 
Council as well as in the street grew heavier by the day. "Key members on the UN 
439 Reuters, 30 January 2003. 
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Security Council said Wednesday that the United States had so far failed to 
convince them that time had run out for a peaceful Resolution to the crisis with 
Iraq. At a crucial council meeting a day after President Bush's state of the Union 
speech 11, of the 15 members supported giving more time to weapons inspectors 
to pursue Iraq's peaceful disarmament. , 443 Even India continued to stand against 
war to topple Saddam: "We have said we are not going to support war (on Iraq). 
This is the principled stand. It has nothing to do with the relations with the US. "444 
Pressure increased from various religious and civil society groups to lift the 
sanctions and prevent a war. Opposition was growing inside the United States 
itself with public demonstrations and many Church leaders stood against any war. 
Bishop Melvin G. Talbert, Chief Ecumenical Officer of the United Methodist 
Church in the USA, said in an anti war advertisement: "Iraq hasn't wronged us. 
War will only create more terrorists and a more dangerous world for our 
children. " This advertisement was paid for by $1 million donated by US 
organizations and celebrities to make the case against war. 445 
The United Kingdom, who was seen by many analysts as playing a moderate 
factor on US enthusiasm to topple the dictator of Iraq, suggested a number of 
ideas, in an attempt to convince the Bush administration to actually seek a second 
UN Resolution after 1441. After Tony Blair met with George Bush on the 31 of 
January 2003, the Guardian newspaper spoke of an agreement to grant reluctant 
European and Arab states the time to come on board and form a coalition of 
nations similar to that of the 1991 Gulf War. "Tony Blair and George Bush 
yesterday agreed to give the UN weapons inspectors and the intelligence agencies 
as long as six weeks to persuade a sceptical France and Arab countries to come on 
board for military action against Iraq. " The newspaper added: "In talks at the 
White House Mr Blair impressed on the Americans that European public opinion, 
including in Britain, will not back "a war without an explicit second UN 
Resolution, "446 
443 AP, 29 January 2003. 
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Showing impatience with the intensifying anti-Americanism amongst EU 
statesman and European public, the Bush administration decided to retaliate by 
calling France and Germany part of the "old Europe" and the arms inspection 
teams as "irrelevant". 
Europe and the regional states had managed to push the United States down the 
road of negotiating for UN Resolution and playing the game of multilateralism. 
However, they also tried to push the US to negotiate a new UN Resolution beyond 
1441. 
Many statements after 1441 reflected the mood in Washington, also indicating 
that the United States wanted to set the rules this time and that diplomatic action 
was closing. "Multilateralism cannot become an excuse for inaction. " Powell 
declared. 447 He even announced: "inspection will not work, " adding, "It's the 
scepticism that we had all along. . . How much longer should inspections go on? 
One month, two months, three months? What will be the difference if they are 
simply trying to get time in order to frustrate the purpose of the inspections? "48 
At the same time, Donald Rumsfeld stated: "The only way the inspectors can find 
anything is if the Iraqi government cooperates and shows it to them. Inspectors 
can't find things. They can only inspect what they've been shown, "449 while Bush 
conceded, "In my judgment you don't contain Saddam Hussein. " 450 
Acknowledging that sanctions and inspections could not attain their goals of 
disarming or weakening Saddam, Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair told 
Parliament, two days after returning from the United States and what was called 
the "war summit": "We are entering the final phase of a 12-year history of the 
disarmament of Iraq. "45' 
On the 14'h February, the Security Council, and with it nearly the entire world, 
listened to Hans Blix's report that spoke of increased Iraqi cooperation with his 
inspections' team and that his team had failed to find weapons of mass destruction 
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inside Iraq. Even worse, he declared that some American information on 
Saddam's weapons was not real and called the weapons' inspectors' findings 
consistent with Saddam's weapons' declaration. Blix's testimony only increased 
the rift inside the Council and added more ammunition to the camp opposing war 
inside the UN and among the masses worldwide. It was another embarrassing 
setback for American diplomacy inside the UN on Iraq. The second day after 
Blix's report, the world demonstrated, with millions taking to the street, placing 
more pressure on governments not to go to war. 
After Blix's report, more than 7 million people took to the streets in one single 
day to protest war in nearly 600 cities around the globe; they were organized by 
various religious groups and NGO's. They were trying to place pressure on the 
Bush administration to delay war and give inspections more time to disarm Iraq 
peacefully. Jack Straw, United Kingdom Foreign Minister, commented on these 
demonstrations: "Yes there was a very, very big demonstration, probably the 
biggest one we've seen in our recent democratic history in London on 
Saturday... We have to take account of public opinion. i452 Opposition to the war 
against Iraq came even from celebrities like Martin Sheen, Mike Farrell, Tim 
Robbins, Rob Reiner, and Barbra Streisand and others, who paid for television 
advertisements against the war. Musicians like Lou Reed, Sheryl, Crow, Massive 
Attack, and REM were against the war too. as" 
The anti-American camp wanted to disarm Saddam peacefully, which, given 
Saddam's nature and track record of cheating the weapons' inspectors and his 
skills in hiding and moving these weapons, seemed incredible. The world 
opposition to the war of liberation seemed to naively play into Saddam's hands, 
allowed him time to manoeuvre with the hope of surviving another day. They 
tended to forget the moral and human grounds of such a war, that would liberate 
the Iraqis-the very people the `peace movement' claimed to be trying to save from 
US bombs-from decades of dictatorship, sanctions, and agony, 
452 1313 , 17 February 
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In another form of pressure on the United States, The EU held an emergency 
summit on Iraq, and decided that inspectors should be granted more time to do 
their job. Unlike in 1991, in 2003 the majority of European and almost all UN 
members' states stood against issuing a green light for the United States to strike 
Iraq. It was very difficult for the US to convince other countries to allow it to 
disarm Saddam by force. The US wanted the UN to declare Saddam in "material 
breach" and none of these countries had given that declaration. Contrary to the 
wishes of the US, these countries actually insisted that inspections were working 
in Iraq and that war was not necessary. The Belgian Foreign Minister, Louis 
Michel, said: "We think the conditions are not there to authorise, to justify an 
American attack, "454 while the Vatican Foreign Minister, Jean-Louis Tauran, 
called any attempt to attack Iraq without UN full support "a crime against 
"ass peace. 
At the same time, German Foreign Minister Joscka Fisher, not convinced by US 
evidence on Iraq, said: "I cannot go to the public and say these are the reasons 
because I don't believe in them. "456 France, a staunch power against a US war 
proposed the strengthening of the inspections teams in Iraq. Their Foreign 
Minister, de Villepin, suggested: "Let us double, let us triple the number of 
inspectors. Let us open more regional offices. Let us go further than this, could we 
not, for example, put up, set up, a specialized body to keep under surveillance the 
sites and areas that have already been inspected? Let us very significantly 
reinforce the capacity for monitoring and collecting information in Iraq. 457 
China was following the projectionist camp too: "it is the universal desire of the 
international community to see a political settlement to the issue of Iraq within the 
UN framework and avoid any war, " 
Jiaxuan 458 
said Chinese Foreign Minister Tang 
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The Russian Federation Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov, again threatened to use his 
country's veto power at the UN Security Council if the US tried to pass a war 
Resolution: "Russia has the right to a veto in the UN Security Council and will 
use it if it is necessary in the interests of international stability... Russia will not be 
in favour of any new Resolution which allows the use of military force directly or 
indirectly to solve the Iraqi issue. s459 Hence, this was the second time Russia 
threatened with the veto to aid Iraq. 
The situation got even worse on the 10th February between the P-5, when the 
United States asked NATO to grant protection to Turkey in case war started, and 
Belgium, France, and Germany used the veto power inside NATO against the US 
request. 460 Two days later, France, Germany and Belgium rejected a scaled-down 
US request to assist Turkey when war started . 
461 Such a division amongst the 
alliance had never been seen since the end of the Cold War. According to Nicola 
Gnesotto, of the European Institute of Security Studies, in Paris "This goes 
beyond bilateral problems. NATO is in trouble. The EU is in trouble and the UN 
is in trouble, " he added, "If the United States goes ahead without a Security 
Council mandate, it wouldn't just be the end of transatlantic relations. It would be 
the beginning of a new world. "462 
After Blix's other report on Iraq, which looked little in favour of Iraq, another 
Security Council meeting ended up dividing the permanent members more: "A 
security Council meeting on Iraq ended in bitter disagreement Thursday with 
Council members unable to agree on basic issues such as a timetable for weapons 
inspectors to report next to the council. Diplomats described a terrible atmosphere 
within the council, which met behind closed doors for four hours Thursday. "463 
On IS` March, to the shock of many, the Turkish parliament rejected the Turkish 
government proposal to allow US troops to attack Iraq from Turkish soil. This 
complicated even further the US push to win UN support for war. And all through 
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March, France and Russia continued to threaten the use of their UN veto power 
against any UN Resolution explicitly or implicitly authorising military action 
against Saddam. 
On the face of it, the United States looked frustrated by the delays and obstacles 
placed by the French, Germans, Belgians, and the Saudi Arabians, and thus 
appeared ready to go it alone. The problem was the absence of what the US liked 
to call "the will of the international community" on Iraq. The international 
community, in fact, was even more divided than ever, both sharply and deeply, 
about any more sanctions on Iraq or regime change in Baghdad. The world had 
looked more worried about "reckless American unilateralism" than Saddam's 
weapons and lack of democracy in Iraq. By early February 2003, the United 
States could not win the argument for war and it looked like Iraq was still able to 
divide the Security Council and world public opinion over inspections, sanctions, 
and regime change, as was the case during the sanctions decade. 
After having 923 inspections carried out across Iraq since their start in November 
2002, and with 180 teams worked for the UN inspection inside Iraq, in addition to 
the U2 surveillance flying above to monitor Iraq's ground and underground 
activities, 464 United States Defence Minister, Donald Rumsfeld declared that 
inspections were dead and stated that it was hard for the inspectors to succeed: 
"Every single thing he does that could be cited as co-operative was after some 
long period of denying, of refusal to do it, and ultimately a willingness to do part 
of it... It is such a reluctant process that it would be take so many years to ever 
really believe you'd done the task of disarming. "465 
On 22"d February 2003, the US president announced that: "Time is short... this is 
chance for the Security Council to show its relevance. "a66 He later stated: "If the 
Council responds to Iraq's defiance with more excuses and delays, if all its 
authority proves to be empty, the United Nations will be severely weakened as 
464 CNN, 9 March 2003. 
465 BBC, 4 March 2003. 
466 
, 
13C, 22 February 2003. 
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source of stability and order. "467 In March he added: "I believe Saddam Hussein is 
a threat to the American people. I believe he's a threat to the neighbourhood in 
which he lives... As we head into the 21st Century, when it comes to our security, 
we really don't need anybody's permission. "468 The United Kingdom, Spain and 
the United States hoped to introduce a Resolution at the UN that would authorise 
them to disarm and overthrow Saddam's regime. At meetings before voting for 
that Resolution, the three powers realized that the majority of the UN Security 
Council members were against removal of Saddam by force and for granting more 
time for UN inspections. 
On the 16`h March 2003, the US, UK, and Spain met in the Portuguese islands of 
the Azores, a meeting which was later known as the Azores Summit. The summit 
declared that it was withdrawing the British-US-Spanish Resolution in the UN 
because of the French and Russian threats of veto. Colin Powell, US Secretary of 
State, referred to the threats of veto by UN member states, said: "it is unfortunate 
that there are members of the council who say `give it more time, give it more 
time' and the inspections are working. " He declared: "the curtain is coming down 
now. We can't continue to go like this. " 469 
However, France, who had campaigned to deny Washington a clear UN authority 
for a war with Iraq and helped block NATO support for Turkey, remained 
adamant. Chirac told the US that his country would veto any Resolution that 
legitimised war with Iraq. He asserted; "Iraq today does not represent an 
immediate threat that justifies an immediate war. "470 France was not alone in 
objecting to war: so were Russia, China, Africa, the Arab world, and Latin 
America members at the UN Security Council. 
After 114 days of inspections and 1000 inspection operations conducted by 
UNMOVIC, the inspectors were ordered to leave on 18"' March 2003 as 
diplomacy failed in the UN. 471 Two days later, operation Iraqi Freedom started. 
467 "Bush's War of Transformation" The Economist, 28 February 2003. 468 CNN, 7 March 2003. 
469 CNN, 16 March 2003. 
470 BBC, 18 March 2003. 
471 Al-Jazeera. net, 18 March 2003. 
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7.5 Summary 
Summarizing the above, one can conclude that US-Iraq policy prior to operation 
Iraqi Freedom had failed to contain, or dislodge Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein 
from power, and compromised a lot to the international community's demands to 
ease sanctions and in turn enhanced the Iraqi despot's standings in Iraq and 
throughout the Arab world. The smart sanctions' vision presented by the US 
policy makers was an admission of the failure of comprehensive sanctions on 
Iraq. International support largely diminished for sanctioning Iraq. Thus, the 
world coddled Saddam with commercial, trade, and diplomatic support. 
Regionally and internationally, governments stood against US efforts through 
smart sanctions to reinvigorate and re-energize sanctions and international support 
on Iraq. Iraq violated UN Resolutions many times and challenged American 
supremacy in the region many times; still, the world did not enforce Security 
Council Resolutions forcefully and stood against any American attempts to do so. 
The implications of these were high on the US policy. Thus, the US was 
convinced, especially after 9/11, that there was no other way but a total invasion 
of Iraq to disarm and overthrow Saddam. However, When the US outlined its 
plans to enforce UN resolutions by force, Iraq's friends- which Iraq managed to 
establish and nurture during the years of the oil-for-food deal- in the UN stood as 
a major obstacle to multilateral cooperation and collective security pushing the 
US to go unilateral. 
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Most Iraqis agreed that Saddam and his sons needed to be removed from power 
quickly and forever. For 23 years, Iraqis lived under tight security controls where 
a culture of fear was in existence everywhere. The regime committed horrific 
crimes against all Iraqis from every ethnic and religious background. 
The international community imposed sanctions, and these made life even worse 
for Iraqi people. The human cost had been enormous. Innocent people had died in 
hospitals because of the lack of medicine, proper equipment, and even the absence 
of simple things like oxygen and injections. The middle and professional classes, 
which were growing in Iraq before the Gulf War of 1991, had been destroyed and 
brought to total poverty. Some 5 million Iraqis, most of whom were professionals, 
had emigrated. Thus it could be argued that Saddam's brutal regime, coupled with 
13 years of economic sanctions, had rendered Iraqis frightened, dependent, 
shattered, and pacified, needing an outside power to stand with them against the 
brutality of the regime, to relieve them of the daily hardship of sanctions, and help 
plant the seeds of a genuine democracy in their land. 
The UN sanctions included Resolutions 687 (1991) and 688 (adopted also in 
1991) that called for the dispatching of Human Rights' inspectors to Iraq to 
investigate the abuses in civil, human, economic, cultural rights of the people of 
Iraq by Saddam's regime. They also called for an end to the repression of the Iraqi 
civilian population, and insisted that Saddam regime had to cooperate with all 
humanitarian groups and organizations. The U. N assembly also passed a 
Resolution on December 2000 with a majority of 102 votes, That Resolution 
denounced the systematic and routine violations by the regime in Baghdad of the 
human rights' of the Iraqi citizens. Even so, no U. N member did anything to 
follow up these decisions and Resolutions. The UN did not follow this vigorously 
or systematically. The Security Council members did not push for the adherence 
to this UN Resolution as forcefully as it had with the Resolution concerning 
weapons' inspectors. This inevitably damaged UN credibility among the ordinary 
Iraqi people who were the very people sanctions and UN Resolutions were 
supposed to help. The EU parliament also issued human rights' decision and 
report in November 2000 and April 2002, demanding investigations of Saddam's 
war crimes and asked for a special tribunal for the regime. However nothing 
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happened on that front. Yet the new Bush administration was the only party ready 
to enforce these Resolutions on the regime when it started its liberation of Iraq 
under operation "Iraqi Freedom" on 20 March 2003. 
In the early 1990s, the UN Security Council, with the support of a broad 
international consensus, subjected Iraq to a comprehensive set of economic 
sanctions. This sanctions' regime was intended to force Saddam Hussein and his 
government out of power, or failing that, to prevent them from exercising any 
kind of significant regional and international influence. 
However, sanctions became more American than UN, as the rest of the Security 
Council members and others in the international community had defected from 
the American hard line stance. Even Kuwait came under immense pressure from 
its other Arab counterparts to relax its hard line policy on Saddam, as all the Arab 
countries opened and restored full ties with Baghdad. Thus, it can be argued that 
the biggest mistake in the past decade was the failure to march into Baghdad 
during 1991, and to change by force the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. This 
failure to promote democracy and human rights in Iraq left him in power for more 
than 12 years after the 1991 Gulf War, during which time, he managed to break 
sanctions and enhance his powers. The Gulf War of 1991 thus was a golden 
opportunity to eliminate the dictator and free Iraq from the misery of Saddam's 
ruthless rule and the agony of sanctions. 
The oil for food deal sewed the seeds of the collapse of sanctions. With more and 
more Iraqi oil being exported, the Security Council division on Iraq policy, and a 
worsening world economic situation, Saddam could afford to take an 
uncompromising line towards UN Resolutions and US demands, and ultimately 
broke the walls of sanctions. The oil-for-food deal opened the door for 
international competition in Iraq and created a potential new market for 
investment and exports. It also created Iraqi-trading partners in favour of Saddam 
inside the United Nations. They helped bring about political and economic deals 
inside the UN to the benefit of Iraq. They helped loosen rather than tighten the 
sanctions on the Iraqi regime. Without the oil-for-food programme, Iraq would 
not have so quickly been rehabilitated back into the world economy and this 
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might have led to a quick collapse of the dictatorship in Baghdad. Thus, the 
programme hastened Saddam political and economic rehabilitation and prevented 
his regime possible collapse due to stricter and more comprehensive sanctions. 
Over the course of this thesis, it has been established that a number of different 
factors and processes had contributed to the failure of the sanctions and the 
current reluctance of the international community to endorse a military action 
against Iraq, or even the creation of a stricter framework of sanctions to contain 
Saddam. This thesis explained how and why containment in the form of 
comprehensive sanctions was no longer effective. 
With respect to Iraq's Arab neighbours, the thesis asserted that security, 
ideological, cultural, and economic imperatives had all played an important role. 
In addition, the terrible suffering of the Iraqi people had been impossible for the 
Arab masses or their leaders to ignore. At the same time, the total collapse of the 
Palestinian-Israeli peace process, and America's failure to respond to Arab 
concerns about perceived increase in Israeli militancy, had caused the Arab states 
to distance themselves from the US and its policy preferences. Instead, they had 
begun to pull closer together, strategically, culturally and economically. Iraq, due 
to Saddam's popular standing with respect to Arab nationalist issues and the 
country's wealth, had been increasingly incorporated into this process. 
Inter-Arab trade with Baghdad also played a great part in the Arab rapprochement 
towards Iraq. By key regional actors trading and politically dealing with Saddam, 
the comprehensive sanctions on Iraq lost its most crucial element of ensuring the 
political and economic isolation by Iraq's neighbours to a long land border. This 
allowed Iraq to rehabilitated back to the strategic reality of the Middle East 
region. Thus, by losing the regional embargo, the sanctions regime lost the 
opportunity to squeeze and maximize the impact on the Iraqi leadership that could 
have helped hasten their capitulation. Instead, Saddam managed to maximise his 
economic and political gains through the oil-for-food deal, and striking free-trade 
deals with the region. Moreover, the region turned a blind eye on its long and 
extremely porous borders that facilitated smuggling of oil and military supplies to 
Saddam. 
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Outside the region, with reference to Russia, France, China and other influential 
countries, the thesis conceded that humanitarian concerns had also been 
important, but proceeded to strongly argue that the primary factors for these states 
had been oil and commerce interests and the Iraqi regime's astute management of 
these significant forces. Saddam's masterful exploitation of the oil-for-food 
programme, combined with Iraq's wealth of resources and its overwhelming need 
for reconstruction, allowed him to attract a host of international business to 
negotiate and sign lucrative business contracts. With the commercial contracts and 
opportunities increased, many countries became advocate of freeing Iraq from 
sanctions. By trading and dealing openly with the world, Saddam was relieved 
from serious international pressure to contain and isolate him diplomatically and 
economically, that wanted to compel him to politically change his behaviour or 
even oust his regime from power. By involving so many states and companies in 
Iraq's present and potential oil and market it was impossible to make sanctions 
multilateral or sustainable. Thus containment was not accomplished, and lost its 
logic, sustainability, and effectiveness. 
Also, the sanctions' years saw the rise of key European powers. Iraq was used by 
some powerful EU members as well as by Russia to challenge American 
leadership and to print its own political and economic identity as a new 
superpower with a distinctive foreign policy. These countries refused to commit 
itself to US demands for Saddam's ouster through tougher smarter sanctions or 
military liberation of the country. They also challenged America's strategy of 
coercive diplomacy based on a continuation of a strict straight jacket on Iraq 
through more targeted sanctions instead they thought they could reform him, thus, 
it was important to appease Saddam and his repressive regime by providing him 
with an opportunity to be reintegrated with the world community through trade 
and diplomacy from these countries perspective. 
The moral dilemma of the humanitarian crisis in Iraq as a result of sanctions was 
haunting the pro-sanctions lobby. The anti-sanctions groups lobbied hard too lift 
sanctions especially the civilian part of it and called for the normalization of 
relations with the Iraqi people. They were concerned for the plight of the Iraqis, 
thus, sanctions for them was a morally unacceptable instrument of foreign policy 
285 
and addressed the crisis in Iraq only from a moral perspective and called for new 
ethical norms to guide the international community and UN work in Iraq and any 
possible future sanctions cases. The various NGO's including that affiliated with 
the UN had created a moral approach to sanctions in Iraq through pushing to 
expand the oil-for-food deal for humanitarian reasons. UN agencies such as 
UNICEF, FAO and WHO had fought the UN imposed sanctions publicly and 
called for its elimination. This boosted Saddam stance at the UN Security Council 
as many of Iraq' friends inside the Council used the humanitarian issue as a 
pretext to enlarge the oil-for-food deal, thus, helped in destroying the logic and 
impact behind the comprehensive economic sanctions. 
The blanket sanctions policy had all but collapsed. In the meantime the US, 
Saddam's chief international opponent, had been unable to raise much support for 
a revised set of "smart" sanctions to deal with Saddam. Therefore, one option 
remained for the United States of America, a sweeping military campaign to alter 
the cheeseboard to America's favour again. 
Iraq got what it wanted - the freedom to travel, to trade, to sell its vast oil reserves, 
and to politically and economically influence the region and in many times the 
Security Council. This was all granted to it through the gradual concessions made 
by the international community to what was essentially a humanitarian 
programme (oil-for-food deal). He even got four years inspections free from- 
December 1998 until November 2002-UNSCOM and its intrusive monitoring 
systems, due to the Security Council stalemate on Iraq. 
The UN Resolution 1441 was a tough Resolution that came too late. This 
Resolution should have been adopted in 1991 instead of the other nearly 50 
Resolutions passed since. If the UN had adopted such a powerful Resolution with 
such a mandate for the inspectors, then the UN would had spared Iraq and its 
people all the suffering and agony of the past twelve years of sanctions. With such 
a mandate to disarm Iraq, the UN could have destroyed and monitored all Iraq's 
weapons as they had clear military backing. If they were faced with any 
obstruction from the Iraqis, the use of force to overthrow Saddam was clear under 
that 1441 mandate. 
286 
Instead, in December 1999, the UN passed a Resolution (France, Russia, and 
China abstention vote) that created UNMOVIC and asked Iraq to readmit the 
inspectors back in return for the suspending sanctions as stated in the 1991 UN 
Resolution paragraph 22 or Resolution 687. The UN also allowed the total lifting 
of the financial ceiling on oil exports under the oil-for-food deal. Iraq could export 
oil to the same level and capacity as before sanctions and the 1991 Gulf War. The 
UN also recommended an increase in funds at around $600 million from the oil- 
for-food programme for the purchase of spare parts and equipment for the oil 
industry. They also created the fast-track process for faster and automatic 
approval of goods to go to Baghdad, as there were many complaints from UN 
member states stating that the Sanctions Committee was slow in the process of 
approval. All these concessions, yet Saddam remained defiant and did not accept 
the inspectors back for four complete years. Nevertheless, in these very four years 
the world increased its trade, commerce and diplomatic relations with Iraq. They 
participated in Baghdad trade fairs and encouraged trade and diplomatic links 
with Iraq. Recalling all this, one can see that the world made one of the biggest 
mistakes in the past century when it decided to appease and deal with Saddam 
rather than participate in eliminating his rule and instituting democracy in Iraq. 
All. in all, the international and Middle Eastern landscape changed from that in 
1990, when sanctions were multilateral comprehensive and tight, while they all 
but collapsed, and become unsustainable. Saddam's regime remained during the 
sanctions years entrenched in power, his political and economic power increased 
domestically and regionally, and his international diplomatic powers and 
economic relations were steadily improving. Thus the United States realized that a 
massive invasion was the only alternative left to contain his powers and remove 
his tyrannical rule once and for all. 
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